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ABSTRACT

The Constitution bestows upon the president the right to make
appointments "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" to
federal posi tiona at home and abroad.

Over the passage of time, through

free use of this power and the implied power of removal, the several
chief executives constructed a vast patronage system, ot which one
primary goal was to reward the party taithf'ul for their services.

The

purpose of this dissertation is to determine how well Andrew Johnson,
the unexpected successor of Abraham Lincoln, used the seemingly powerful
patronage weapon. and the reasons why he used it as he did.
Prior to his elevation to the presidency, Johnson had been a
Jacksonian Democrat with a great faith in the wisdom of the masses of
people.

As such, he had subscribed to the spoils system with its attend

ant principles of loyalty to the party and rotation in office.

There is

little evidence to indicate that he subsequently changed his views,
despite the tact that they were of questionable validity in the unbal
anced postwar political context of

1865-1869.

Andrew Johnson was also a decided individualist, a characteristic
which showed itself on several occasions during his presidential career .
This trait at times overshadowed his political co�victions and, increas
ingly during the course of his presidency, dictated his actions .

Nowhere

was this tact more clearly evident than in his use of the patronage .

As president, Johnson initially was allowed a tree patronage hand,
but as he and the dominant element of the Republican party, the Radicals ;

ii

81:Jl62

iii
increasingly clashed on the issues of reconstruction, the latter moved
to wrest control of the system trom him.
policies, he appealed to the people in the

Seeking endorsement for his

1866

congressional campaign.

Many of his supporters urged that he use the federal patronage to affect
the outcome of the elections , and a number of changes were made, but the
Radicals emerged victorious.

Some observers, both at that time and

later, charged that this result occurred because Johnson misused his
patronage powers , but he probably realized that he could not have changed
the outcome of the elections regardless of how he might have used his
powers of removal and appointment.
Having failed to win popular support for his position, Johnson
then faced the alternative of either turning to the Democratic party and
bolstering it with the federal patronage or becoming politically isolated.
The leaders of that party .both expected and encouraged him to return to
the fold, but the chief executive steadfastly refused to do so.
people had not elected a Democratic president in

1864

The

and Johnson's

integrity and honesty dictated that they were not to receive one against
their will.
While becoming increasingly politically isolated, Johnson sought
to reward those who had remained faithful to him.

Close supporters were

appointed to office, and despite demands from Democrats that changes be
made, he refused to remove loyal cabinet members from their posts.

At

the same time, however, the president would not tolerate disloyalty.
Wh�n his secretary of war proved unfaithful, Johnson, defying Radical
legislative �fforts to secure Edwin M. Stanton in his position, removed

iv
him-from office.

This move led to the chief executive's impeachment

and trial, a process which the Radicals unsuccessfully attempted to turn
into a condemnation of his entire patronage policy.
Both primary and secondary sources were used for this study.
Heavy dependence was placed upon certain manuscript collections, parti
cularly those of Andrew Johnson, Senators John Sherman and Lyman Trum
bull, and Representative Elihu

B . Washburne.

The Congressional Globe,

the United States Senate Executive Journal, and the official account·of
the impeachment trial were also of considerable value.
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INTRODUCTION
Two clauses of the Constitution relate to the subject of execut ive
patronage .

The first provides that the president

shall nominate , and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate , shall appoint Ambassadors , other public Ministers and
Consuls , Judges of the supreme Court , and all other Officers
of the United.States , whose Appointments are not herein other
wise provided for , and which shall be established by Law :
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers , as they think proper , in the President
alone , in the Court s of Law , or in the Heads of Department s . 1
While the Constitution thus gave the president an extensive role
in the process of appointment to federal office , it ·failed to make any
provision for removals .
removals to be made ?

Under what circumstances and by whom were

This question became the center of a prolonged

discussion in·the First Congress when the bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs ( later State Department ) came before that body
in June , 1789 , with the provision that the secretary was " to be removable
by the President . "

During the course of the debate in the House of

Representatives several greatly variant ideas were aired, but the central
issue for the maj ority of the members was whether the right to remove
was an � officio power of the president or an incident of the power to
appoint and therefore to be shared by the president and the Senate .

2

!united States Constitution , Article II , Section 2, Clause 2.
The only restriction placed on this provi sion was that incumbent congress
Ibid. , Article I , Section 6 ,
men could not hold other federal offices . -Clause 2.
·

2v irtually unsupported was the position of William Smith of South
Carolina who insisted that the only provi sion made by the Constitution
1

2
The latter view was presented clearly by Alexander White of
Virginia , who maintained that , since the Constitution divided the power
of appointment between the president and the Senate , "they ought also to
be as soc iated in the dismission from office . "

3

In support of the view,

John Page , a fellow Virginian , gave expression to a thought which undoubtedly also was troubling some of his colleagues .

Arguing that leaving

the power of removal with the president alone would encourage the growth
of an organization of civil servant s loyal to him , Page warned that " conferring this power , so far from making the President more respons ible ,
diminishes his responsibility , and inclines to establish him an independent
monarch . "

4

The chief spokesman for the president ' s right t o remove from
office was James Madison , who had argued in an earlier House discussion
on this subject that to divide the removal power between the pres ident
and the Senate would have the effect of diminishing the president ' s
responsibility for the actions of those officials under him .

5

He now

summar ized his position :

for removal was impeachment , thereby implying that offices were to be
held during good behavior or at least for terms fixed by law. Annals
of Congress , First Congress , 475 . A view receiving some moderate sup
port was presented by Sherman of Connecticut , who maintained that office
was the creation of Congress and therefore within the limits of the Con
stitution could be regulated in any manner Congres s saw fit . Ibid . , 511 .
3
4
5

Ibid . ' 4 73 .
Ibid . ' 5 40- 41 .
!bid . , 387 , 39 4-95 .

3
Vest this power in the Senate jointly with the President ,
and you abolish at once that great principle of unity and
responsibility in the executive department , which was in
tended for the security of liberty and the public good . If
the President should possess alone the power of removal from
office , those who are employed in the execution of the law
will be in their proper situation , and the chain of depend
ence be preserved; the lowest offices , the middle grade , and
the highest , will depend , as they o ght , on the President ,
and the President on the community. �
Events came to a climax on June 22.

The second clause of the

bill was amended to provide that the chief clerk of the department , who
was to be appointed by the secretary and assigned such duties as he saw
fit; would assume temporarily the secretary ' s duties "whenever the said
principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the
United States" or in case of vacancy of that office for
This amendment carried by a vote of 30 to 18 .

any

other reason .

The words "to be removable

by the President" then were deleted from the bill by a vote of 31 to 19 .
These actions implied that the power of removal already rested with the
president , thus making the original wording unnecessary . 7 In this manner ,
the champions of executive removal scored a safe but not overwhelming
victory .
In the Senate , the body most vitally concerned in the matter , the
result was much less decisive . Although not entered for the public record , the debate raged for four days , July 1 5-18 , and finally resulted in
a nine to nine tie . Vice-President John Adams then broke the deadlock
by casting his vote for executive removal . 8
6 Ibid . ' 18 .
7 Ibid. ' 600-8 .
5
8Charles Francis Adams ( ed . } , The Works of John Adams , Second
President of the United States ( 10 vols . , Bostoii':" 18 50-18 56) , I , 449- 50 .

4
This action by Congress , or the 11decision of 1789" as it often
was called , received varied treatment in the judicial opinions of the
first half of the nineteenth century . John Marshall , in Marbury�·
Madison (180 3 ) , tended to favor the view that office was to be held dur
ing good behavior , an opinion soon discarded. 9 While approving of the
association of the Senate with the president in the appointment procedure ,
the American jurist James Kent (1763-184 7 ) was ambiguous on the question
of removal . 10 His contemporary , Joseph Story (1779-184 5 ) , recalling the
early view of Alexander Hamilton , argued that the power to remove was
an incident of and inseparable from the power to appoint and stated that
it "would be a most unjustifiable construction of the Constitution , and
of its implied powers , to hold otherwise . " 11 In reference to the
11inferior Officers" mentioned by the Constitution , Story maintained that
the 11remedy for any permanent abuse is still within the power of Congress ,
by the simple expedient of requiring the consent of the senate to removals
in such cases . " 12
9united States Senate , The Constitution of �United States of
America: Ana1ysis and Interpretation ( Washington , 19 52 } , 4 57- 5 8 .
10James Kent , Commentaries on American Law (9th ed . ; 4 vols . ,
Boston , 18 5 8 ) , I , 30 9-10 .
11Joseph Story , Commentaries £!!.the Constitution of �United
States with �Preliminary Review .2f. the Constitutional HistoTt of the
Colonies and States before the Adoption of the Constitution th ed. ;
2 ¥ols. , Boston , 1873 ) , II , 35 1- 52 . Alexander Hamilton had assumed in
Federalist #77 that senatorial approval would be necessary for removal
as well as for appointment . Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and
John Jay , The Federalist Papers (Mentor ed . ;New York , 1961 ) , 4 59 .
12 story , Commentaries , II , 6 . The majority decision of the
35
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Hennen (1839 ) seemingly tended to support

5
The other clause of the Constitution pertaining to presidential
patronage states:

"The President shall have Power to fill all vacancies

that may happen during the Recess of the Senate , by granting Commissions
1
which shall expire at the End of their next Session . " 3
The key word in this statement was "happen . " As early as 1823 ,
the attorneys-general were interpreting it to mean "happen to exist" and
such was the meaning which generally came to be accepted. 14 The implication of this interpretation could be quite far-reaching . A person
appointed to any office by the president would be entitled to hold that
office until the expiration of the next session of the Senate . A vacancy
then would "happen to exist" and there was nothing to prevent a president , if �e so chose , from reappointing the individual .

There was also

the possibility that the chief executive could fail to submit a name at
all and simply fill the vacancy after the expiration of Congress , thus
1
completely nullifying the Senate 's power . 5
Story ' s contention in that it commented , "But it was very early adopted ,
as the practical construction of the Constitution , that this power [ of
removal ] was vested in the President alone . And such would appear to
have been the legislative construction of the Constitution." Richard
Peters , Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in� Supreme Court of the
United States : January Term, 1839 ( Philadelphia, 18 39 ) , 259 . The impli
cation apparently was that Congress had the right to change the said
construction at any time .
13united States Constitution , Article II , Section , Clause 2 .
2
.
14Senate
, The Constitution , 4 55 .

1 5 carl Russell Fish , The Civil Service and the Patronage ( Cambridge ,
1904 ) , 192 . Although he frequently pursued the first alternative as out
lined , not even the hard-pressed Andrew Johnson was inclined to follow
the latter course . The possibility , however , supplied excellent grist
for alarmists mills .
1

6
The first six presidents of the United States tended to pursue
patronage policies which were remarkably uniform.

The aristocratic

George Washington ( 1789-1797 ) and John Adams ( 1797-1801 ) believed that
the government should be

by the affluent and that the best families
should encourage their most capable sons to enter public service . 16
run

Appointments to office were made on the basis of such considerations as
personal integrity, community standing, and place of residence . 17 Few
removals were made by the two and most of those made were for such
things as neglect of duty or mismanagement of public fUnds . Although as
early as 1792 there was emphasis upon the importance of political conformity in the filling of vacancies, Washington apparently made no
removals and Adams very few on the basis of political considerations . 18
There was a sharp increase in removals from office during the
early part of Thomas Jefferson ' s administration .

Inheriting a civil

service completely dominated by Federalists, the Republican Jefferson
felt it necessary to make changes in one-fourth of those offices where
appointment by the president and confirmation by the Senate was required. 19
16Fritz Morstein Marx (ed . ), Elements of Public Administration
( 2nd ed . ; Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , 1959 ), 18 . -l7Leonard D. White, The Federalists : A Study in Administrative
History, 1789-1801 (New York, 1948}, 25 7-68 . The stress on place of
residence meant an attempt at geographical apportionment for the more
important national offices and local residence for lesser positions .
18 Ibid. , 71-78, 71-78, 84-8 , 87 .
2
2
2
5 2
l9o . Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration ( th ed. ; New
5
York, 196 2 ), 3 0 .

7
Following this transition period, Jefferson and his three immediate
successors--James Madison ( 1809-1817 ), James Monroe ( 1817-1825 ), and
John Quincy Adams ( 1825 -1829 )--while confining their choices for office
to adherents of the Republican party , generally followed the practice of
their Federalist predecessors .

Being of much the same social class,

they too apparently tended to confine their appointments to the better
classes .

Like them also, they emphasized integrity, respectability, and

the importance of geographic apportionment and local residence in the
filling of public offices . 20
The elevation of Andrew Jackson to the presidency in 1829 witnessed the introduction of a quite different patronage arrangement, a
scheme which was to become known as the spoils system. Jackson himself
set the theme during the course of his first annual address .

Warning

that continuation .in office tended to produce indifference to public
interest, he noted,
The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit
of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence
may readily qualify themselves for their performance ; and I
can not but believe that more is lost by the long continuance
of men in office than is generally to be gained by their
experience . 2 1
Jackson ' s call for rotation in �ffice was not an entirely new
idea .

That theory had received strong impetus in 182 0 with the passage

20Leonard D . White, The Jeffersonians : A Sgugy in Administrative
History, 1801-1809 (New York,"""i9 51), 3 55- 57, 360- 2, 3 68 .
21James D . Richardson (comp. ), A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (10 vols . , Washington, 1896-1899),
II, 448=49- . -

8

of the Four Years Law, a measure which provided for four-year terms for
such federal officials as district attorneys, naval officers, army p�masters, collectors of customs, and others who were in charge of public
funds . Although later modified, this act greatly aided the institution
of the spoils system by giving Jackson a legal basis for making desired
removals, regardless of the competence of the officials being replaced. 22
With the introduction of the equalitarian attitudes of Jacksonian
democracy and the ascendancy of the common man, the spoils system became
the w� of life in the administration of the federal government .
proscription was the expected result of

any

General

change in party control .

Party affairs were lett largely to professional politicians who in return
for their faithful labors expected reward in the form of office and/or
patronage when their side gained control of the reins of government . 2 3
The pre-Civil War attitude toward the spoils system was one of
widespread acceptance .

Such complaints as were made were usually those

of the "outs" and these objections had a w� of disappearing once the
"outs" became the "ins . " Thus, the opponents of the system generally
tended to be of Federalist-Whig-Republican origin, since they were more
often out of office than in during the ante-bellum period . 2 4
Whatever else Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865) m� have been, he
difinitely was not a civil service reformer .

His elevation to the

2 �arx, Elements of Public Administration, 19.
23stahl, Public Personnel Administration, 31-32.
24Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils : A History of the Civil
Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (Urbana, 1961) , 7 .
--

9
presidency was followed by perhaps the most complete turnover of federal
officeholders in the entire history of the spoils system. Only those
whose efficiency made them virtually indispensable were spared.

The

number of removals during this transition from Democratic to Republican
control of the federal government varied from department to department .
Removals were relatively few in the State Department but were wholesale
in the Treasury Department , which was headed by Simon Cameron , a hearty
spoils system proponent . 25
The patronage position of the president thus was theoretically
awesome as of 186 5 .

The accepted interpretations of the pertinent con-

stitutional passages favored the chief executive . The spoils system had
placed at least as much emphasis upon the removal power of the president
as upon his appointive role . 26 James Madison ' s 11 chain. of dependence"
had become an actuality and almost daily became more lengthy . At the
close of the Civil War , the seven administrative departments which ran
the government employed approximately 53 ,000 persons who were collecting
a total annual payroll of about $ 30 ,000 ,000 .

Of first importance was

the Post Office Department , with employees in almost every town and
hamlet in the United States .

Second in size was the Treasury Department ,

with a large number of positions in Washington to fill , as well as in
custom houses and internal revenue agencies throughout the country .
25Harry J . Carman and Reinhard H. Luthin , Lincoln and the Patron
age (New York , 194 3 ) , 331- 32 .
26 Leonard D . White , The Jacksonians : A Study in Administrative
History , 1829-1861 (New Yor�l9 54) , 33- 34 .

10
By virtue of its Land, Patent, Indian , and Pension Bureaus , the Interior
Department was also worthy of considerable patronage attention .

Remain-

ing federal positions were divided among the War, Navy, State, and Justice
Departments .

27

The president chose the heads of the seven divisions and these in
turn normally made the appointment s to office in their respective departments .

Important appointments, such as chief clerks and maj or field

officers , customarily were cleared with the president and on some occasions were dictated by him .

Subordinate positions were left to the heads

of the local offices, who made the formal appointments after clearance
with the head of the department .

28

Although the entire federal patronage system was thus theoretically
in control of the president by 1865 , his power was limited by certain
practi cal c onsiderations .

There were traditional sources of advice to

be consulted on the subj ect of appointments and/or removals .

Senators

were to be consulted on all moves for and from their respective states .

27

Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils , 1-2 . If Hoogenboom' s figures
are accurate , the passing of the war apparently allowed the government to
make considerable retrenchment . By 1868, there were 41 , 588 persons in
federal pos itions drawing a total annual salary of $21,1 8 0,736 . 87 .
United States Senate, Trial of Andrew Johnson ( 3 vols . , Washington, 1 868 ) ,
I , 736 . It should be noted that , of this large number , very few actually
held presidential offices , i . e . , those filled by the j oint action of the
president and the Senate in the manner set forth by the Constitution .
In 1859, this total stood at 1,520; in 1869, 2,669 . Carl R . Fish,
" Removal of Officers by the Presidents of the United States ," American
Historical Association Annual Report ( 1 899 ) , 81 , 8 3 . The remainder were
appointed in the way described in the body of the text .
28

White, The Jacksonians , 395-96 .

11
Local changes usually were made with the consent of the congressmen
concerned .

Also to be given careful attention were the recommendations

of governors of important or pivotal states, heads of departments, and
certain powerful political bosses, such as Thurlow Weed of New York . To
deviate from the normal channels of patronage advice was to risk the
anger of hundreds along the party line who were dependent upon the party
and its successes for their place in the community . 29
The political situation caused by the Civil War added its own
peculiar limitation to executive patronage .

Prior to the coming of the

war, Americans had become accustomed to functioning with a two-party
political system in which patronage was used to bolster the power of the
group in office .

During the course of that conflict, however, party

affiliations became blurred.

While the bulk of the Democratic party

favored a negotiated settlement,

many

Democrats labored by the side of

Republicans in the task of preserving the Union .

This coalition was

represented on a national ticket in 1864 which put forth a Republican
for president and a Democrat for vice-president . The venture was rewarded
with success, but within six months of the election, the former was dead
and the latter, as the new chief executive, was in control of the immense
�ederal patronage system.

The question was, with a fitful peace restored

to the country by mid-186 5, for and against whom was it to be used and
for what purpose?
29Ibid . , 123-12 4 ; Carman and Luthin, Lincoln and lli Patronage,
186 5333 ; W. R . Brock, An American Crisis : Congress and Reconstruction, -1867 (Harper Torchbook edition ; New York, 1963 ) ,164 .

12

In sum, the opinion of the president ·had never carried such
weight in patronage matters as·it did in 1865 , but the risks of total
political disaster for him were. also _great . Th� s·was the delicate . posi�
tion into which a former Tennessee tailor was thrust by an-.assassin' s
bullet in April of that fateful year.

CHAPTER I
PATRONAGE:

THE PRE-PRESIDENTIAL VIEW

Andrew Johnson was born in Raleigh , North Carolina , on December
29 , 1 80 8 .

His father , a likable tavern porter , died when the lad was

only three , and his mother , a laundress and seamstress , later apprenticed
him to a local tailor .

Some time af'terward , be ran away , leaving an

angry employer who offered a reward for his return .

He returned to

Raleigh in: 1 825 but shortly t bereaf'ter moved westward , settling finally
at Greeneville , Tennessee .

Here be married Eli za McCardle , the father-

less daughter of a shoemaker , started a family , and worked at his trade .
By thrif't and hard labor , he gradually acquired some modest wealth and ,

according to some.accounts , with the help of his wife the bas i c elements
of an edu�ation which largely had been denied him earlier in life .

1

Deeply interested in politics , the young man advanced rapidly
upon entering the politi cal arena .

In the short period from 1 829 to 1841 ,

be served suc cessively as alderman and mayor of Greeneville , state repre
sentative , and state senator .
confused .

2

His earliest political leanings were

0 . P . Temple , an opponent of Johnson in a later congressional

campaign , much later recollected that be was consi dered a Whig in 1 835

1This resume is based primarily upon the treatment of Johnson ' s
life given by Robert W. Winston , Andrew Johnson , Plebeian and Patriot
( New York , 1928 } , 3-25 passim , and the brief s ummary in the Biographi cal
Directory of� American Congress , 1774-1961 ( Washington , 1961 ) , 1122-23 .
2

Ibid. ; Winston , Andrew Johnson , 26-39 .
13

14
and continued to be so considered by the Whigs until about 1839 .

3

Be

that as it mey, his stint in the Tennessee Assembly apparently crystallized his views, and he became a Democrat "of the Jackson kind, not a
Democrat in the party sense but a universal Democrat, looking to demo
cracy to cure all the evils of life . "

4

In 1842, Johnson moved to the national scene by securing election
as a Democrat to the Twenty-eighth and the four successive Congresses
(March 4, 1843-March 3, 1853) . 5

Shortly after his initial election, he

made it amply clear that he endorsed rotation in office, the fundamental
doctrine of the spoils system .

In a letter published in the Jonesboro

Whig in February, 1843, Johnson and some friends wrote to Aaron V . Brown,
a Middle Tennessee Democratic congressman (1839-1845) and future governor
(1845-1847), urging that William Dickson, the long-time Greeneville postmaster, be replaced .

As one of their arguments, they stated:

"That the

doctrine of rotation in office we believe to be correct and that it is a

3
0liver P . Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee from 1833 to 1875:
Their Times and their Contemporaries-(New York, 191�367-68- . - The party
situation in Tennessee in the mid-1830's was in a state of flux and
Johnson for a time seemingly hesitated between the Whigs and the Demo
crats . LeRoy P . Graf and Ralph W . Haskins (eds . ), The Papers of Andrew
), I, xxiv-xxv .
Johnson (1 vol. to date, Knoxville, 19674
Winston, Andrew Johnson, 26 . Johnson was prone on occasion to
declare this loyalty in soaring terms . Illustrative was a remark he
buried in the middle of a lengthy address to the people of his congressional
district in October, 1845: "A belief in the pure and unadulterated prin
ciples of Democracy, is a belief in the religion of our Savior, as laid
down while here upon earth himself--rewarding the virtuous and meritorious
without any regard to station, to wealth, or distinction of birth."
Graf and Haskins, Johnson Papers, I, 240 .
5
Biosraphical Directory, 1123 .

15
violation of a fundamental principle of the Republican party to continue
a man in office during his life

•

•

•

•

"

Also cited as a major indictment

was their belief "that the Post Office at this place will be used as an
engine to promote the pretensions of persons to office who are opposed
6
to the present Administration. 11

Such a practice constituted another

cardinal violation of the spoils system .
The Tennessee congressman did not hesitate to express his Jacksonian patronage attitudes in Washington .

In a speech before the House on

January 21, 1845, Johnson called for apportionment of federal offices .
Noting that there were at least seven or eight hundred such positions in
Washington and abroad, he declared that there was not one congressional
district "but what can furnish its proportionable number of officers, as
well qualified and equally as pure and incorruptible
about this city . "

as

those hangers-on

After a person bad held an office for a time, there

was no reason why be should not be removed and another allowed to benefit
7
as be had.

Approximately a year later, he presented to his colleagues

seven resolutions which among other things affirmed as "one of the cardinal tenets in a Republican form of Government" rotation in office,
demanded terms of no more than eight years for all federal offices and
their apportionment among the congressional districts, and called for
due consideration of "farmers and mechanics" in filling governmental

6
Jobnson, M . Lincoln, and others to Aaron V . Brown, December 6,
1842, Graf and Haskins, Johnson Papers, I, 108 .
7

congressional Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess . , Appendix 220 .

16
pOSl.•t•J.Ons .

8

He offered almost verbatim the same resolutions to the

Thirtieth and Thirty-second Congresses .

9

The Tennessean was unable to

get his associates to adopt his version of the spoils system .
Like any congressman, Johnson had a deep and abiding interest in
obtaining and controlling federal patronage for his district and state,
an interest which led him into conflict with President James K . Polk .
Both men were Tennesseans and Democrats, and Johnson at first tended to
support him .

In his speech to the House on January 21, 1845, Johnson

vehemently denied that the South was promising support for Polk's policies in return for executive positions .
to say that James K . Polk

•

•

•

It was "still a greater slander

was capable of using such unworthy means

to obtain support for his administration . "

10

Representative Johnson soon discarded such a view of the new
president as be found himself increasingly in disagreement over Polk's

8
Ibid . , 29 Cong., 1 sess . , 192-93 . As one student of nineteenth
century Tennessee politics has noted, Johnson at times was accused of
demagogism, but his continuing concern for the mechanic and farmer was
great and sincere . Thomas P . Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in
Tennessee: A Study in Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill, 1932), 312 .
.
9
Cong . Globe, 30 Cong . , 1 seas . , 457; 32 Cong . , 2 sess . , 1164 .
Another example of Johnson's beliefs in apportionment and rotation in
office came on May 31, 1848, when he unsuccessfully tried to amend a
bill regulating clerical appointments in the executive departments by
inserting two sections calling for apportionment of offices among con
gressional districts and eight-year terms for the officers appointed .
Ibid . , 30 Cong . , 1 seas . , 800-02 .
10

Ibid . , 28 Cong . , 2 sess . , App . 220 . In making this statement,
Johnson apparently was choosing to. gloss over the fact that patronage was
used as a means of party rewards while making a heated defense of southern
integrity . Another representative earlier had indicated his conviction
that a few well distributed offices would make the tariff more acceptable
to the South . The Tennessean replied to this notion by declaring that

17
patronage policies .

In a diary entry dated July.21, 1846, Polk traced

Johnson's opposition to him to some appointments made in East Tennessee
with which the congressman was "dissatisfied . "

11

Whatever the cause,

Johnson bad been quick to press his attack on the chief executive .

On

March 9 be bad declared in reply to a question concerning Tennessee's
share of executive appointments that Pennsylvania "had more of those
appointments in one county than the whole state of Tennessee put together . "
On June 10, 1846, his reply to a remark by Stephen A . Douglas of Illinois
to the effect that the president had more important things to do than
"the pitiful business of scattering spoils among minor officers" bad been
a sarcastic "Is he not now?"

13

The dSir after Polk had confided his

opinion to his diary, Johnson wrote to his friend Blackston McDannel, a
Greeneville Democrat, concerning Polk's appointments:
Take [them] all and all and they are the most damnable
set that were ever made by any president since the government
was organized, out of Tennessee as well as in it-- .
There
is one thing I will say, that is, I never betrayed a friend
.2!:. [�] guilty of the black sin of ingratitude--I fear Mr.
Polk cannot say as much-- 14
•

•

In a practical sense, Johnson was the loser in this running argument because Polk made careful note of Johnson's opposition to him and

it was "a slander on southern reputation to se:y that she can be bought
by any office in the gift of the executive . " Ibid .
1�i
o M . Quaife (ed . ), The Diary of James K . Polk during his
Presidency, 1845 to 1849 (4 vols . , Chicago, 1910), II, 37 .
12

Cong . Globe, 29 Cong . , 1 sess . , 472 .

13

Ibid . , 954 .

14
Johnson to McDannel, July 22, 1846, Graf and Haskins, Johnson
Papers, I, 332 .

12

18
simply ignored him in making appointments in Tennessee .

15

Although the

representative ceased his attacks upon the president after realizing
that his attitude almost led to his defeat in the congressional campaign
of 1846, Polk could not forgive his fellow Tennessean .

On January 1,

1849, the chief magistrate bitterly confided to his diary,
Professing to be a Democrat, he [Johnson] has been politi
cally if not personally hostile to me during my whole time .
He is very vindictive and perverse in his temper and conduct .
If he had the manliness or independence to manifest his opposi
tion openly, he knows he could not be again elected by his
constituents . l6
A Tennessee legislature dominated by Whigs "gerrymandered" Johnson
out of Congress in 1851 by passing a bill adding Johnson's home county of
Greene to a solidly Whig district .

17

He therefore did not stand for

re-election in 1852, but he still retained a vital interest in federal
patronage .

Writing to anAbingdon, Virginia, Democratic newspaper editor,

he noted concerning the incoming Pierce administration that what was
needed to correct the abuses and corruptions prevalent throughout the
various departments of the government was an ample and skillful use of
the "pruning knife . "

With typical Jacksonian logic, he noted that the

Whigs should expect removal with the Democrats returning to power, but
that those pseudo-Democrats who had managed thus far to retain office

205 .

15
charles A . McCoy, Polk and� Presidency (Austin, 1960), 180,

16
Quaife, Diary, IV, 265 . George Fort Milton, The Age of Hate:
Andrew Johnson and� Radicals (New York, 1930), 83 . Polk was not
entirely correct in these remarks, since Johnson after their rift over
patronage gave particularly strong support to Polk's Mexican war policy.
Cong. Globe, 29 Cong . , 2 sess . , 39-40 .
l7
Winston, Andrew Johnson, 42, 68-69 .
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should be removed among the first, since they tended to "change their
political complexion with as much ease as the camelion [sic] changes
the hues of its skin. "

18

While thus expecting, the Pierce administration to make the usual
sweep of offices which occurred with every change of party control,
Johnson saw little hope for his home state to receive its share of
offices "on account of behaving so badly in-the late election . "

19

Tennessee's failure to support the Democratic ticket had to be punished
because loyalty to party was one of the prime requisites of the spoils
system .

Johnson's attempts to secure offices from Pierce for some

fellow Tennesseans seemingly reflected his belief that such loyalty was
necessary in order to obtain office .

In recommending one S. C . Pavatt

for a charg� d'affaires position, his letter stated, "His long devotion
to democratic principles, and his willing sacrifice of time and means

18
Johnson to Leonidas Baugh, December 1, 1852, Leonidas Baugh
Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina ) ,
copy i n Johnson Papers . Johnson's acceptance o f the spoils system axiom
that some changes must occur even merely with a change from one chief
executive to another of the same party can be seen in a letter written
in 1850 to the Greeneville postmaster, William Lowry . Millard Fillmore,
a Whig, had recently succeeded Zachary Taylor, another Whig, as presi
dent and, in his note to Lowry, Johnson warned that offices in Tennessee
probably would be swept clean as the new postmaster-general intended "to
do the work thorough. " Johnson to Lowry, August 12, 1850, Graf and
Haskins, Johnson Papers, I, 584.
19
Johnson to David T. Patterson, December 3 , 1852, Andrew Johnson
Papers (Andrew Johnson Project, University of Tennessee ) . Unless other
wise noted, the originals of the papers in the project's Johnson collec
tion are in the Library of Congress . Tennessee was one of only four
states to cast its electoral vote for the Whig ticket of Winfield Scott
and William A . Graham . The Tennessee vote was 58,898 to 57,018 . Edward
Stanwood, A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897 (New York, 1898 ),
257.

20
for the cause & success of his party induce us to solicit for him one of
the positions he desires

•

•

•

•

"

20

The one outstanding qualification

of Colonel D . H . Cummings of Knoxville which recommended him to be governor of Washington Territory was the fact that he was "a sterling
Democrat . "

21

First elected in 1853, Andrew Johnson served two terms as governor
of Tennessee .

The bitter gubernatorial campaign of 1855 produced the

one major instance in which he had serious difficulty with patronage .
His opponent was Meredith P . Gentry, an old-line Whig and the endorsed
candidate of the American, or Know-Nothing, party .

Although the governor

was successful in his re-election bid, the Know-Nothings, with the help
of the Whigs, initially were able to control both houses of the General
Assembly by a narrow margin .

22

The State Senate subsequently refused

to confirm Johnson's nominations for various state boards and the penitentiary inspectors .

In addition, bills were introduced into the Assembly

designed to remove many of the governor's appointive powers and to place
in the hands of the legislature the appointment of the board of directors
of the Bank of Tennessee, the keeper of the penitentiary, and the

20
Johnson and others to Franklin Pierce, March 1, 1853, Johnson
Papers (original in National Archives} .
21
Johnson and others to Pierce, February 17 , 1853, ibid . (original
in National Archives} .
22

stanley J . Folmsbee, Robert E . Corlew, and Enoch L . Mitchell,
History of Tennessee (4 vols . , New York, 1960), II, 10-12 . The party
division in the Assembly stood: Senate: 12 Democrats, 12 Know-Nothings,
2 Whigs; House: 36 Democrats, 36 Know-Nothings, 1 Whig . Philip M . Hamer
(ed . }, Tennessee: A History, 1673-1932 (2 vols . , New York, 1933}, I,
503 .

21
commissioner of roads .

These changes apparently were being sought in

order to fUlfill previous promises made to certain individuals regarding
these positions .

Whatever the reason for the attempts, they failed

because of an anti-Know-Nothing majority which developed in the House.

23

Johnson had survived the test and continued to make his appointments with
an objective which he seems always to have had, the furthering of his
own political ends .

24

His ambitions were rewarded with his election to

the United States Senate upon expiration of his second gubernatorial
term in 1857 .

25

The ex-governor could not have been returning to the national
scene at a more critical time .

The 1850's had witnessed an increasing

rift between the North and South, one which came to a climax in 1860 .
The presidential campaign of that year, one of the most dramatic in
American history, witnessed the division of the Democratic party, a

2

3w . M . Caskey, "The Second Administration of Governor Andrew
Johnson, " East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, II (1930),
45 .
24
This interpretation of Johnson as pre-eminently politically
inspired was suggested in the Washington National Republican by an anony
mous contemporary writer . 1865 scrapbook, Johnson Papers .
25

Robert G . Russell, "Prelude to the Presidency: Election of
Andrew Johnson to the Senate, " Tennessee Historical Quarter1y, XXVI
(Summer, 1967), 148-76 . According to this source, Johnson's success in
gaining the Senate seat was part of his grand design in a move toward
the presidency . In order to make this step, he actively and successfully
campaigned for a friendly legislature in the 1857 elections . This effort,
coupled with the rising star of the Democracy in Tennessee and the fading
of the combined Whig-Know-Nothing forces, gave him the seat . Neither
Russell nor any other source consulted ventured so far as to conjecture
that Johnson's patronage had anything to do with his 1857 success, but
things being what they were in the mid-nineteenth century, it probably
would be safe to assume that patronage did play some role, however minor,
in this victory .

22
four-man race, and the emergence of a pluraJ.ity president, Abraham
Lincoln .

B,y the time of his inauguration, the Union had been diminished

by the seven states which comprised the Lower South .

26

Treading a moderate path, Tennessee in the 1860 presidential
canvass had voted for John Bell, a long-time Tennessee Whig leader .

The

state had no Republican party organization, but Bell's conservative Constitutional Unionist faction seemed to occupy a position close to that
of the Republicans .

Many Tennessee Unionists in early 1861 therefore

assumed that the channel of federal patronage would be through that group .
This assumption began to wilt, however, when Lincoln selected Montgomery
Blair, a former Jacksonian Democrat, over Henry Winter Davis, an old-line
Whig, for postmaster-general .

Since the latter part of Bell's political

career had been distinguished by anti-Jacksonianism and the Post Office
Department was the single largest source of federal positions, the Constitutional Union forces thus were eliminated from serious patronage
consideration .

27

As Bell's chances of becoming Lincoln's chief patronage dispenser
for Tennessee faded, the suspicion grew among conservatives there that
the new president was referring inquiries for federal positions in
Tennessee to that state's strong-willed, pro-Unionist senator, Andrew

26
south Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Texas .
27
J . Milton Henry, "The Revolution in Tennessee, February, 1861
to June, 1861," Tennessee Historical Quarter1y, XVIII (June, 1959}, 10506, 108 .

23
Johnson .

28

This

man,

who equated secession with treason, was a natural

choice for such a role, and what little doubt Tennessee Unionists may
have held about his selection undoubtedly was shattered when one of John
Bell's recommendations was sent to Johnson for his approval .

29

The Bell

adherents had defeated Breckinridge in 1860, but they now had to turn to
. .
30
a Breckinridge Democrat for Federal positions .
This realization so
disheartened them that they abandoned their struggle to save Tennessee
for the Union, leaving that task to Johnson and his friends .

31

28

Ibid . , 107 . Johnson's erstwhile opponent 0 . P . Temple later
suggested that the reason Johnson was so strongly pro-Union was that he
at first believed that Tennessee would remain loyal, but that even if
the state did leave the Union, his political chances would be brighter
in the North . His declaration of loyalty to the Union while other
southern senators were moving away would elevate him to prominence and
possibly to the presidency . Temple, Notable Men, 394-96 . If Russell is
correct in his thes� (see above, n . 25), such reasoning as Temple here
suggests would appear feasible . It is difficult to believe, however,
that Johnson was so completely politically motivated . Is·it not possible
that he sincerely believed in the Union cause and was willing to take a
stand on this conViction alone?
29

on March 11, the first assistant postmaster-general forwarded
to Johnson a recommendation by John Bell that James Turk be made mail
agent from Chattanooga to Knoxville . The notation read, "I am instructed
to inquire whether the enclosed suggestion meets your approval . " John A .
Kasson to Johnson, March 11, 1861, Johnson Papers . For other indications
of Johnson's influence, see the following letters to him in the Johnson
Papers: S . P . Chase, March 13, 1861; J . L . Williams, March 20, 1861;
George Harrington, March 26, 1861; George C . Whiting, March 16, 1861 .
30
Johnson made no apologies for having voted for Breckinridge in
1860 . As he put it in a speech in Cincinnati on June 19, 1861, he be
lieved there had been "no disagreement between Republicans, Bell men,
Douglas men, and Breckinridge men, as regards the preservation of the
of
Union of States . " Fr ank Moore (ed . ), The Rebellion Record: A Diary -American Events (11 vols . , New York, 1861-1868), II, 148-51 . ....
31
Henry, "Revolution in Tennessee," 113-14 .

24
Saving Tennessee for the Union and the incoming Lincoln administration was not an easy assignment.

Johnson had been deluged with let-

ters inquiring about federal positions since early 1861, and not all of
them had been encouraging.

A letter from West Tennessee informed him
...

that M. C. Galloway, the Memphis postmaster, was resigning effective
March 5 in order to "throw upon the postmaster appointed the odium or
prejudice of accepting office under Lincoln."

32

The Nashville postmaster

wrote on February 22 to inform Johnson of his decision to retire because
33
he did not want to hold office under the new president.

The United

States marshal for Middle Tennessee frankly expressed to Johnson his
sentiments:

"I am a Southern man in my feelings, and if a separation

does take place, I want Tennessee to go with the South."

34

An applicant

for that position declared his qualification to be the fact that he was
"probably the only man in Middle Tennessee that voted for him [Lincoln]."

35

Despite the manifestations of hostility toward Lincoln and
expressions of the desire to see Tennessee leave the Union, there were
many opportunists who were eager to obtain federal positions from the
hated Black Republican, Abraham Lincoln.

Andrew Johnson's mail was filled

with pleas that he intercede with the incoming chief executive for

32

E. W. M. King, William Brown, and J. Knox Walker to Johnson,
February 18, 1861, Johnson Papers.
33

s. R. Anderson to Johnson, February 22, 1861, ibid.

34
J. B. Clements to Johnson, March 1, 1861, ibid.
35
John Newman to Johnson, March 5, 1861, ibid.
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situations ranging from Judge to postmaster to mail agent .

One of the

many seeking to be appointed marshal for Middle Tennessee assured Johnson that any influence he exerted on his behalf with the Lincoln admin
istration would be "duly appreciated."

36

The incumbent postmaster at

Athens requested the senator to "intercede in my behalf with the incoming
administration . "

37

Another writer, recommending a friend for a route

agent's position, noted that he himself did not know Johnson personally
but was aware that he had more sway with the new administ�ation "than
any

man

in the state . "

38

Some of those actively seeking office from a Republican president
were, like Johnson himself, Democrats .

Under ordinary circumstances,

this could not have been expected, but these were not normal times .

As

one Democratic incumbent who was seeking to retain his post reasoned,
"I take it for granted that Mr . Lincoln is under no particular obligation
to either of the political parties in Tennessee--as he received no direct
support from Tennessee.

tt39

Others, while declaring their past

Democratic convictions, also avowed their loyalty to the federal government .

One Johnson correspondent stated that he had bee.n a Democrat since
36
T . C . Ramsey to Johnson, February 21, 1861, ibid .
37
w . G . Horton to Johnson, February 23, 1861, ibid .

38
E . H . Dunn to Johnson, March 2, 1861, ibid . Any perusal of the
Johnson Papers for February and.March of 1861 will reveal that a large
portion of Johnson's correspondence in these months concerned patronage .
Those cited are intended to be merely illustrative of such petitions .
39
J. B . Clements to Johnson, February 18, 1861, ibid .

26
the time of Jackson but added that he was "now a Union

man .

"

40

As was to be expected, Johnson's work was complicated by the fact
that there were several much coveted places .

The federal marshalships

for the eastern and middle divisions of the state were in this category,
with each being sought by at least nine aspirants.

The postmasterships

of Memp;his, Nashville, and Knoxville also had wide appeal, particularly
the one in Nashville which had a minimum of eight seekers .

41

An astute politician, Johnson was not slow in making use of his
advantageous situation.

As friend and former foe alike sought placement

through him and as he passed judgment upon their applications, he apparently allowed party considerations and personal attitudes to sway him.
He seemingly believed that the one sure way to insure Unionism in
Tennessee was to build a party around himself.

42

At least some individ-

uals realized that this was what the senator was attempting to do.
Recommending Lewis Tillman for the middle Tennessee marshalship, one

40

william Smith to Johnson, February 18, 1861, ibid.

41-'�e eastern post ultimately went to Blackston McDannel, a longtime Johnson friend, while E . R. Glascock received the middle one. The
Knoxville postmastership was retained by the incumbent, C. W. Charlton,
and Nashville went to W. D. McNish, who had been recommended by the out
going postmaster. These appointments are to be found in the Secretary
of the Interior, Register of Officers and Agents, Civil, Military, and
Naval, in the Services of the United States on the Thirtieth September
1861 (Washington, 1862)-.- Apparently becauseof widespread southern sym
pathy in West Tennessee, situations there generally were not filled.
With Tennessee's withdrawal from the Union in mid-1861, those appoint
ments already made in the eastern and middle divisions in effect were
negated .
42
Henry, "Revolution in Tennessee, " 110; LeRoy P . Graf, "Andrew
Johnson and the Coming of the War, " Tennessee Historical Quarter1y, XIX
(September, 1960), 220 .

27
correspondent noted that his candidate was a "Johnson man on principle"
and added that the securing of this post for him would be "the best thing
you can do towards Johnsonizing Midale Tennessee."

43

Regardless of his ·

personal political ambitions at this point, Johnson failed to achieve
his main purpose.

Tennessee withdrew from the Union in mid-1861.

44

Tennessee's desertion from the ranks of the Union left Andrew
Johnson for all practical purposes a senator without a state to repre
45
sent.

His continued loyalty to the Union cause, however, undoubtedly

inspired Lincoln to call upon him to go to Nashville as military governor
after Union forces had liberated portions of the state with victories at
Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in February of 1862.

46

His assignment was

to construct a loyal civil government in Tennessee and to restore that
47
state as rapidly as possible to its proper relations with the Union.
As his chief aides, he selected Edward H. East (secretary of state),
Joseph S. Fowler { comptroller), Horace Maynard (attorney-general), and

43

william S. Speer to Johnson, March 12, 1861, Johnson Papers.
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For particulars, see J. G . Randall and David Donald, The Divided
Union (Boston, 1961), 184-86.
45
Tennessee's other senator, A. 0. P. Nicholson, withdrew from
the Senate at the conclusion of the Thirty-sixth Congress. Biographical
Directory, 172. Of the state's ten-man congressional delegation, only
three served in the Thirty-seventh Congress (March 4, 1861-March 3, 1863),
while all its seats in both the Senate and House were vacant for the
duration of the Thirty-eighth Congress (March 4, 1863-March 3, 1865).
Ibid., 175, 181.
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Randall and Donald, The Divided Union, 186, 202-4.
47
Milton, Age of Hate, 108; Winston, Andrew Johnson, 222-23.

28
Edmund Cooper (private secretary and confidential agent.)

48

The announcement of Johnson's appointment was followed immediately
by correspondence requesting positions under his military governorship.
While a few petitioners desired posts of considerable importance, others
were much more humble in their requests.

A former resident of the Nash-

ville vicinity who had been driven from his farm asked for a clerkship
in the Nashville post office "so that I can earn a living until I can
fall back on my trade again."

49

Another wanted "some position in the

gift of the government sufficiently remune:rative to support a family."

50

A few coveted placement simply because of the adventure which they apparently felt would be involved.

In that vein was a letter from a twenty-

eight year-old clerk in the Capitol Bakery who wrote, "I want to go to
Tennessee with you, I do not care in what capacity, so that I .£!!!. �
!2_."

51

A former resident informed the new governor that he had "a desire

48
clifton R. Hall, Andrew Johnson, Milit
Governor of Tennessee
(Princeton, N. J., 1916), 42. East later (1892 �an for governor of
Tennessee as the Prohibition candidate and polled about 500 votes.
Folmsbee, Corlew, and Mitchell, History of Tennessee, II, 161, 162n.
Cooper, a former state representative and presidential elector, later
served in the Thirty-ninth Congress and then as Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury during the Johnson administration. Biographical Directory,
735. Fowler, a lawyer and teacher, played an especially active role in
the reconstruction of the state government and then served in the United
States Senate (1866-1871). Ibid., 910. Maynard, likewise a teacher and
lawyer, served in the Thirty-fifth, Thirty-sixth, and Thirty-seventh
Congresses (March 4, 1857-March 3, 1863) and later in the Thirty-Ninth
and four succeeding Congresses. He was also postmaster-general during
the last year of the Hayes administration. Ibid . , 1280.
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H. Mitchell to Johnson, March 7 , 1862, ibid.
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to revisit my native Tennessee .

I have considerable acquaintan [ c] es

with men and things in Middle Tennessee and could probably make myself
useful . "

52

Upon assuming his duties, Johnson was advised by a prominent
Tennessee lawyer and jurist, who like many other Unionists had been
forced from the state, that a central element of his program must be to
"place a Union man in every official position in the state, from the low
est to the highest . "

53

In a proclamation addressed to the people of

Tennessee on March 18, 1862, the governor made it amply clear that this
was exactly what he intended to do .

Positions in the state and county

governments, he declared, would be filled by "persons of probity and
intelligence, and bearing true allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the United States . "

Once these people had been appointed, their

authority was to be "accordingly respected and observed . "

54

The state's new chief executive was not long in taking action .
On March 25, 1862, he demanded that the Nashville m�or, Richard B .
Cheatham, and the city council members take the oath of allegiance to the
Union.

When they refused to do so on the grounds that such an act was

not required of corporation officials, Johnson removed them from office
and replaced them with men loyal to the Union.
5�
53

. S. Northcott to Johnson .,
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March 8, 1862, ibid .

R . J . Meigs to Johnson, March 15, 1862, ibid .
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Andrew Johnson, "Appeal to the People," Records, Office of
Secretary of War, copy in ibid .
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30
As the Nashville incident indicated, stauch and unswerving loyalty
to the Union became the major prerequisite for holding office in Tennessee
under Andrew Johnson .

All offices were filled with such men .

56

When

Johnson at last felt in March, 1864, that some local elections could be
held he demanded that those voting take an extremely rigid oath in which
they swore to uphold and defend the Constitution and promised to seek
and work for the success of Union arms .

57

It has been charged that by

making the oath so rigid Johnson deprived himself of the aid, advice, and
influence of many undoubtedly loyal individuals .

Johnson, however, hav-

ing expeienced months of frustration and lack of co-operation, apparently
was content to finish his work with the help of the few very dedicated
people who had chosen to stand with him .

58

Lincoln's military governor was determined to be the real authority
in Tennessee and in this he had the full support of his superiors in
Washington.

59

He was given virtually a free hand in Tennessee matters .

One writer who had petitioned the War Department for an officer's commission in a proposed East Tennessee regiment told Johnson that he had been
informed by his own father, who was in Washington at the time, that
"every thing connected with such appointments, for Tennessee, had been

56
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Jonathan T . Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson:
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(Chapel Hill, 1953 ), 51.
58
Hall, Johnson, Military Governor, 216-17 . The process of
restoration of civil government to Tennessee was not completed in fact
until very shortly before Johnson took the oath as vice-president in 1865 .
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59

Ibid . , 238-39 .

31
referred to you and that your recommendation would be necessary to
obtain a commission .

n60

A petition signed by several officers in Tennes-

see military units requesting the promotion of a fellow officer to the
rank of brigidier general stated that the signees were asking Johnson to
present the man's case to Washington "knowing as we do that the War
Department looks to your recommendation alone for the promotion and
advancement of Tennessee officers . "

61

Another man wrote that he had

called upon the president that day and "on your letter he gave me an
order for an appointment . "

62

According to one of Johnson's biographers �

those who dared to oppose him were removed from the scene � including
Generals Buell and Rosecrans .

63

Although in a powerful position � Johnson apparently had no qualms
about advising against the appointment of even a friend, if he felt that
he was not qualified .

Learning that John B . Rodgers wanted to become a .

federal judge for Tennessee, the governor wrote Maynard in Washington,
"You know that my personal feelings toward him are kind, but am compelled
to say that he has not the first qualification for the appointment and
especially so at this time . "

To Lincoln himself, he declared, "Rodgers

60
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winston, Andrew Johnson, 239 . Winston probably was overstating
the case because the major reason for the removal of the generals was
apparently their inactivity as military commanders rather than clashes
with Johnson .
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is my personal friend, but he will not do for Judge at this time .
hope he will not be put upon us . "

I

64

As Johnson continued his efforts to restore Unionism in Tennessee,
the 1864 presidential campaign began to occupy the North's attention .
What appeared to many as a stalemated war had placed Lincoln's re-election
in doubt .

In an effort to add wider appeal to the Republican ticket, the

party name was dropped in favor of the title National Union, and Lincoln
began to search for a vice-presidential candidate who would be politically
more appealing than Hannibal Hamlin.

Having a well established Democrat

from a border state would give the ticket more than a sectional appeal .
Joseph Holt of Kentucky was being considered, but Andrew Johnson was also
a prime possibility .

A loyal Unionist who had fought secession in his

own state, the latter always had been a friend of labor and possessed
an admirable record

as

military governor .

led Lincoln to select the Tennessean

as

These considerations finally

6
his running mate . 5

In accepting the 1864 vice-presidential nomination, Johnson made
no secret of his Democratic convictions .

After stating his firm Unionist

sentiments, Johnson, in his concluding remarks, made an open appeal to

64
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Governors of Tennessee (7 vola . to date, Nashville, 1952Holt (1807-1894), a Kentucky j urist, had served successively under the
Buchanan administration as commissioner of patents, postmaster-general,
and secretary of war . An avowed War Democrat, he was made j udge-advocate
general by Lincoln in 1862 . He later prosecuted the accused assassins
of Lincoln . Mary B . Allen, "Joseph Holt," Dictionary of American Biography (22 vols . , New York, 1928-1958), IX, 181-83 .
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his old party to stand fast to the task of preserving the Union .

He

declared:
In accepting the nomination, I might here close, but I
cannot forego the opportunity of . seying to my old friends of
the democratic party proper, with whom I have so long and
pleasantly been associated, that the hour has now come when
that great party can justly vindicate its devg�ion to true
democratic policy and measures of expediency .
With no deceptions as to his political stance, Andrew Johnson
occupied the vice-president's position on the ultimately successful
National Union ticket and then succeeded to the presidency following
Lincoln's assassination, April, 1865 .

As his political career to that

point testified, he was a Democrat of the Jacksonian stripe .

In the

realm of patronage, being of that persuasion meant a firm belief in the
spoils system with its insistence upon such things as rotation in office,
equal consideration of all men, and loyalty to party as an important
qualification for office.

As

he assumed the duties of his . new office

there was nothing to indicate that Johnson believed otherwise .
At the same time, Johnson was also a decided individualist and
tended at times to be inconsistent .

Although he had followed the Demo-

cratic lead on major issues in the pre-war period, he had not alweys
been a party man and had often found himself in opposition to the party
leaders .

67

One of his antagonists later observed that party was

66
John Savage, The Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson,
Seventeenth President of the United States (New Yor� 1866), 300 .

67
winston, Andrew Johnson, 26 ; Graf and Haskins, Johnson Papers,
I, xxviii-xxix .
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important to Johnson only in that it allowed him "to mount upon the
shoulders of his followers and thus rise to power . "

68

A more sympathetic

observer has maintained that Johnson was a decided follower of Andrew
Jackson and a dedicated Democrat, and that he never fundamentally changed
his stance, although, like any astute politician, he did know how to
modify details "to fit circumstances . rr
Be

69

that as it may, it was true that, despite an apparent adherence

to the idea of party loyalty, he had labored as hard at times in the past
to build a following loyal to himself as he had to further the Democratic
cause .

This may have been because, as in 1853 when he ran for governor

against the wishes of the party leadership, he felt himself to be repre
sentative of the true Democracy, the party of · the masses .

70

· It may have

been because, as in 1861 when he had served as Lincoln's chief patronage
dispenser for Tennessee, he equated himself with something more important
than party .
Whether or not one or both of the above was the case or his inconsistency was primarily because he merely desired to advance his own
political fortunes by whatever means available remains very much open to

68
Temple, Notable Men, 380 . One disappointed 1861 Tennessee
office-seeker presented a similar view to Secretary of State William H .
Seward . See Felix A . Reeve to Seward, April 16, 1861, Johnson Papers
(original in National Archives) .
69
Abernethy, Frontier to Plantation, 310 .
70

In 1853, the Democratic leadership, largely drawn from the upper
classes, had not favored Johnson ' s candidacy for the governorship . B,y
way of mass meetings held in many counties, Johnson had illustrated his
support among the common people and ultimately secured the party nomina
tion . His subsequent victory at the polls in turn gave him control of
the Democratic party in Tennessee . Ibid . , 314-15 ; 317 .
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questio� .

Jacksonian Democrat , ambitiO\lS individualist, or an enigmatic

combination of both, Johnson . now was faced with the complex problems of
reconstructio� .

Not the . leas� of these . problems arose from the enormous

federal patro�age..suddenly at · his disposal, an inheritance which could
prove to be either a great blessing or a ter.rible curse to his political
future .

CHAPTER II
A TIME OF CONSENSUS
The initial reaction in the North to the sudden elevation of
The mourning of northerners

Andrew Johnson to the presidency was mixed .

for their fallen leader was not to be alleviated by the gradual realization that, in the hour of triumph, a southerner had been thrust into the
captain's position .

The prevailing mood was thus one of sorrow mixed

with apprehension, suspicion, and distrust .
This atmosphere did not last long .

1
Because he at first appeared

as all things to all men, Johnson initially was able to command the supTo

port of factions which were essentially hostile to one another .
southern Unionists, he was one of their own .

Northern Conservatives

hoped he would soften his hard wartime stand and follow the lenient reconstruction policy which Lincoln had appeared to be following at the
time of his death .

Radicals expected him to lead their cause .

former Confederates were fearful of what was to come .

Only

2

Among the first to rush to the support and aid of the new chief
executive were the Radicals .

Johnson's continued insistence that

1
Winston, Andrew Johnson, 299; Rembert W . Patrick, The Reconstruc
tion of the Nation (New York, 1967), 26 .
�ilton, Age of Hate, 181-82. The Radicals were so sure that
Johnson was their kind of man that the attitude of at least some of them
toward Lincoln's death was virtually one of rejoicing . Kenneth M .
Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-!§ll. (New York, 1965), 50-51 .
36

37
secession was treason and that treason must be made odious was sweet
music to Radical ears .

In a letter endorsing Johnson's stance, Lincoln's

first vice-president, although not of the Radical persuasion himself,
sent to his successor some thoughts which reflected that attitude :
We have no true men with us who are not delighted with your
course . Adhere to your course
and you will be sure to
make your Administration cherished and respected by all good
men; and you will thus give it a place in history second to
none other . 3
•

•

•

Johnson's first oral pronouncements served both to reinforce
Radical expectations and to offer a raf of hope to those who favored a
more lenient policy .

As the days passed, it became increasingly clear

that the president had drawn a line between the secession leaders and
those who had merely followed their lead .

While continuing to insist

that those in high authority had to be punished, he promised to the
masses of southerners, who he believed had been deceived and misled,
mercy, conciliation, and amnesty .

4

As long as Johnson was able to refrain from any decisive policy
moves, all went well, but such a situation could not continue indefinitely .
On May 29, 1865, he issued two proclamations .

One of them dealt with

amnesty and, as the preamble stated, was a continuation of Lincoln's
amnesty proclamations of December 8, 1863, and March 26, 1864 .

The

stated purpose of the Johnson proclamation was "that the authority of
the Government of the United States maf be restored and that peace,

3
Hannibal Hamlin to Andrew Johnson, Maf 3, 1865, Johnson Papers
4
Milton, � of Hate, 182-83 .

•
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order, and freedom mS¥ be established . 11

Amnesty and pardon were granted

to all vho had 11directly or indirectly participated in the existing
rebellion" and vho nov would take a prescribed oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Union .

There were fourteen specific classes exempted

from this generous grant, including civil and diplomatic and high ranking
military officers of the Confederacy, Confederate governors, and those
rebels with taxable property with an estimated value of more than $20,000 .
Those affected by these exemptions could receive pardon by special
application to the president .

5

The second proclamation of MS¥ 29 vas issued in order "to organize
a State government whereby justice mS¥ be established, domestic tranquillity insured, and loyal citizens protected in all their rights of
life, liberty, and property . 11

The state in question vas North Carolina,

and William W . Holden vas appointed provisional governor .

His duty vas,

at the earliest practicable period, to prescribe such
rules and regulations as mS¥ be necessary and proper for convening
a convention composed of delegates to be chosen by that portion
of the people of said state vho are loyal to the United States,
and no others, for the purpose of altering or amending the con
stitution thereof .
•

•

•

Holden vas given authority "to exercise within the limits of said State
all the power necessary and proper to enable such loyal people of the
State of North Carolina to restore said State to its constitutional relations to the Federal government . 11

The proclamation also provided for

the restoration of federal laws and courts, the re-opening of treasury

5Richardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 310-12 .
proclamations, see ibid . , 213-15, 218 .

For the Lincoln
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and post offices throughout the state, and the appointment of men to
fill these positions .

6

William Woods Holden ( 1818-1892 ), the new provisional governor of
North Carolina, had at one time been a Whig, but he became a Democrat
after assuming editorship of the North Carolina Standard in the mid-1840's .
Making that paper a Democratic journal of powerful influence throughout
the state, he favored in the 1850's the doctrine of secession .

In the

late years of that decade he was defeated first for the governorship and
then for the United States Senate .

After supporting Breckinridge for

the presidency in 1860, he served as a member of the state secession
convention and voted in favor of such a move .

Rapidly cooling toward

the southern cause, he made an unsuccessful bid for governor in 1864 on
an anti-Jefferson Davis ticket and then maintained silence until his
appointment to office by Johnson in May, 1865 .

7

Within a few weeks and on the basis of the North Carolina reconstruction plan, President Johnson had appointed provisional governors
for the remaining six heretofore unreconstructed states of the former
Confederacy .

8

On June 13, William L. Sharkey ( 1798-1873 ) was designated

6

Ibid . , 312-14 . The loyal persons referred to in the proclamation
were defined specifically to be those who could take the oath of amnesty
and who were qualified as voters by North Carolina law in effect immedi
ately prior to that state's withdrawal from the Union.
7J . G . DeR . Hamilton, "William Woods Holden," D . A . B . , IX, 13839; Hugh T . Lefler, History of North Carolina (2 vols�, New-York, 1956 ),
I, 335, 349-50, 387-88 ; II, 484-85, 529-30, 536-38 .
8

without formal declaration, the Johnson administration recognized
as legitimate governments organized by Lincoln in Louisiana, Arkansas,
and Tennessee . On May 9, 1865, Francis H . Pierpoint, who had claimed
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to bead the Mississippi government.

A native East Tennessean who

received some of his schooling at Greeneville, Sharkey had served under
Jackson at New Orleans in the War of 1812.

Moving to Mississippi, he

was admitted to the bar in 1822 and served in the state legislature in
1828 and 1829.

Elected in the early 1830's to the high court of errors

and appeals, be served in that capacity for many years, while declining
cabinet positions in both the Taylor and Fillmore administrations.

A

states-right Whig early in his political career, Sharkey gradually bad
modified his stand.

Serving as president of the controversial Nashville

Convention of 1850, be effectively worked to block attempts of southern
extremists to gain control .

B,y 1861, be was an active anti-secessionist

and in 1863 took an oath of allegiance to the Union.

Sent as a member

of a commission appointed in the dying hours of the state's Confederate
administration to negotiate with Johnson on Mississippi reconstruction,
be subsequently received the provisional governorship appointment .

9

On June 17, Georgia and Texas received their provisional governors
in the persons of James Johnson and Andrew J. Hamilton respectively.

A

lawyer, Johnson (1811-1891) bad served as a Unionist in the Thirty-second
Congress but bad failed in his reelection attempt.

Prominently associated

jurisdiction over a small portion of Virginia since the early days of
the war, was recognized by executive order as that state's governor.
William Archibald Dunning, Reconstruction: Political and Economic, 18651877, 36. For particulars on the development of the Virginia situation,
see Randall and Donald, The Divided Union, 240-41.
9

charles S. Sydnor, 11William Lewis Sharkey,11 D. A. B . , XVII, 2122 ; William C. Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi (Baton
Rouge, 1967), 17, 40-41.
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with the Georgia Know-Nothings in the late 1850's, he had reluctantly
followed Georgia into secession .

10

A lawyer and native of Alabama, Andrew Jackson Hamilton (18151875) had been appointed attorney-general of Texas in 1849 .

Serving in

the state legislature in 1851-1853, he entered Congress in 1859 where,
as a Unionist, he labored to effect conciliation between North and South.
Regarded as a traitor after the start of the war, he escaped from Texas
by way of Mexico and went to Washington .

Given the rank of brigidier

general and made provisional governor of Texas by Lincoln, he spent most
of the remainder of the war in New Orleans awaiting the chance to assume
his position .

Johnson, therefore, simply was reaffirming an earlier

Lincoln decision in appointing Hamilton provisonal governor in 1865 .

11

The next state destined for a provisional government was Alabama,
but by that time, Johnson's reconstruction pattern was clear and his
mail began to contain some suggestions concerning gubernatorial appointments for the remaining states .

According to one correspondent, the

qualifications of William H . Smith for the Alabama post included not only
his ability, integrity, firmness, and awareness of the evils of slavery,
but also the fact that he had been forced from his home in 1863 because
of his "unflinching adherence to the Union."

12

Two other correspondents

10
Biosraphical Directory, 1126 ; Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, A His
!2!Z. of the United States Since the Civil War (5 vols . , New York, 1917 ) ,
I , 34; "James Johnson, " National clopaedia of American Biography (49
and A-K vols . , New York, 1893, I , 227-28.
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182-183.
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G . Caldwell, "Andrew Jackson Hamilton, " D . A . B . ,

12
J . A . Stewart to Johnson, June 9, 1865, Johnson Papers .

VIII,
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admitted that their candidate for the place, John J . Seibels, had served
for about a year as a Confederate colonel but also maintained that he
had been firmly opposed to secession and had . given in only after it was
beyond his power to resist .

Since the war, his name had become the

"rallying point" for the Union men of Alabama .

13

The appointment did not go to Seibels, but on June 21 one of the
men pushing his candidacy did receive it .

Lewis E . Parsons (1817-1895)

had apparently devoted his efforts in the 1850's toward the preservation
of the Unio� .

As a delegate to the Baltimore convention in 1860, he

supported Douglas as the Democratic candidate, and although he submitted
to the verdict of the majority and followed Alabama into secession, he
never gave wholeharted support to the Confederacy, despite the fact that
he had two sons who served in its army .

14

Johnson next turned his attention to the first of the states which
had withdrawn from the Union, South Carolina .

Several names for the pro-

visional governorship had been suggested by his correspondents .

A

Buffalo, New York, writer, identifying himself as a native and long-time
resident of South Carolina forced from that state by the war, recommended
that Judge John Belton O'Neale or Benjamin F . Perry be · selected for the
post .

Both of these men, he declared, had stood firmly for the Union

until forced into silence "by the tyranny that made all individual effort

13
ibid .

L . E . Parsons and Joseph C . Bradley to Johnson, June 10, 1865,

14
Hallie Farmer, "Lewis Eliphalet Parsons," D . A. B . , XIV , 268-69 .
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1
hopeless . " 5

Four South Carolina citizens declared that William Aiken,

James L . Orr, or Henry Brist would be "very acceptable . "

16

Another name

submitted was that of William W . Boyce, who was identified as being of
the "very highest order of Statesmanship, fixed in purpose ; conservative
in sentiment ; and truly loyal in feeling . " 1 7

From these possibilities,

Johnson ultimately selected on June 30 Benjamin F . Perry as the

man

for

the task of reconstructing the bellwether state of the late conflict .
An

18

ardent nationalist, Perry (1805-1886) had opposed vehemently

the policy of nullification in the 1830's .

Defeated on three occasions

for Congress, he frequently served in the state legislature in the period
1836-1862 .

While viewing secession as foolish, he had followed his

state's lead and served in several Confederate offices .

19

15
J . C . Thornton to Johnson, June 8, 1865 , Johnson Papers .
16
Augustin L . Taveau and others to Johnson, June 17 , 1865, Augustin
Taveau Papers (Duke University Library), copy in ibid .
17
W . R . Robertson, James L . Orr, and others to Johnson, June 29,
1865, Johnson Papers .
18
Exactly why Johnson chose Perry is not clear . Shortly after
his appointment, Perry himself asked the president how he came to select
him . According to the governor's biographer, Johnson simply replied,
"I lived only one hundred and twenty-five miles from you, and of course
knew all about you . " Lillian A . Kibler, Ben.lamin F . Perry : South Caro
lina Unionist (Durham, N . C . , 1946), 385 .
l9
J . G . DeR . Hamilton, "Benjamin Franklin Perry, " D . A . B . , XIV ,
483 . 0 . P . Temple maintained that there was evidence that Johnson had
worked for a short time in Greeneville, South Carolina, in his early
life, and that while there he had met Perry, then a young lawyer, and
had borrowed books from him . Temple, Notable Men, 357, 361 . However,
Perry's principal biographer gives no indication that such a meeting
ever took place . See Kibler, Benjamin F . Perry.
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The appointment of Perry to the South Carolina post left only
Florida outside the process of reconstruction .

Johnson's correspondents

seem to have been agreed that William Marvin was the man for the situation .

Several citizens of that state, in signing a letter requesting

Marvin's appointment, presented him as one who had been "from the begin
ning and all along a steady unfaltering Union

man .

"

20

AnQther group of

petitioners agreed with this sentiment, viewing Marvin as an able selection because of his "exceedingly cautious and prudent temperament united
with his great learning and acquirements together with his popular and
pleasing manners, and his great private worth .

n21

On July 13, Marvin

became Florida's provisional governor .
A native of New York, William Marvin (1808-1902) had been
appointed United States district attorney for the southern district of
Florida by Andrew Jackson in 1835 .

After Florida's admission to the

Union, Polk had appointed him judge of the district, an office which he
held under the protection of United States forces until mid-1863, when
he returned to New York City for the duration of the war .

22

The men chosen to lead presidential reconstruction encountered
two major difficulties during their respective terms of office, namely,
their relationship with the military governors of their areas and the

20
H . W . Brooks and others to Johnson, July 5, 1865, Johnson Papers .
21
22

A . A . Low and others to Johnson, July 6, 1865, ibid .

"William Marvin, " National Cyclopaedia, XI , 379; Oberholtzer,
History of the United States, I , 35; Kevin E. Kearney (ed . ), "Autobio
graphy of William Marvin, " Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXVI (January,
1958), 198, 207, 214-15 .
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appointment of loyal men to office.

In the complex postwar situati on,

the War Department under the direction of Edwin M. Stanton in effect
divided the regular Ar� into two separate forces.
normal duties of the era:

One was given the

patrolling and maintaining order along the

Mexican and Canadian borders, fighting Indians, and handling peacetime
duties in the eastern areas; the other was stationed in the South, and
it was this one which became very much involved in the political issues
of the d�.

23

The provisional governments were among other things an attempt
to combine military and civil administrations in the southern states .
While the governors appointed by the president were laboring to restore
loyal state governments, the military governors, appointed by Secretar,y
of . War Stanton and General-in-Chief U . S . Grant, were to command the
24
military forces and to enforce martial law when necessary.

The problem,

however, was that the exact function of the army in the presidential
reconstruction process was never defined by either Johnson or the War
25
Department.

In the proclamation of M� 29, which organized the North

Carolina government and also served as the basic formula for the other
states, Johnson had described the role of military commanders as being

23

Harold M. Hyman, "Johnson, Stanton, and Grant: A Reconsidera
tion of the Army's Role in the Events Leading to Impeachment," American
Historical Review, LXVI { October, 1960), 86-87.
24
Patrick, Reconstruction, 31; James E . Sefton, The United States
� and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 {Baton Rouge, 1967), 16-17.
25

Harris, Presidential Reconstruction, 61.
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one of assistance to the provisional governors and directed that they
were "to abstain from in any way hindering, impeding, or discouraging
the loyal people from the organization of a State government as herein
authorized . "

26

The chief executive reinforced this in a telegram to

Major General George G . Meade, the commander of the Division of the
Atlantic, in which he made it clear that military officials were not to
interfere with the work of Governor Perry in South Carolina unless John
son himself specifically directed them to do so .

27

In the absence of any explicit, positive instructions, clashes
were to be expected .

The sharpest one occurred in Mississippi over the

touchy. issue of organization of local militias .

The last months of the

war had witnessed a drift toward anarchy in that state and this continued
to be the case after the coming of peace .
state .

Crime was rife throughout the

Weak local governments, particularly in the interior, needed

milita.I7 assistance to maintain law and order, but the army generally
was reluctant to take the initiative .

Governor Sharkey thus received

numerous pleas to do something about the lawless white groups operating
in many areas , but his appeals for military aid were confounded by a
scarcity of troops and the wholesale substitution of blacks for whites
who were being rapidly mustered out of the service .

This impasse in

turn led to a lack of co-operation between the civil and military
authorities and to racial tension and conflict .

28

26
Richardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 313 .
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Johnson to Meade, August 31, 1865, Johnson Papers .
28
Harris , Presidential Reconstruction, 66-70 .
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White lawlessness and threats of Negro violence caused Sharkey to
attempt to re-establish militia units in counties not being protected
adequately by Federal forces .

On August 17, 1865, he issued a proclama-

tion calling for the organization of local militia units to aid in suppressing lawlessness and particularly urging former Confederate soldiers
to enroll their acquired military talents in this task .

29

The governor's action immediately aroused the suspicion and
hostility of the military authorities .

General Henry W . Slocum, command-

ing officer of the Department of Mississippi, ordered a cessation of
organizational activities and informed the president of Sharkey ' s actions .
Carl Schurz, a special presidential envoy who was touring the South on a
fact-finding mis sion, happened to arrive on the scene at this point and
sent a despatch to the chief executive supporting Slocum .

30

President Johnson's initial reaction to Sharkey ' s activities was
to advise against the move because of possible unfavorable reaction in
the North, instructing him rather to rely upon the military for the
necessary armed support to enforce law and order .

Sharkey in turn wrote

to Johnson outlining the reasons for his actions, and Johnson, in a dramatic reversal of his former stand, had an order issued to Slocum instructing him to allow the militia organization to continue .

He then

sharply reprimanded Schurz for his intervention in the affair, informing
him that he was to aid in advancing the governmental policy in the South,

29
30

Ibid . , 71-72 .

Ibid . , 73; Eric L . McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction
{ Chicago,-r§64), 193 .
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and allowed Sharkey to publish the rebuke on the questionable premise
that it would increase southern confidence in the president .

31

Although there were other conflicts of various kinds, the ar� on ·
the whole sought to have peaceful contacts with the civil authorities .
After surveying the relations between the military and provisional governors, one qualified student of the era has concluded that as of December, 1865, the South had definitely made progress toward rejoining the
Union and that the � had assisted in this progress by enabling the
interim governments to function effectively .

32

The second major problem encountered in restoring loyal governmenta in the South concerned the matter of appointing loyal men to office .
The secretary of the treasury and the postmaster-general had been instructed to select loyal local residents and, if such could not be found,
to appoint persons from other districts or states .

33

These officials

immediately encountered difficulties which were outlined clearly by Secretary of the Treasury High McCulloch in an extensive letter to Johnson
in March, 1866 .

The major problem was finding officials who' could take

the loyalty oath required to hold federal position .

McCulloch predicted

continuing difficulty because of this point and the reason was obvious:
31
Harris, Presidential Reconstruction, 73-75 ; McKitrick, Andrew
Johnson, 193-194 ; Sefton, � � Reconstruction, 27-28 ; Johnson to
Schurz, Augu�;Jt 30, 1865, Johnson Papers .
32 .
Sefton, &:!!!;L � Reconstruction, 37, 59 . In a chapter entitled
"Working With (and Against) the Provisional Governors, " Sefton gives an
adequate survey of the problems which occurred during the period in ques
tion in the attempt to merge civil and military governments .
3 �ichardson, Messages and
Papers, VI, 314 .
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In the progress of the rebellion very few persons of
character and intelligence in most of these States failed , in
some way or other , to participate in the hostilities , or to
connect themselves with the insurgent government . This is
almost universally true of the young men who are expected to
fill clerkships and other inferior places in the revenue
service .
Yet the only alternative was to appoint outsiders to these posts . While
admitting that the government could appoint northern men , McCulloch
advised against such a move :

"I deem it

my

duty further to remark that

I do not consider it advisable for the government to attempt to collect
taxes in the Southern States by the hands of strangers . " 34
Although the secretary probably was correct in his assumption ,
the fact still remained that ,

the Nation concluded , the difficulty of
finding qualified men in the South was "ins urmountable . " 35 One of the
as

persons having trouble qualifying was the candidate for judge for the
United States District Court in North Carolina. Robert P . Dick ,
3 4McCulloch to Johnson , March 19 , 1866 , Hugh McCulloch Papers
( Library of Congress ) . The oath to which McCulloch was referring was
the so-called Iron-Clad Oath which had been enacted by Congress in July ,
1862 . The latter part was a swearing of allegiance to the United States ,
but the first half was the strong part , "I , A . B . , do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United
States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily
given no aid, countenance , counsel or encouragement to persons engaged
in armed hostility thereto ; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor
attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever , under any
authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States ; that
I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government ,
authority , power or constitution within the United States , hostile or
inimical thereto . " Wal.ter L . Fleming , Documentary History of Reconstruc
tion ( 2 vol.s . , New York , 195 0 ) , I , 191-92 .
35 "Congress , " Nation , January 11 , 1866 , p . 36 .
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Governor Holden ' s nominee , boldly stated the dilemma in a letter to the
president :
If I cannot hold office in North Carolina no one else can ,
If I
who remained at home in the midst of the storm.
cannot hold office , then every federal appointment must be made
from the Northern States . Nine tenths of our people are earn
estly desirous of returning to the Union with their whole soul ,
--but foreign tax gatherers and northern judicial officers will
necessarily greatly try their patience and retard the restora
tion of genuine fraternal feeling[ . J 36
•

An

•

•

accompanying letter from Holden asserted that William S . Mason , his

nominee for United States District Attorney , was experiencing the same
problem but that to bar such men from office meant the probable necessity
of filling federal offices with outsiders . 37 Faced by such circumstances
as these letters outlined, some of the cabinet members involved simply
appointed men of ability regardless of their former sentiments and
despite the fact that this was in defiance of an act of Congress . � ·
Apparently , whenever possible , they selected people who were resident
in each state to fill positions there , a practice that was continued
even after Congress took control of southern reconstruction in early

36nick to Johnson , June 29 , 186 5 , Johnson Papers .
37William W. Holden to Johnson , June 29 , 186 , ibid .
5
38Milton , Age of Hate , 2 49 . It should be noted that Johnson , in
less specific terms , had instructed the secretaries of state , interior ,
navy , and the attorney-general to resume their functions in these states .
In · S O doing, they were bound to encounter some of the same difficulties
as the secretary of the treasury and the postmaster-general .
39For evidence , see particularly the judiciary and treasury
reports in the 186 5 and 1867 editions of United States Register £t
Officers and Agents .
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In filling local and state offices , the provisional governors
met the same problems , and their solution was much the same .

On July 2 0 ,

186 5 , Governor Parsons of Alabama issued a proclamation retaining those
who were in office as of May 22 , the date on which the Confederate state
government had ceased to function.

He further ordered that these offi-

cials were to take the oath of amnesty as provided in the presidential
proclamation of May 29 , and that those who could not were to surrender
their places .

He also reserved the right to remove anyone for "disloyalty
or for improper conduct in office , or neglect of its duties . " 40 Provisional governments in other states were organized in much the same
fashion . 41
Such tactics , however , caused many to complain that loyal Union

men were being passed over in favor of former secessionists .

B,y

a cir-

cular telegram dated August 22 , 186 5 , the president called these charges
to the attention of his governors and requested their replies .

Parsons

denied that any Unionist had been neglected in favor of a secessionist
and noted that he always tried to find a "reasonably qualified" Union
and , failing to find one , filled the office in question with those
"least objectionable . " 4 2 Sharkey of Mississippi felt that in a few

man

minor instances secessionists "may have been accidently appointed , but
never from design . " 4 3 Holden likewise stated that such unintentional
4°Fleming , Documentary History, I , 17 4-7 5 .
41Ibid . , 174 .
4 2Lewis E . Parsons to Johnson , August 4 , 186 , Johnson Papers .
2
5
4'-w
L . L . Sharkey to Johnson , August
25 , 186 5 , ibid .
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appointments undoubtedly had been made in North Carolina, but , on the
whole , such was not the case. 44 South Carolina ' s Governor Perry touched .
on a sore spot when he asserted :
So far as I am concerned , all my sympathies are with the
Union men but there are many now seeking office as Union men who
were never heard of as such in the rebellion . Their latent
Unionism has been brought to light by the hope of office . 4 5
In a later note , Perry declared that in much of the state there existed
a decided lack of Union men and noted that in this situation he had
tended to favor those who were familiar with the duties of the respective
offices , if they had taken the oath and had been pardoned .

He cited the

governors of Mississippi , Alabama , and Georgia as having f�llowed the
same course . 46 These replies and those of his other governors apparently
satisfied the president because he did not choose to pursue the matter
further . 47
Apart from the appointment of provisional governors , Johnson ,
like Lincoln before him, had numerous other federal offices to distribute .
In fact , the end of the war opened positions which Lincoln bad not had
44w. W. Holden to Johnson , August 6 , 186 5 , Index to the Senate
2
Executive Documents , 39 Cong. , 1 ses s . ( 2 vols . , Washington-;-1866 ) , I ,
No . 26 , 222 . Johnson ' s telegram and several of the replies to it are
reproduced in this source .
4 5 B. F . Perry to Johnson , August 8 , 186 , Johnson Papers .
2
5

46Perry to Johnson , August , 186 , ibid.
5
29
47For the other answers , see the following letters in the Johnson
Papers : J . Johnson , September 2 , 186 5 ; A . J . Hamilton , September 23 ,
186 5 . For some reason , Governor Marvin of Florida apparently did not
reply to the presidential query .
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at his disposal and added to this was a reorganization of the �
following the war which made available approximately two thousand regular
officer places . 48 The Nation declared the amount of patronage at the
disposal of the chief executive to be "prodigious" and affirmed that it
had never been greater . 49
The new president also discovered that he had a prodigious amount
of advice as to what to do with this newly acquired power .

Some urged

that the president do nothing in their particular areas for the time
being.

Thurlow Weed , the prominent New York state political leader ,

observed to his friend and associate , Secretary of State William H .
Seward , "We are all right in the State , and only need to be let alone . " 5 0
Simon Cameron , Lincoln' s first secretary of war and a key Pennsylvania
figure , urged that no changes be made in Philadelphia, at least not until
after the October elections .

"It me¥ be close ," he noted , "and we cannot

afford any disturbing elements in the contest beyond those that recon
struction will produce . " 51
There were others who wanted the president to make changes .
Fearing some possible temporary congressional opposition to Johnson ' s
reconstruction policy , Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana declared
48Fish , Civil Service , 189 .
49 "Congress , " Nation , January 11 , 1866 , p . 36 .
5 °weed to Seward , September 29 , 186 5 , William H . Seward Papers
(University of Rochester Library ) .
5 1cameron to Johnson , July 21 , 186 5 , Johnson Papers ( original in
National Archives ) .

that a "resolute wielding of your patronage in favor of your friends �
inside the Union party � cannot fail to build you up with the people and
disarm the opposition in Congress . " 52 A New York newspaper man urged
that Johnson consider War Democrats � "men after your � heart � " in
filling positions in New York . 53 John Cochrane , a Democrat who desired
the lucrative position of collector of the New York Custom House , maintained that in considering candidates for the position , Johnson should
appoint "the fittest and most capable person , who is your friend. Grind
your � � upon your � grind stone . " 5 4 Parke Godwin of the New York
Evening � wrote to assure the president of his support and to urge
that federal offices , particularly in New York ,
be filled by men who comprehend your own ideas in this respect .
Young men , not identified in any manner with the old factions or
cliques , but willing to do justice to all , accustomed to busi
nes.s , and capable of discerning and moulding the future , are
the men now needed. Officials of this character will rally
around them, from all the old parties , a powerful and enthusi
astic support . 55
Confronted with advice that might be well-intentioned or motivated
by mere selfish ambition , the chief executive proceeded in a careful

man-

ner in dealing with patronage matters . Continuing well into 1866 , the
few pronouncements on this subject to groups or individuals were cautious ,
highly proper , and somewhat vague .

In response to a telegram from one

5�orton to Johnson , December 7 , 186 5 , Johnson Papers .
53H . C . Page to Johnson , December 22 , 186 5 , �·
5 4cochrane to Johnson , February 4 , 1866 , ibid.
55Godwin to Johnson , December . 25 , 186 5 , ibid.
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of his Ohio advisers concerning the truthfulness of a certain officeseeker , Johnson asserted grandly :

"Our

desire is to appoint good and

honest men who are capable , faithful to the Constitution , and for the
preservation of the Union . " 56 To a committee representing the Virginia
legislature , he maintained that in a state attempting to resume normal
relations with the Union "all the responsible positions and places ought
to be confined distinctly and clearly to . men who are loyal. u 57 The only
clearly defined guideline which he set down came in an executive directive dated April 7 , 1866 , in which he ordered that , in filling federal
positions and in making promotions , preference should be given to former
soldiers and sailors who had served honorably . Those who had suffered
wounds or who had other service-connected disabilities were to be given
special attention . 58
Such evidence as exists concerning Johnson ' s patronage policy in
the early months of his presidency indicates that he consulted the normal
sources of advice dictated by the spoils system in making his appointments , i . e . , cabinet members , congressmen , governors , prominent state
political figures . Apparently , the new president initially used the
communicati on channels set up by his Republican predecessor .
would find this approach impractical

as

He soon

postwar national politics and

56aeorge W. Morgan to Johnson , May 31 , 1866 ; Johnson to Morgan ,
May 31 , 1866 , ibid .
57 Edward McPherson , The Political History of the United States of
America during the Period of Reconstruction (Washington , 1880 ) , 57 .
58Richardson , Messages and Papers , VI , 4 39- 4 0 .

the 1864 National Union party came to be dominated by the Republicans ,
who in turn would fall overwhelmingly under the leadership of the Radicals , a faction which increasingly was dissatisfied with the new chief
executive .
However , this turn of events was yet in the future .

The one major

problem in the Tennessean ' s early months in office was identifying those
persons on the state level whose advice should be sought and followed.
The key states of New York and Pennsylvania apparently presented the
most difficulty for Johnson in this area .

In New York , the question

revolved around whether the Seward-Weed forces represented the element
which should be entrusted with the patronage in that state . This faction
had received a large share of the appointments in the state during the
Lincoln administration ; 59 but there were naturally opponents to this
group and they made their presence

own . John Cochrane , obviously

kn

deeply influenced by Dean Richmond , the Democratic boss in New York ,
wrote to Montgomery Blair , Lincoln' s first postmaster-general and a key
Maryland political personage , stating that the loyal Democrats of New
York would unite with that faction of the National Union party opposed
to Seward and . Weed if one of their men was appointed to the New York
collectorship .

He strongly implied that the two , "who falsely assume

59carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage , 6 3-64 , 2 4 5 , 2 62 ,
279-80 . Johnson , like Lincoln , apparently continued to follow generally
the lead of this faction in New York throughout his administration .

57
conservatism , " were not the true friends of Johnson . 60 Another correspondent recognized that the pair "largely controlled the wires" of the
political organization , but he pressed the point that they did not control the "sentiments nor the judgments of the people" and cited as evidence of this the small majority returned by New York for the Lincoln
Johnson administration . 61
In Pennsylvania, the question was whether to listen to the voice
of Simon Cameron or the anti-Cameron forces headed by John W. Forney ,
editor of the Philadelphia Press , and Andrew G. Curtin , Pennsylvania ' s
governor .

As

already noted , Cameron was urging a cautious approach .

Curtin and Forney desired changes . The governor wanted the Philadelphia
postmaster , C . A. Walborn , whom he charged with trying to undermine him,
6
removed . 2 Forney , backing Curtin ' s effort , declared that his personal
desire was to protect the president from "the influence of wrong counsels"
and . urged him to follow the lead of the Union members in Congress from
Philadelphia, for to do otherwise "would be most unfortunate for the
60 cochrane to Montgomery Blair , November 19 , 1865 , Johnson Papers .
Blair , a former Democrat turned conservative Republican , forwarded the
letter to Johnson on November 21 . The leaders of the Radical opposition
to Seward and Weed were New York Evening Post poet-editor William Cullen
Bryant , Tribune reformer-editor Horace Greeley , attorney Hiram Barney ,
and prominent merchant George Opdyke . Barney was a son-in-law of the
noted abolitionist and philanthropist Lewis Tappan and served as collector
of New York from 1861 until he became a political liability to Lincoln
and was forced from the position in 1864 . Opdyke served as m�or of New
York from 1862 to 1864 . Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage ,
York
2 1-22 ; William Hartman , "Custom House Patronage and Lincoln ," New -Historical Society Quarterly , XLI (October , 1957 ) , 440-57 passiiii:'"
6 �homas J . Sizer to Johnson , December 18 , 1865 , Johnson Papers .
6 2Curtin to Johnson , June , 1865 , ibid.
22
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interests of the common cause . " 6 3 The chief executive subsequently
received letters from advocates of both camps , asserting that he was
unwisely following the other . 64
Also in line with the dictates of the spoils system, Johnson
allowed relationship and friendship to guide some of his patronage policies during his early days in office .

While stating his opposition to

appointing relatives to office , he made his son Robert assistant secretary to the president and gave his brother William, who died shortly
after he assumed the duties of the office , the position of surveyor of
the port of Velasco , Texas . 65 At the request of one of his old East
Tennessee cronies , Sam Milligan , he appointed Horace Maynard to the
Board of Visitors to the Naval School at Newport . 66 He nominated Lewis
D . Campbell , one of his Ohio political friends , as minister to Mexico , 67
while Joseph A. Wright , another Midwest political associate , became
minister to Prussia. 68
On the whole , President Johnson ' s first months in office must be
considered a success , and this is nowhere more true than in his patronage
63Forney to Johnson , July 5 ,
29 , 1865 , ibid.
64william A. Babcock to Johnson , August 15 , 1865 ; A. B. Sloanaker
to Johnson , November 2 , 1865 , ibid. Apparently Johnson initially fol
lowed the advice of the Forney element .
65Milton , � of Hate ,
232 ; Winston , Andrew Johnson , 292 , 494 ;
Graf and Haskins , Johnson Papers , I , 4n .
66Milligan to Johnson , May 1 , 1865 ; Johnson to Maynard , May 16 ,
2
1865 ; Maynard to Johnson , May 19 , 1865 , Johnson Papers .
67Milton , � of Hate , 141 ; William Seward to Henry Sanford ,
December 23 , 1865 , Seward Papers .
68Graf and Haskins , Johnson Papers , I, 146n .
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policy .

His appointments to the provisional governorships had been

generally well received . Even the Radical Republicans , who became increasingly restive throughout the summer and fall of 1865 because of the
rapidity of Johnson ' s reconstruction policy , accepted the president ' s
provisional governor appointees at that time . 69 As the New York Times
concerning this period later noted ,
In the choice of Provisional Governors , in appointments to
subordinate offices , in the terms passed upon the Loyal legis
latures , and in a hundred other wey-s , he exerted himself to
secure expression and to impart authority to the. loyal element .
He selected men in whom, until lately , the Radicals found no
fault . 70
·

In sum, one scholar of the period asserts that , during the first
months of Johnson ' s administration , he proved himself "a virtuoso of
politics . " While retaining wide support among moderate Republicans ,
northern Democrats , and the large majority of Southerners with his ambiguous and vague pronouncements on thorny reconstruction problems , he held
appointments and removals at a minimum in order to keep from being identified with one particular element or another .

"Had Andrew Johnson died

in January , 1866 , " concludes David Donald , "he would have gone down in
69Howard K . Beale , The Critical Year : A Study of Andrew Johnson
and Reconstruction (New York , 1958 ) , 39 . Of Johnson ' s various guber
natorial appointments , Holden seems to have aroused the most opposition
within the state to which he was appointed . For accounts of the mixed
reaction concerning Holden see R. J . Powell to Johnson , October 2 1 ,
1865 ; H . M . Watterson to Johnson , June 29 , 1865 , Johnson Papers ; James
Roy Morrill , III , "North Carolina and the Administration of Brevet Major
General Sickles ," North Carolina Historical Review , XLII ( Summe r , 1965 ) ,
29 1 . It is of some interest to note that of the seven men whom Johnson
appointed as provisional governors , one , Holden , later declared in favor
of congressional reconstruction , while two others , Perry and Parsons ,
were active participants in the pro-Johnson National Union movement of
1866 .
70Editorial , New York Times , September 8 , 1866 .
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our history books as one of our most politically astute Presidents . " 71
The point is that he did not die and the political conse�sus which had
prevailed up to that point was soon to disappear under the weight of the
increasing complexities of reconstruction .

7lnavid Donald, The Politics o f Reconstruction , 1863-1867 .(Baton
Route , 196 5 ) , 23-24 �
--

-

-

-

CHAPTER III
FOR WANT OF A POLICY
The president was allowed a free patronage hand during his early
months in office , but that situation soon changed.

To understand why ,

one must briefly examine the 186 5 positions of Johnson and Congress on
reconstruction , the problem which was destined to become the central
issue of the Johnsonian presidency .
The proclamations of May 29 , 186 5 , contained the basic ideas of
presidential reconstruction , and although his plan was somewhat ambiguous , the chief executive did have a policy and that was more than could
be said for Congress , which was in recess at the time Johnson assumed
office . Perhaps the new national leader should have called for a special
session to deal with the problems of reconstruction , but even if he had
done so , it is unlikely that Congress would have accomplished much because there was no general agreement among its members as to what should
be done . 1 As it was , Johnson apparently hoped to achieve such an outstanding success with his reconstruction effort that the tide of public
opinion would be in his favor by the time the national legislators met
in December .
1At least one recent authority on the subj ect of reconstruction
argues that Johnson should have called Congress into special session .
See Brock , An American Crisis , 29 .
61
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The president ' s position was enhanced by the fact that there were
differences of opinion among Republicans as to the proper course to pur
sue concerning reconstruction .
majority of that party in

Moderation was the wat chword of the

186 5 , and in dealing with the South , this

meant compromise , tempering justice with mercy , and co-operation with
the president ' s efforts to rehabilitate that region .

The one point upon

which they all generally agreed was that guarantees of some sort that
the events of recent years would not be repeated at a future date should
be exacted from the southern states as the pri ce of their readmission to
the Union .

Because the chief magi strate had not indicated otherwise ,

they as sumed that his policy was an experiment . in this direction , that
his mind was open to possible alternatives, and that no final decisions
had been made .

Prominent among the moderates. were Senators William Pitt

Fessenden of Maine , Edwin D . Morgan of New York , James W. Grimes of Iowa ,
John Sherman of Ohio , Lyman Trumbull of Illinois , and William M . Stewart
of Nevada .

In the House of Representatives were James G . Blaine of

Maine , Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts , James A. Garfield , John Bingham,
and Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio , and Elihu Washburne of Illinois .

In

the cabinet were Postmaster-General William Dennison , Att orney-General
James Speed , and Secretary of the Interior James Harlan .

On the state

level , Governors Oliver P . Morton of Indiana and John A. Andrew of
Massachusetts occupied moderate ground ,

as

did such prominent nonofficial

figures as the Reverend Henry Ward Beecher and editors George William

63
Curtis of Harper ' s Week1Y and E . L . Godkin of the Nation .

2

Those men who had become recognized as Radical Republicans ,
initially because of their opposition to Lincoln ' s experimental soft
line toward the South , had no organization in 186 5 , and the only mutual
bond which tended to unite them was suspicion that Johnson ' s lenient
policy was courting disaster .

Even that feeling was not universal among

the Radicals , and a number of them were able to persuade themselves
until well into 1 866 that the president was sound in his stand and that
he was the man they had considered him to be at the time he assumed the
presidency .

While such persons as Thaddeus Stevens , Charles Sumner , Ben

Wade , Ben Butler , George Boutwell , and Henry Wilson began to be a little
uneasy about the president ' s policy during the summer and fall of 186 5 ,
the only clear voice of Radical opposition at that time was that of
Maryland congres sman Henry Winter Davis--and he would be dead before the
year was out .

3

In brief , the idea that some Radical plot against Johnson

and his reconstruction policy was formed even before the reconvening of

�cKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 77-79 ; Patrick , Reconstruction , 51-52 ;
Brock , An American Crisis , 4 5 . Actually , Dennison , Speed , and Harlan
were probably about as close to the Radical camp as they were to the
moderate . For pertinent comments concerning their re�pective positions ,
see Chapter V .

1McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 5 4-64 passim ; Patrick , Reconstruction ,
51 . Davis died on December 30 , 186 5 , after having served as a Know
Nothing in the Thirty-fourth Congres s and a Republican in the Thirty
fifth and Thirty-sixth Congres ses . He failed in his re-election bid in
1 86 0 but was elected to the Thirty-eighth Congress . He did not stand
for re-election in 1864 . Biographical Directory , 783 .
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Congress in December , 1 86 5 , appears to be incorrect .

4

The one thing which virtually all Republicans were determined to
see before agreeing to readmi ssion of the former Confederate states to
their full right s and privileges within the Union was a truly repentant
South .

Unfortunately , there was little evidence of such repentance as

members of Congress met for the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress .

They were greeted by delegations from several of the southern

states seeking admi ssion as representatives of the southern people .
Among them were nine former high-ranking Confederate military officers-four generals and five colonels--and many ex-civil officials .

On the

state level were governors and legislators who had faithfully served the
Confederate c ause .

Many of the states were busy enacting the so-called

Black Codes which were designed to deny the freedman any voice in the
new state of affairs .

Were these acts to be considered repentance?

The

Republican maj ority in Congress thought not and denied the southern
representatives their seats .

The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was

organized to investigate presidential reconstruction and southern read
mittance would have to await the outcome of that investigation .

5

4
There were a few prominent Republicans who never were a part of
either the moderate or Radical faction of the party . Among these were
cabinet members Welles , McCulloch , and Seward , former Senators Thomas
Ewing of Ohio and Orville Browning of Illinois , former Attorney-General
Edward Bates , General William T . Sherman , and Senators James R . Doolittle
of Wis consin , Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania , and James Dixon of Connecticut .
They were for immediate readmittance of the southern states and would
continue to support steadfastly Johnson and his restoration effort s .
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 80-81 .
5

Patrick , Reconstruction , 6 0 , 6 5 .

President Johnson did not question the right of Congress to pass
upon the qualifi cation of its members , but he did not believe that Congress had any constitutional right to question the legality of the south
ern state governments which had been formed under executive direction .

6

In contrast , the �adical Republicans seemed to feel that- reconstruction
was properly the domain of Congress and resented what they considered to
be presidential encroachment on that right .

Most Republicans , however ,

while believing that the final reconstruction decisions must rest with
Congress , apparently did not feel that the chief executive had acted
improperly during the recess and did not consider themselves opposed to
him during the early weeks of the session .

7

February of 1 866 proved to be the turning point for moderate
Republican support of the Johnson administration .

At that time , the

president and Congress were deadlocked over the is sue of the legality of
the southern governments .

Moderate Republicans desired to protect the

persons and rights of the freedmen during this stalemate _and an extension
of the time and power of the Freedmen ' s Bureau , which had been created
originally in March , 1 86 5 , to give aid and relief to former slaves and
needy southern whites , seemed to be the best means to accomplish this
obj ective .

Senator Lyman Trumbull introduced the measure and it easily

passed through Congres s .

Believing that Johnson saw the need to protect

the freedmen , moderate Republicans confidently expected the president

6
7

Ibid . , 6 3 .
Brock , An American Crisis , 97 .

66
to sign the bill .

Much to their surprise and dis� , he vetoed the

measure on February 19 , arguing among other things that , in the absence
of the southern states , the right of Congress to legislate for them was
questionable .

The veto was sustained by one vote in the Senate , but it

was to be the last on a maj or issue which would be allowed to stand .

8

The president followed this move by making an intemperate speech
to a large group of serenaders at the White House on Washington ' s Birthday .

In it , he roundly condemned the Radicals for their obstruction of

his reconstruction policy and singled out some of their leaders for particular mention .

This tactic thoroughly alienated the Radicals and the

two actions together proved something of a turning point for the moderates .

From this time onward , they deserted the president ' s cause in

increasingly large numbers .

Johnson had succeeded in uniting the

Republican . party--against himself .

9

Seeing the increasing hostility of the maj ority of the Thirtyninth Congress , Johnson began to look forward to the congressional elections of 1 866 in the belief that the people would sustain him at the
polls by electing representatives friendly to him.

One way of assuring

a favorable result appeared to be through the use of the seemingly awesome powers of the federal patronage .

8
9

There were more than 4 0 , 000

Patrick , Reconstruction , 66- 67 .

Ibid . , 6 9 ; Brock , An American Crisis , 106 , 110-ll . Trumbull had
also introduced a Civil Rights Bill to protect the Negro once military
forces were withdrawn from the South . Johnson ' s veto of this measure in
March , 1866 , was overridden in Congress and the moderates increased their
desertion of him.
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federal appointive positions scattered throughout the various departments
of the government .

10

If these positions , or at least the key ones , could

be filled with Johnson sympathi zers , the out come of the 1 866 elections
conceivably could be swayed greatly .
In his desire to appoint to office those whose loyalty to the
Union was unquestionable , Lincoln had filled many federal positions ,
particularly the important ones , with those who came . to identify them
selves with the Radic al cause .

11

As Congress , increasingly dominated by

the Radicals , made it clear that presidential reconstruction was not
acceptable , demands by Johnson proponents that federal offices be swept
clean of Radi cal incumbents became ever greater .
from Democrats and Republicans alike .

This pressure came

A New Hampshire Democrat , declar-

ing that the president had Democratic support in that state " from principle , without hope or expectation of office , " urged that Johnson make
it known that " support of your policy is the condition �:>n which they
[ R�publicans] can hold offi ce under your Administration . 11 12

From Nevada ,

a writer began his letter by announcing that federal patronage in that
state was completely in the possession of those hostile to Johnson and
warned that support for the president could not be sustained unless the
situation were altered.

13

From San Francisco came a similar warning .

1°
For more precise figures , see Introduction , footnote 27 .
11
Beale , Critical Year , 11 8 ; Carman and, Luthin , Lincoln and the
Patronage , 329-30 .
--

--

12
Edmund Beebe to Johnson , March 5 , 18 66 , Johnson Papers .
13
E . R . Chase to Johnson , March 22 , 18 66 , ibid .

--

68
To receive support in that area , Johnson must not allow all of his
14
patronage to remain in the hands of his "un friends , as it now is . "
A Johnsonian friend and as sociate in Ohio , Lewis D . Campbell , had " reliable information" that " every Revenue Collector in Ohio except perhaps
one or two , are bitterly opposing you .
ditto . "

15

Your Assessors and Postmasters

From Hartford, a Gideon Welles correspondent informed the

secretary that the president ' s appointments were being used in behalf of
the Radical cause and called for the appointment of none but " open ,
earnest Johnson men . "

16

From friendly newspapers came much the same advice which the
president was receiving through the mail .

Typical was the New York

Herald , under the direction of James Gordon Bennett .

On April 2 3 , he

urged the removal of Radi cal officeholders and the bestowal of their
posts upon Administration friends .

The re�;�ult of such a move would be

" such a revolution by next fall that the radical disorganizers will be
defeated in the election, and the Johnson party thus formed m&¥ hope to
be the party of the future . "

17

On April 25 came another appeal :

Let the President
use all the legitimate means at his
command , in the dispensation of patronage , to strengthen his
position and encourage his supporters within the lines of the
•

•

•

14
J . McCormick to Johnson , April 21 , 1 866 , ibid.
15

campbell to Johnson , April 25 , 1866 , ibid.

16
Alfred E . Burr to Welles , June 10 , 1 866 , Gideon Welles Papers
( Library of Congress ) .
17
New York Herald , April 23 , 18 66 , cited by McKitrick , Andrew
Johnson , 3 6 5 .

69
Union war party . The Johnson republicans everywhere , under
this encouragement , can go i to the Congressional contest with
every assurance of success . lg
Prodded by the urgent appeals of his supporters , Johnson apparently
began to make a few removals , and reports of his actions soon began to
reach members of Congress . A Peoria correspondent informed Illinois
Senator Lyman Trumbull that the postmaster there , a "working Republican ,
radical , and a man who stands by Congress every time ," had been replaced
by Isaac Underhill , a well-to-do individual who associated with the
Republican party only when he desired office . 19 From Cairo , Trumbull
and his fellow Illinois Senator , Richard Yates , learned that Assessor
Dewitt C Barbee , a "good

true man , " had been replaced by a man of
"known Copperhead proclivities and associations . " 2 0 Senator John Sherman
•

&

was informed by the Circleville , Ohio, postmaster that there was a plot
in the making to remove him from office and that every indication now
existed that Johnson "means to coerce every . Postmaster , and all other

18New York Herald , April , 1866 , ibid . , 78. Johnson later was
3
25
warned by a member of the Herald staff that he must either make some
decisive moves in the direction being urged by Bennett or lose the sup
port of the Herald because of Bennett ' s tendency to support what . he con
sidered the strongest position . W . B. Phillips to Johnson , May 20 , 1866 ,
Johnson Papers . As Phillips predicted , the president did lose the sup
port of the newspaper in question when Bennett saw that the election
tide was running against the president . See Phillips to Johnson , Sep
tember 16 , 1866 , ibid .
l9G . Martin t o Trumbull , April 19 , 1866 , Lyman Trumbull Papers
( Library of Congress ) .
2 0John Olney and others to Trumbull and Yates , May 3 , 1866 , ibid.
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Federal officers , into the support of his policy , and in antagonism to
that of Congress . "

21

Remarking that several agents had been removed

recently , as he understood , " upon express order of the President , " a
Columbus pension agent also conveyed to Sherman his fear of impending
removal .

22

Reports such as these to Trumbull and Sherman obviously were
being received by their colleagues because , early in May , the Senate
became locked in a serious discussion concerning the possibility of
limiting the president ' s patronage powers .

On April 30 , Trumbull had

introduced an amendment to a post office appropriation bill which would
have had the effect of holding up salary payments to persons appointed
during the recess of Congress until the Senate had confirmed their
appointments .

23

The fiction was initially maintained that the amendment

was being submitted to give uniformity to already established practice
and that it had nothing to do with the feud between Congress and the
President .

As the debate progres sed , however , tempers began to warm and

the real issue came to the surface .

In expressing his support for the

Trumbull amendment , John B . Henderson of Mis souri declared :
I am not afraid to take my position on this subj ect . I have
nothing to ask from the present Executive in the way of patron
age ; and I can safely express the opinion here that if I had the
.

2

� . H . P . Denny to Sherman , May 7 , 1866 , John Sherman Papers
( Library of Congress )

·

•

.

22
Joe

� . · Dwyer

to Sherman ,

�

25 , 1866 , ibi d .

.
23
Excluded were appointments to vacancies whi ch occurred as the
result · of death , resignation , or expiration of term. Cons . Globe , 39
Cong . , 1 sess . , 227 4 .
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President would not grant it . I am satisfied from various
appointments that have been made in � own State , and from
appointments that I understand are to be made in that State�
4
that nothing I could say would have any influence whatever .
Reporting on newspaper despatches that removals were in the wind , Senator
"We are subsequently

Timothy Howe of Wisconsin professed hi s bafflement :
told that the

ax

is in motion .

The

is in motion for what ?

ax

down and appropriate the spoils to the victors ?

To hew

Who are those victors

that are gathering in the spoils , and when and where did they achieve
the victory? "

He noted that the only victory that Johnson bad achieved

of which he knew had been that of 1864 , when he was elevat�d to the vice- ·
presidency .

" If he has achieved a victory since then , " Howe innocently

declared , " I have omitted to read of it in the papers and I have not
been informed of it in any way . "

25

In response to a remark by Luke

Poland of Vermont to the effect that he had no definite knowledge of
presidential plans to make removals , Trumbull heatedly stated :
But the Senator tells us he has no knowledge that the Presi
dent designs making any removals .
Well , sir , I have some
knowledge that removals are being made throughout the country .
It is not proper to speak here of removals which have been made
and are now pending in executive ses sion ; but if it was , I
think I could bring to the notice of the Senator quite a number
of cases . But , sir , outs ide of executive session , I have seen
it stated in newspapers of the country that the marshal of the
western district of Pennsylvania has been removed , that the
collector of internal revenue in the district of Pitt sburg has
been removed , that the postmaster in Pittsburg has been removed .
Sir , I have heard o f a number of removals , which ar e also
noticed in the papers of my own St ate . Yes , sir , I have heard
of a letter written to a man holding an insignificant office in
Illinois from one of the Departments , informing him that , having
taken part in a meeting whi ch passed resolutions sustaining
Congress , he would have an opportunity to explain the matter
�
The Senator seems not to have heard of any of these things . 2
•

24

Ibid . , 2308 .

25

•

•

Ibid . , 2337 .

26

Ibid. , 2 420.
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One of the underlying currents of the debate and one especially
irritating to the senators was the fact that many of them were not being
consulted concerning impending removals in their respective states ,
while other people were .

Henderson indicated his displeasure at this

tactic in his speech of May l .

Henry Wilson of Massachusetts made it

even clearer on M� 8 in remarks concerning some events in New Jersey :
Now what would you think of a letter written by a public
officer to another public officer in New Jersey s�ing , "The
Secretary of the Treasury directs me by the order of the Presi
dent to say to you that you must remove a certain man in your
employment , and in filling his place consult Mr . [ James M. ]
Scovel? " It is well known and understood that Mr. Scovel struts
over New Jersey claiming to control the public patronage in that
State , and we have nominations before the Senate now of his
dictation. 27
The debate raged from April 30 to May ll and during this period
of time much the same ground was plowed concerning the president ' s right
and power to remove as had been covered during the First Congress . 2 8
Throughout the debate , President Johnson had his supporters in the persons of such men as James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin and Reverdy Johnson
27 Ibid. , 45 . In his speech , Wilson also recalled how he and
2 2
several of his colleagues remembered that Scovel had been in Washington
earlier bragging that he would elect a senator from New Jersey opposed
to the president . Such was probably the case because Scovel was presid
ing officer in the upper house of the New Jersey legislature and held
the deciding vote in the election of a senator to represent the state .
Having been won to the Johnson cause by promises of controlling federal
patronage in the state , he prevented a joint session of the legislature
and thus the election of a man hostile to the administration . He later
in 1866 deserted the Johnson cause to allow the election of a man who in
1868 would vote against Johnson in the impeachment trial . David Miller
Dewitt , The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson (Madison , Wisconsin ,
1967 ) , 79,"""158.
""
2 �L
lMany of the same arguments would be heard once again the following year in relation to the passage of the Tenure of Office Act .
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of Maryland .

29

There were also those who , while not necessarily favoring

the executive cause , believed the amendment to be unneces sary because ,
as Senator Sherman put it , the president , in making removals merely to
gain support for his policy , "would lose more votes by the exercise of a
power of that kind

•

•

•

than he could gain .

I do not believe that the

power of appointment would affect political opinion in this country one
iota . "

30

Still , many others felt as Senator Howe did when he argued that

to vote down Trumbull ' s amendment would cause the pres ident to " think it
justifiable to insist upon making vacant all places filled by those who
do not sustain his policy and to supply their places by those who do . "

31

The final vote t aken on May 11 resulted in a 23 to 16 victory for those
who opposed the Trumbull amendment and the is sue of curbing the executive
removal power was temporarily laid to rest .

32

The entire episode concerning the Trumbull amendment was a kind of
tempest in a teapot .

The comments of the partic ipants such as Henderson

and Trumbull concerning removals of which they had heard made it appear
that large numbers of removals already were being made .

Indeed , the

29

on May 1 , Johnson inquired as to the true purpose of the pro
posed amendment and then answered his own question by rather propheti
cally surmi sing that it must be to place before the Senate " some grolind
upon which the other branch of Congress may impeach the President of the
United States . " Cong. Globe , 39 Cong . , 1 sess . , 2310 .
30

Ib_.
.d '
_J.

32

22 80 .

31

Ibid . , 2 4 53-5 4 .

Ibid . , 2559 . The amendment originally passed the Senate on
May 2 by a vote of 19 to 11 with 19 absent , but on the following day ,
Senator Poland , apparently encouraged by others , moved to reconsider the
measure . There was some subsequent vote-switching on May 11 and 10
absences with the result of the defeat of the measure . See ibid . , 2339 ,
235 8 , 2 4 29 .
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Nation reported that the measure had been introduced because of the
" many recent removals of postmasters , internal revenue collectors , et c .
of the radical Republican order . "

33

In realitY. , the entire affair appar-

ently was inspired by fervent Johnsonians who had been warning federal
officeholders that failure to subscribe to the president ' s policies
would mean removal as soon as Congress adjourned rather than by actual
widespread removals .

The New York Times labelled the Senate ' s attempt

34
to . limit the chi ef executive ' s patronage powers "wholly unprovoked . "
The ho.s tile New York Tribune . refrained from attacking Johnson for having
actually made office changes , being content to " fervently trust that the
President will do nothing calculated to widen the breach between him and
Congress . "

35

As the debate over alleged presidential removals progressed in
the Senate , Johnson adherents were doing more than merely demanding the
purge of Radicals from publi c offices .

There was increasing sentiment

among such persons to organize a national movement to sustain the presi
dent ' s policy .

In March , 1 866 , a National Union Club was organized in

Washington under the leadership of As sistant Postmaster-General Alexander
W. Randall for the purpose of supporting the Johnson administration .
Such prominent conservative Republican figures as Thurlow Weed , Seward ,
Welles , McCulloch , Cowan , Dixon , Doolittle , and Browning backed the
effort , and similar clubs sprang up in various parts of the

33 "
34
35

congress , " Nation , May 1 , 1866 , p . 5 46 .

Editorial , New York Times , May 4 , 1 866 .
Editorial , New York Tribune , May 5 , 1866 .
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nation .

36

B,y the late spring , a nat ional organization was a definite

possibility .

In June , the call for a general convention was issued and

the meeting took place in mid-August in Philadelphi a.

Amid a great deal

of enthusiasm and exc itement , the National Union party was launched .

37

Following the Philadelphia convention , the pressure upon Johnson
to purge Radicals from office became more intense .

38

Friends and advis-

ers urged change and , as Johnson procrastinated in the days and weeks
immediately after the convention , they must have felt as one Brooklyn
writer who complained to Weed on August 24 ,
We have had so many rumors of their [ Johnson enemies ] removal
resulting in no official announcement of the fact , that many of
your earnest supporters begin to doubt whether they will be
removed at all , and so obj ectionable are they to every conserva
tive , that many are becoming indi fferent to the coming canvass . 39
Perhaps even more illustrative of their attitude would have been the
anguished cry of another individual in early August , " ' How long , Oh Lord
40
how long ! ' "

36
Roy F . Nichols , " A Great Party Which Might Have Been Born in
Philadelphia , " The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography , LVII
( October , 1933 ) , 361 .
37
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 403-1 7 passim ; Milton , Age of Hate ,
350-53 passim.
38
Lloyd Paul Stryker , Andrew Johnson : A Study in Courage ( New
York , 1929 ) , 329 .
39

Edward J . Lowber to Thurlow Weed , August 2 4 , 1 8 66 , Thurlow Weed
Papers ( Univers ity of Rochester } .
40
Joseph H . Geiger ( Columbus , Ohio ) to Johnson , August 2 , 1 866 ,
Johnson Papers . For examples of other pleas for the removal of Johnson
enemies from office made in and around the time of the Philadelphia meet
ing , see the following letters to Johnson in his papers : George Bartlett
( Binghamton , N . Y . ) , August 7 ; R . Emmet Monaghan ( West Chester , Pa . ) ,
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Secretary McCulloch testified to the intensity of the pressure
being placed upon the president to make changes in officeholders .

In an

August 22 letter to Senator William Pitt Fessenden , he declared that the
demand upon the chief executive to make changes was so great " that it
will be out of the question for me to save from decapitation all the
Government officers in the first and second Districts in Maine . "

41

To

Elihu Washburne , an Illinois congressman , he wrote on September 1 4 that ,
while no revenue office changes had been made in Washburne ' s district to
that point , the upcoming elections were caus ing such a stir that patron
age moves were hard to resist .

42

Johnson had either intentionally or inadvertently declared war on
the Radicals on February 22 and it subsequently had blossomed into a
struggle with Congress .

Now , with a national movement sustaining him in

this battle , the chief magistrate was almost compelled to give his supporters aid in the form of public offices .

The New York Times reported

that he had pledged such support to a New Hampshire delegation that had
called upon him in the wake of the Philadelphia convention .

It quoted

the president as replying to their request for removal of officeholders
opposed to him by stating that "we have now a policy and principles

August 1 4 ; A . D . Rock { San Francisco ) , September 10 ; William J . Allen
{ Cairo , Ill . ) , September 21 ; G . Busteed {Boston ) , September 29 ; D . M .
Leatherman ( Paris , France ) , October 4 , 1 866 .
4

�cCulloch to Fessenden , August 22 , 18 66 , William Pitt Fessenden
(
Papers Library of Congress ) .
4

�cCulloch to Washburne , September 14 , 1866 , Elihu B . Washburne
(
Papers Library of Congress ) .
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recognized and laid down by the most intelligent , able , and patriotic
body of men that has been convened since the days of the Declaration of
Independence . "

He then declared that those who received patronage from

the government would have to adhere to the principles set forth at Philadelphia , since it was now " a duty the Administration owed itself that
strength and power should be given to those who . maintain the principles
declared by that great body of national men . "

43

Whether or not the chief executive actually gave this pledge , the
evidence seems to indicate that he still was hesitant to make office
changes .

This was undoubtedly true in part because there were certain

problems connected with the use of patronage , particularly in the set of
circumstances in which Johnson found himself , of whi ch his fervent followers may or may not have been aware .

One of the diffi cult ies concerned

the matter of how extensive removals should be .

Should there be a gen-

eral proscription of offices or only removal of key Radical figures?
There were those who urged the former course upon Johnson , but others
who advised caution .

In a letter to a brother in Washington who had

access to Johnson , Hugh Ewing , who had served as chairman of the Kansas
delegation to the Philadelphia convention , neatly summari zed the dilemma
which faced Johnson nationwide when he remarked concerning those in Kansas who wanted wholesale removals :

"They are too anxious to at once

remove every Federal office holder in the state and are very injudicious
in indiscriminately recommending successors

•

.

In a letter to

43
News item in the New York Times , August 18, 1866 .
44

Hugh Ewing , H . S . Sleeper , and James L . McDowell to Thomas
Ewing , Jr . , Sept ember 11, 1866, Ewing Family Papers ( Library of Congress ) .
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McCulloch , Samuel J . Tilden , a key New York politician and future
presidential candidate , warned against making indiscriminate changes , in
that the . giving of Federal offices as "mere personal benefactions

•

•

•

would be suicide on the part of the President and a betrayal of his sup
porters and his caus e . "

45

From Des Moines , John A . Kasson , who had

served under Lincoln as first assistant postmaster-general , informed
Montgomery Blair that a few specific changes could be made , but that
wholesale removals would serve to create among the ousted " open working
enemies , where now they are half-disposed friends . "

46

From experience with such removals as he already had made , President Johnson probably was aware of exactly what Kas son meant .

The mail

of many congres smen indi cated the hostility which had been aroused by
such attempts to turn Radicals out of office .
declared to Senator Lyman Trumbull :
been based on charges .

One removed postmaster

" I should have felt badly if it had ·

I aimed to do my duty but all the Post Offices

in Illinois could not buy me to the support of A Johnson . "

47

One of

John Sherman ' s correspondents commented that rightly or wrongly each
person removed from office "now is rather looked upon as the victim of

45

Tilden to McCulloch , September 17 , 1866 , John Bigelow ( ed. ) ,
Letters and Literary Memorials of Samuel J . Tilden ( 2 vols . , New York ,
1908 ) , I , 203 . Apparently foreseeing Johnson as the Democratic candidate
for president in 1 8 6 8 , Tilden actively labored on Johnson ' s behalf during
the 1 866 campaign and attempted to build a coalition party of Democrats
and Republicans in New York . Alexander C . Frick , Samuel John Tilden : A
Study in· Political Sagacity ( New York , 1939 ) , 153-5 5 .
--

46
47

Kasson to Blair , August 28 , 1866 , Johnson Papers .
H . S . Thomas to Trumbull , Ma;y 19 , 1 866 , Trumbull Papers .
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Executive vengeance . "

48

An officeholder , obviously expecting a Radical

victory , informed his congressman that it would be " for my future advan
tage

•

•

to be turned out of the office I hold . "

•

49

While requesting

his representative to save his posit ion for him if possible , an Ohio
federal employee defiantly added , "Well if I must die I will die with my
harness on [ . ]

I will not desert my friends to hold any position .

u 50

Horace Greeley ' s anti-Johnson New York Tribune gave its assessment of
the situation by declaring , "Our friends in office are very quiet and
reticent .

Kick them out , and they will be lively as skinned eels in hot
51

vinegar . "

Fessenden calmly gave much the same opinion to the secretary

of the treasury :

" Turning our friends out of office any where only un-

ties their tongues , and intensifies the activity of energetic and influential men .

If the President will do it to gratify such flunkies as

Doolittle and Cowan , he must take the consequences . "

52

That removals

were not to be made lightly was a fact undoubtedly obvious to the president , if not to his followers .
Another problem involved in federal office distribution was the
often conflicting advice which Johnson had to weigh in making patronage

48
N . S . Jones to Sherman , June 13 , 1 866 , Sherman Papers .
49
Papers .

Frederick Brown to Elihu Washburne , June 19 , 1 866 , Washburne

5°

Horace C . Beebe to James Garfield , July 26 , 18 66 , Jame s A . Gar
field Papers ( Library of Congress ) .
5

�ditorial ,

New York Tribune , July 1 8 , 18 66 .

52
william Pitt Fessenden to Hugh McCulloch , August 15 , 1 8 66 ,
McCulloch Papers .

8o
decisions .

The more important the position , the greater the problem.

An outstanding example of this fact can be seen in connection with the
position of collector at the New York Custom House .

Chauncey M . Depew ,

himself a disappointed candidate for that coveted post in 1866 , later
described its importance :
It was a position of great political power because of its
patronage . There being no civil service , the appointments
were sufficiently numerous and important to largely control the
party in the State of New York , and its political influence
reached into other commonwealths . It was an office whose fees
were enormous , and the emoluments far larger than those of any
position in the country . 5 3
Twice within a period of a few months , Johnson had to make an
appointment to this key position .

In August , 1865 , he had selected for

that office a personal friend, former New York Senator Preston King , a
Democrat turned Republican and acceptable to the influential Weed-Seward
combination .

In November , King , either by accident or design , fell from
a ferryboat into New York harbor and drowned . 54 Following this tragic
death , various New York factions began to push their candidates for the

5 3 chauncey M . Depew , � Memories of EightY Years (New York , 1 ) ,
922
46 .
54Whether King ' s death was an accident or suicide is open to
question . James G . Blaine later charged that King was in reality a Radi
cal whom Johnson wanted to remain conservative . Caught in the middle
between his personal friendship with Johnson and his convictions that to
remain in office was to forfeit the good will of the many who had faith
in his integrity , he decided to commit suicide . "From the anguish which
his sensitive nature could not endure , " Blaine later explained , "he
sought relief in the grave . " James G . Blaine , Twenty Years of Congress :
� Lincoln to Garfield ( 2 vols . , Norwich , Connecticut , 1886T, II , 187 .
For particulars concerning King ' s appointment , see John H . and LaWanda
Cox , Politics , Principle , and Prejudice , 1865-1866 : Dilemma of Recon
struction America (Glencoe , New York , 196�68-70 .
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now vacant position .

War Democrat s

favored either General A . Dix or

General John Cochrane , both Democratic Johnson supporters in New York .
Prominent regular state Democrats--such men as S . L . M . Barlow and Dean
Richmond--favored either Sanford E. Church , a McClellan Democrat who
nonetheless had supported the war , or Judge William D . Shipman , a Connecticut Democrat .

Other possibly acceptable candidates of the New York

Democracy were John Van Buren , Mart in Van Buren ' s son and a prominent
party strategist , and General Henry W. Slocum, who had been the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for governor of New York in 1 86 5 .

Both

regular and War Democrats definitely opposed the appointment of a WeedSeward man , and both sought the support of presidential adviser Mont
gomery Blair .

55

The Weed-Seward forces had ideas of their own .

This faction

included not only the secretary of state and the prominent New York
Republican political boss , but also such figures as Senator Edwin D .
Morgan and New York Times editor Henry J . Raymond , who was at that time
also the leader of Johnson Republicans in the House of Representatives .
This combination favored H . H . Van Dyck , who like King was a Democrat
turned Republi can , but they also had a number of other acceptable candidates to suggest .

Weed initially would have accepted a War Democrat

such as Colonel Henry G . Stebbins , a former congressman , but after
Johnson ' s veto of the Freedmen ' s Bureau Bill and his February 22 speech ,
he hardened his position on the grounds that any Democratic appointment

55

Ibid . , 113-17 . Blair himself favored the regular Democratic
cause and urged this course upon the president . Ibid . , 116 .
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would be taken by Johnson ' s opponents as evidence that he had deserted
the Union party .

A March 1 6 conference between Weed and upstate Demo-

cratic boss Richmond resulted in a compromise candidate in the person of
DeWitt Littlej ohn , a former Republican speaker of the state legislature .
B.y this time , however , Senator Morgan was favoring Chauncey Depew , former
New York secretary of state , a possibility which Weed somewhat reluctantly
endorsed .

56

Out side influences also were brought to bear upon the harried
chief executive .

Senator James Dixon of Connecticut , one of the few

strong Johnson Republicans yet remaining in the Senate , was pushing the
cause of Judge Henry E . Davies of the New York Court of Appeals .

Davies

was a Republican of doubtful loyalty , but even more important , generally
was considered anti-Weed .

B.y March , Secretary McCulloch was also favoring

Davies , and despite efforts of both Morgan and Van Dyck t o discredit him ,
Davies appeared to be Johnson ' s favorite .

To make matters worse for the

Seward-Weed fact ion , when Congress in April overrode Johnson ' s veto of
Trumbull ' s Civil Right s Bill , both Senator Morgan and Representative
Theodore M . Pomeroy , the congressman from Seward ' s home district , voted
for the measure .

Montgomery Blair , a consistent Seward foe , promptly

presented this turn of events as evidence of Seward ' s disloyalty .

57

B.y late March , yet another man was being urged for the coveted
position--Henry A . Smythe , president of the Central National Bank of the
City of New York and a presumed Republican possessed of an uncertain

56

rbid . ,

118- 21 .

57

Ibid . ,

121-23 .
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political past .

Charles Halpine , a War Democrat and editor of the New

York Citizen , urged Smythe ' s appointment on the grounds that he would
find wide ac ceptability .

He further assured the president that Smythe ' s

only concern would be "to find out your wishes & do all in hi s power to
advance your interests by the political influence of the Custom House . "

58

Another Smythe advocate , Robert J . Walker , a former Mississippi senator
and now a close banking associate of Smythe , presented his candidate ' s
appointment as necessary in order to make the state of New York " certain
for the Union policy . "

59

Senator Johnson of Maryland as sured the chief

executive that Smythe ' s appointment would be certain of acceptance by
the Senate , and the fact that he was a well-known businessman would make
him acceptable to the merchant class with which a collector must deal .

60

Yet another prominent figure who was pushing Smythe ' s candidacy was
61
William S . Huntington of J� Cooke and Company .
In mid-April President Johnson announced Smythe ' s appointment as
collector .

Weed earlier had urged upon his colleague in the cabinet the

importance of a Republican ' s being appointed to the position in order to

58
charles G . Halpine to Johnson , March 21 , 1 866 , Johnson Papers .
59
walker to Johnson , April 1 4 , 1866 , ibid . B.y this statement ,
Walker apparently meant that Smythe would work for Johnson ' s policy . In
an earlier communication , he had presented Smythe as a Republican Johnson
supporter . Walker to Johnson , March 30 , 1866 , ibid.
60
�everdy Johnson to Johnson , April 15 , 1 866 , ibid .
61

cox , Politics , Principle , � Prejudice , 125 .
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assure Republican ascendency in New York . 62 Therefore , while Smythe was
not the choice of the Weed-Seward group , be undoubtedly was preferable to
either Davies or a Democrat , and Weed worked for his confirmation . 6 3
By

appointing Smythe , the president bad made it clear that he

intended to determine his own patronage policy . As Senator Morgan wrote
to Weed in early May concerning Smythe ' s confirmation :

"I shall vote

for him and make the best of the appointment . It is the President ' s
appointment . " 64 There are , however , always problems in charting one ' s
own way , and perhaps the biggest problem which the chief executive encountered in deciding his own patronage course was what to do about professed
Democratic support .

Being out of power , the members of that party were

eager to give support to Andrew Johnson , a former Democrat whose soUthern
policy promised a rapid restoration of the South to the Union and thereby
a rebirth of the power of the Democracy . The problem for Johnson was that ,
while the party bad bad its faction {War Democrats ) which actively bad
supported the Union cause during the war , it also bad bad another group
{ Copperheads ) which just as actively bad worked for a negotiated or
6 2weed t o Seward , February 8 , 1866 , Seward Papers . By this
2
declaration , be meant conservative Republican ascendancy .
63cox, Politics , Principle , and Prejudice , 1 .
25
64E . D . Morgan to Weed, May , 1866 , Weed Papers . Smythe ' s
5
appointment generally was received quite well . As the Nation declared
concerning the new collector : "He is beyond question an honest man , and
has had no training in the working of party machinery , and will there
fore , if let alone , make the New York Custom House a credit to the coun
try , which it can hardly be said to be at present . " "Topics of the Day , "
Nation , May 14 , 1866 , p . 609 .
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compromise settlement with the South .

This effort branded them as

traitors in the minds of true Union supporters , and at the same time led
many ,

particularly Radical Republicans , to equate the view of the entire

Democratic party with that of the Copperheads .

65

Under these circumstances , Johnson could not afford to encourage
or accept Democratic aid without laying himself open to charges that be
was consorting with traitors and that he , like President Tyler in the
1840 ' s , was des erting the party which had placed him in power .

66

Yet

the Democrats , without repudiating their extreme Copperhead wing , were
determined to support him.

Despite the effort s of such conservative

Republican leaders as Doolittle , Cowan , Dixon , and Raymond

to prevent

it , the Democrats dominated the Philadelphia convention and took charge
of the National Union movement .

The extremism created by the war which

called into being such creatures as Copperhead Democrats and Radical
Republicans would not allow the establishment of a conservative , middle
of-the-road party in 18 66 .

67

65

The maj ority of the Democratic party bad aligned themselves in
one degree or another with the Copperhead sentiment . Thus , there was a
tacit willingness by many Democrats to allow Radicals , whom they in turn
equated with the entire Republi can party , to brand them as Copperheads .
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 4 09-10 .
66
cox , Politics , Principle , and Prejudice , 110 .
67
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 405-17 passim. On the eve of the
New York elections , the Times predicted that Johnson ' s cause would be
defeated . It would not be because the president ' s policy had been un
sound : " • • • it will be due , in a very large degree , to the fact that
this policy has become identified , in the public mind , with the Demo
cratic Party and the secession sentiment in the . South--and that its
succes s at the polls involves the return of the Democratic Party , as
organized and directed during the war , to place and power .
The
•

•

•
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Having been unable to prevent a Democratic take-over of the
National Union movement , Johnson ' s conservative Republican supporters
could not stop a Democratic effort to obtain public offi ces .

Johnson

had been plagued with this problem before the convention and it became
worse afterward.

68

Under continuous pressure , he apparently weakened

and either willingly or unwillingly appointed some Democrats to office .

69

This move quite naturally called forth unhappy comments from Republicans .
Senator Fes senden warned Secretary McCulloch :
Sweat , the Copperhead Candidate For Congress in this Dist .
with others of his kidney , will probably try to persuade Mr .
Johnson that i f he c an control the offices i n this Dist . he can
be elected , and will support him. Let not the President be de
ceived . Sweat is totally untrustworthy . We shall whip him to

issue is between these two parties . There is no Nat ional Union organi
zation in the field ; there are no candidates representing the National
Union movement . The Philadelphia Convention has disappeared from the
contest . " Editorial , New York Times , October 8 , 1 8 66 .
68
The papers of John Sherman contain many letters charging that
Copperheads were being appointed or attempting t o be appointed to office
at least as early as May and June , 1866 . An examination of this collec
tion therefore illustrates the situation which Johnson faced even then .
See as examples the following letters to Senator Sherman : C . N . Locke ,
May 2 8 ; W . P . Nixon , May 28 ; C . S . Pyle , June 12 ; James Lewis and others ,
June 22 .
69

Tbe Radical-oriented Nation observed at one point after the
elections that the president " still makes removals and appointments in
the interest of the Democratic-Conservative party . " "The Northern Elec
tions , " Nation , Nov·ember 15 , 18 66 , p . 390 . During the campaign ' s course ,
the hostile New York Tribune noted the recent removal of an unquestion
ably loyal New York postmaster with many relatives who had served the
Union faithfully during the war . " So Mr . Johnson swings round his circle , "
that organ s arcastically concluded , " rewards loyalty and makes treason
odious . " Editorial , New York Tribune , September 25 , 1 866 . Even the
Times , whose editor had been one of the principal figures at the Philadel
phia convention , was forced to warn " the authorities at Washington " that
every Democratic appointment did " far more harm than ten good ones can
remedy . " Editorial , New York Times , October 6 , 1 8 66 .
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death with ease , and all the worse if the President makes a
change in the offices . 70
Again , on August 29 , he commented , " I can only regret that the President
finds himself compelled by his unfortunate compli cations with bad men to
remove faithful & competent officers , and to fill their places with cop
perheads and flunkies .

He must take the consequences . "

71

A Weed corre-

spondent , while declaring hi s loyalty to Johnson ' s cause , dej ectedly
commented concerning the appointment of a Copperhead postmaster :

II

if the good Union men who has [ sic ] stood by the Country in its hour of
Pearil [ sic ] are to be put [ to ] one side to make room for Copperheads
then I do not know what to say .
under such circumstances . "

72

It will be poor encouragement to fight

Another New Yorker , while recognizing the

necessity of removing Radicals from offi ce , denounced the replacement of
loyal persons by Copperheads :

" Every Loyal man removed to make place

for Copperhead Democrats , only excites to action the party displaced &
his fri ends while before they were disposed to be friendly . "
fornia

man

73

A Cali-

informed Secretary Seward that "to put old Copperheads into

office because their present professions are sound must utterly destro.y
all hope of securing popular consideration of the logi c of the Executive
whose practice is so distasteful to the masses . "

Papers .
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An exasperated New

70
w . P . Fessenden to Hugh McCulloch , August 17 , 1 8 66 , McCulloch
7

�ess enden

to McCulloch , August 29 , 18 66 , ibid.

72
Aaron Roggen to Weed, August 30 , 18 66 , Weed Papers .
73
George W. Ernest to Weed, October 2 , 1 866 , ibid .
74
James W . Simonton t o William H . Seward , September 2 5 , 1 866 ,
Seward Papers .
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York writer cried , " We cannot stand this , Mr . Seward , the removal of any
more loyal men for Copperheads to t8ke their places . "

75

I n appraising

the New York s ituation in late October , Thurlow Weed perhaps unknowingly
summar i zed the paradox into which Democratic support had led President
Johnson , " In many c ases where unwise appointments have been made the
lines are drawn between loyal and disloyal men , with , unhappily , the
disloyal p ortion in favor of the President . "

76

While thus wrestling with complex patronage problems which perhaps
only he alone fully understood , Johnson made matters worse for himself .
Re�lizing that if he followed usual patronage practices , the spoils of
office l� at the disposal of the Radicals , he proceeded to deviate from
the normal channels of patronage , relying rather upon close friends and
associates for advice .

As one of his biographers has noted , these men

were neither southerners , nor rebels , nor Copperheads , as the Radicals
charged , but were conservative Republicans , many of whom had been close
to Lincoln .

They were men like Seward , Welles , McCulloch , Browning ,

Cowan , Dixon , Doolittle , the Thomas Ewing family of Ohio , and the Francis
P. Blair family of Mis souri and Maryland .

77

The best documented example

of what this reliance meant as far as patronage matters were concerned
occurred in the instances where Johnson apparently allowed Doolittle a
voice not only in Wi sconsin appointments but also in those in neighboring

75
76

Elihu G . Cook to Seward , October 15 , 18 66 , ibid.

weed to Seward , October 27 , 1 866 , ibid.

77
winston , Andrew Johnson , 327 .
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Illinois . 78 Such. a willingness to allow personal advisers to have a
hand in determining patronage moves , particularly in states not their
own , was not calculated to ingratiate Johnson on Capitol Hill , regardless of the political professions of the men involved .

Some remarks

made during the debates on the Trumbull amendment were illustrative of
the discontent felt in Congress concerning this practice . 79
In addition to relying upon men such as these for advice concerning patronage matters , Johnson also resorted to the use of private agents
who reported directly to him. One such person was Dan Rice , a famed
circus clown who had a deep interest in politics .

Over the course of

two months , he recommended that several federal officeholders in western Pennsylvania and New York be removed and suggested possible replace
ments . 80 Another presidential spy was located in New York ' s Third Distri.ct (Brooklyn ) and forwarded information from there to the chief executive upon "your request to me to keep you· advised of your friends in
office and your enemies . " 81 Yet another informant apparently was sent
to study the patronage situation in the South . An anguished treasury
official stationed in Florida complained to his congressman that B . C .
78see Anson S . Miller to Lyman Trumbull , June 1 3 , 1 , 17 , July 6 ,
5
1866 ; Trumbull to Miller , June 18 , 1866 ; Trumbull t o Jason Marsh , June
21 , 1866 ; Marsh to Trumbull , June 26 , July 16 , 1866 , Trumbull Papers ;
Miller to Elihu Washburne , June 20 , 1866 , Washburne Papers .
79 see particularly comments of Henderson and Wilson . The Scovel
affair which came to light during these debates also might be cited as
a deviation from normal patronage practices in the sense that promises
seemingly were made to him which ignored the accepted role of concerned
congressmen . See above , footnote 27 .
80Rice to Johnson , June 1 ,
23 , July 31 , 1866 , Johnson Papers .
81F . O ' D,rrne to Johnson , April 16 , 1866 , ibid.

90
Truman � Johnson ' s private secretary and also a New York Times correspondent � was in his area boasting that he had the influence to "set up
or knock down j ust whom he pleases . "

82

As the 1866 congressional campaign neared its conclusion � President Johnson seemed determined to make sweeping patronage changes .

Such

was the tone of his remarks during the latter part of his famed " swing
around the c ircle . "

In Cleveland on September 3 � he railed against "this

gang of office-holders � these blood-suckers and cormorant s , " as sailed
congressional attempts to limit his patronage power , and stated his
thinking to be that the t ime had arrived "when those who had enj oyed fat
offices for four years should give way for those who had fought for the
country . "

83

In St . Louis on September 8 , he asked how those who had

"enj oyed the emoluments of office long enough" were t o be removed from
offi ce "unless your Executive can put them out , unless you can reach
He then answered his own question by declar-

them through the President ? "
ing ,

Well , let me s ay to you , if you will stand by me in thi s
action [ cheers ] , i f you will stand by me in trying to give the
people a fair chance
to participate in these offices , God
being willing , I
11 kick them out . I will kick them out j ust
as fast as I can .

��

82
8

•

•

•

n . Richards to Elihu Washburne , June 7 , 1866 � Washburne Papers .

�cPherson ,

84

Political History , 136 .

Ibid . � 140 . For a discus sion of the pres s ' s att itude t oward
Johnson ' s swing around the circle � see Gregg Phifer , "Andrew Johnson
versus the Press in 1866 , " East Tennes see Histori cal Society!:;Publi ca
tions , XXV ( 1953 ) , 3-23 .
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That whole sale removals was not Johnson ' s final decision was
testified to by the fact that in late October a cabinet member st ill
could tell a prominent New York politician that the president felt that ,
" in making changes , the greatest care should be exercised . "

85

He fol-

lowed this declaration by noting that some appointment s had been held up
because his chief des ired "to make as few changes

as

pos sible , and none on

political grounds unless it is c lear that the interests of the s ervi ce
or the int erests of the administration are to be certainly benefited by
them . "

86

In the final analys i s , there was apparently not a great change

in the chief executive ' s patronage moves after his return from the
" swing . "

Although the number of changes varied greatly from loc ality to

locality , Johnson ' s actions in September and October , 1866 , were not
those of a

man

bent upon general proscript ion .

It cannot be denied that

he intensified his patronage activities from August onward , but the
Radical declarat ions concerning mas sive removals const itut ed an obviously
successful attempt to stampede the loyalt ies and votes of federal office
holders and their friends in the Radical direction .

87

The Senate finally

had t o deal with some 526 removals out of an approximate . 2 500

85

Hugh McCulloch to Samuel J . Tilden , October 22 , 1866 , Bigelow ,
Tilden Letter s , I , 206 .
86
McCulloch to Tilden , October 26 , 1866 , ibid . , 207 .
87

An excellent example of the inflammatory nature of Radi.c al
comments concerning the president ' s us e of the patronage appeared in the
New York Tribune concerning the upcoming Radical-oriented s oldiers con
vent ion : "That Mr . Johnson has i ssued orders to decapitat e all s oldiers
who attend the Pittsburg Convention is stat ed on good authority [ source
not indicat ed ] . " Editorial , New York Tribune , September 2 2 , 1866 .
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presidential positions .

88

Apparently, little patronage aid was forth-

coming for those who had attended and supported the National Union move
ment .

89

In sum, as one student of the period has noted, Johnson's

removals prior to the 1866 elections were anything bu� "free and indis
criminate . "

90

Indeed ,· according to a leading authority on presidential

removals, of an estimated grand total of 2669 presidential civil service
officers, Johnson, during his entire administration, removed approximately 903 .

� way of comparison, Lincoln removed 1095 of an estimated

1520, while Buchanan made 458 changes from about the same number in following an administration of his own party .

The Harrison-Tyler adminis

tration's record was 458 of an approximate 924 .

91 ·

The 1866 congressional elections resulted in a landslide victory
for the Radical Republicans and a corresponding humiliating defeat for

88
For an office-by-office count, see Appendix I . The period
involved is December 3, 1866, to April 20, 1867 and thus undoubtedly in
cludes removals made well after the congressional elections and perhaps
not in connection with them . Two estimates made by senators friendly
to Johnson during Senate debates on the extent of 1866 removals were 446
out of 2434 and 440 out of 2450 . Cong . Globe, 39 Cong . , 2 sess . , 492,
1517 .
89

In the weeks following the convention, Johnson received a
number of letters indicating that the correspondents felt that there was
a lack of patronage support for the National Union movement . As examples,
see the following letters to him in the Johnson Papers: Bien Bradbury
(Washington, D . C . ), August 24; David Wilkin and others (Carson, Nev . ),
August 27; William J . Allen (Cairo, Ill .i, Septembe� 21 ; J . G . Abbot
(Boston), September 29 ; John N . Cochran (Washington, D . C . ), October ?;
Charles Knap ·(washington, D . C . ), October 27 ; S . S . Henkle (Washington,
D . C . ), October 28 . The original of the Wilkin letter is in the National
Archives .
90
0berholtzer, History of the United States, I, 438 .
9l
Fish, "Removal of Officers by the Presidents, " 77, 81-83 .
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the president .

Johnson ' s actions in the hectic weeks and months

preceding thi s outcome seem to indicate that he never developed a definite patronage policy .

If he ever had one i n mind , he apparently did

not reveal it to those friends and associates who subsequently left writ
ten records for posterity .

92

Thi s close-mouthed approach led at least

some of his contemporaries to charge that he had failed properly to use
his executive powers and that he was indec i sive .

In an August 2 5 , 1866 ,

diary entry , crusty Gideon Welles lamented the fact that Johnson had not
acted more promptly .

"Hi s delay and the. activity of the Radicals , " grum

bled the secretary of the navy , "have weakened his caus e

•

•

•

•

"
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With

the advantage of some twenty years hindsight , James G . Blaine commented ,
The wonder in the polit ical world was , that the President had
not resorted to this form of attack more promptly , and pursued
it more determinedly . Hi s delay could be explained only by what
was termed his t alent for procrastination , and to a certain inde
cision which was fat al to him as an execut ive officer . 94
Although the most recent tendency has been t o debunk the idea
that proper us e of patronage would have helped Johnson greatly ,

95

that

generat ion of historians which sympathized with the seventeenth president
92

one of Johnson ' s cabinet members later commented , "Naturally
distrustful , he _gave his confidence reluctant ly--never without reserve ;
he had therefore few constant friends . " McCulloch , Men and Measures of
Half � Century : Sketches and Comments ( New York , 1888 ) , To5 . In com:
menting on: much the s ame subj ect , Welles noted , "Many of his most impor
t ant steps have been taken without the knowledge of any of his Cabinet ,
and: I think without the knowledge of any person whatever . " Howard K .
Beale ( ed . ) , Diary of Gideon Welles (3 vola . , New York , 1960 ) , III , 190 .
93
94
95

Ibid . , II , 587 .
Blaine , Twenty Years of Congres s , II , 267 .

For examples , see McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 379 ; Brock , An
American Crisi s , 163-65 .
.]

94
felt forced to come to much the same conclusion concerning his us e of
the system as had his contemporaries .

Thus , Beale crie d, "But Johnson

did nothing to meet the s ituation unt il the fall of 1866 when it was too
late . "

96

Milton wrote of his "faulty judgment , " of his attempt to change

his patronage course "too late , " and of his "ill-fated procrastinat ion .

n 9l

Even Winston CO!!lpla:i,ned of Johnson ' s "too patient ear" in listening to
divided counse1 .

98

Although Johnson seems to have promised much and delivered little
to his followers as far as patronage was concerned , to charge him with
indecision is hardly the answer to the question as to why he never developed a definite policy in the period prior to the 1866 elections .

As it

had been advanced particularly by the Jacksonians and by Lincoln , the
system of patronage was designed primarily to give recognition to the
party faithful .

The office held was in a s ense a badge designating one ' s

service to his party .

The other uses of the system were limited .

Patronage might be used to tip the balance in favor of one or the other
fact ion within a party .

Johnson ' s supporters made the mistake of assum-

ing that it could be used to create an entirely new party c ompletely
loyal to the pres ident .

They failed to realize that it could be of

value only to an established organization .
Was Andrew Johnson cognizant of these considerations ?

While

vainly attempting to turn the Radi cal tide in 1866 , he apparently made
96

Beale , Critical Year , 121 .

97
Milton , � of Hate , 277 , 322 .
98
winston , Andrew Johnson , 353 .
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only such changes in federal positions as he felt absolutely had to be
made in order to appease in some measure the demands of his followers .
Did that mean that he did not realize the real power of the patronage
weapon which he held?
him better?

Would a policy of general proscription have served

He .was guilty of departing from the normal channels of

patronage communicat ion .

Would an observance of convent ional patronage

methods have altered the situat ion which he faced?

Would such a move

have made the Radicals more willing to work with him?

Would he indeed

have been in a better position if he had made no moves whatsoever in the
patronage arena?

In answer to such questions , one recent student of the

event s of 1866 has concluded , "In all likelihood patronage would have
done him l ittle good no matter how he had used it . "
'

99

Perhaps no one in

1866 realized this fact more than did Andrew Johnson himself.

100

99
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 379 .
100
on April 14 , Johnson bitterly complained to Welles about Senator
Doolittle and Cowan ' s urging him to make changes when they themselves
were not "prepared to t ake or recommend action . " "These men take upon
themselves no responsibility , " Welles quoted the president as saying ,
"while goading me on to
breasting this storm. " He indicat ed that
he would t ake action "at the proper time , " but said that he . must be
allowed to select that t ime . Beale , Diary , II , 481 , 483 . The tenor of
this conversation , as Welles recorded it later , seems to reinforce the
conclusion that Johnson was aware of the problems involved in making
patronage changes .
•

•

•

CHAPTER IV
LAME DUCK PATRONAGE
The 1866 elect ions dealt a serious blow to presidential
reconstruction .

Such things as the black codes , the obvious lack of

repent ance on the part of southerners , and race riot s in Memphis in late
April and early M� of 1866 and in New Orleans on July 30 had convinc ed
northern voters that the executive program was a failure .

Thus , the

Radicals emerged with an overwhelming maj ority in both houses of Congress
and with what they cons idered a mandate to establi sh a congress ional
reconstruction policy .
The first session o f the Thirty-Ninth Congress had made some steps
in that direction .

By overriding the presidential veto of Trumbull ' s

Civil Right s · Bill in April , Congress had served notice that it considered
pres idential reconstruction inadequate .

As a first step in establishing

a feasible alternative , it passed the Fourteenth Amendment in June of
1866 .

The maj or effect s of this measure were to make the freedman a

full citizen of the United States and to bar from political office s ev
eral thousand white southerners who had held prominent positions in the
Confederacy .
Congres s ional leaders implied that ratificat ion of the amendment
would be sufficient to get southern representations seated in Congress .
Tennes s ee promptly approved the measure and in July , 1866 , was restored
to it s place in the Union .

Between October , 1866 , and February , 1867 ,

97
the other southern states rej ected it , and there the matter stood as the
second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress {December 3 , 1866-March 4 ,
1867 ) was running its course .

1

While all but one of the former states of the Confederacy were
rej e cting the Fourteenth Amendment , Congress was devis ing a definite
reconstruction program.

The result was the First Reconstruction Act on

March 2 , 1867 , passed over the president ' s vet o .
ures followed on March 23 and July 19 .

Two supplementary meas-

The t otal effect of these three .

laws was to reduce the ten unreconstructed states of the South to the
virtual status of territories .

The existing state governments were de-

clared void , the South was divided into five military districts , and the
military commanders were given almost unlimited authority in these areas
until acceptable const itutions could be drawn up under their direction
and ratified both by the citizens of the respective states involved and
by Congres s .

2

At this point , President Johnson could have hindered the congresional effort through his power of appointment .

As commander-in-chief

of the armed forces , it was his respons ibility to select the men who were
to command the five districts .

The only stipulat ion--that the men chosen

had to hold at least the rank of bri gadier general-- as not a s erious
one , s ince the possibility of appointing men of brevet was well as lineal

1
Patrick , Reconstruction , 74-82 passim . It ·should be noted that
the promis e of readmiss ion upon rat ification of the Fourteenth Amendment
was implied and was not an offi cial part of the measure .
·

2

Ibid . , 98-101 .
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rank was not precluded .

Thus , Johnson could choose from a hundred or

more officers , s everal of whom certainly were sympathetic to . executive
reconstruction effort s .

3

Although the opportunity to strike a blow against Congress thus
presented itself , Johnson ' s sense of duty prevailed .

He c onsidered the

First Reconstruction Act to be unconstitutional , but as . chief executive
he apparently felt that it was his duty to enforce the law until the
court s decided otherwise .

4

Whatever his reasoning , he made no deliberate

effort t o select officers who would att empt to obstruct the functioning
of congres sional reconstruction .
The initial assignment of commanders on March 11 placed maj or
generals in command of all five district s .

John M . Schofield ; who did

not prominently display his political colors but who favored lenient
treatment for the South , had been in charge of Virginia since the preceding August .

3

He remained in control of that stat e , whi ch was designated

serton , � and Reconstruct ion , 115-17 .

4
Johnson ' s lack of confidant s makes it difficult to det ermine
exactly what was his thinking concerning thi s matter � His seemingly
faithful execut ion of . the re construction laws worried .Welles who , in
trying to explain his chi ef ' s moves , wavered from the explanat ion that
he simply was doing his duty to one in which he was acting on the erron
eous theory of Attorney-General Stanbery that under these laws the mili
tary was a mere police force working under or at least with the c ivil
authorities . Beale , Diary , III , 82 , 164 . Secretary of the Interior
Browning later recorded that Johnson , in response to McCulloch ' s urgings
that the military governors be duly appoint ed in order to forestall any
impeachment poss ibility , heatedly declared that he would not be influ
enced by the impeachment threat but "would go forward in the cons cien
tious dis charge of his duty
"
James G . Randall and Theodore C .
Pease . ( eds . ) , The Diary of Orville . Hickman Browning (2 vola . , Springfield ;
Ill . , 1925, 19�, II , 135 .
•

•

•

•
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the First District .

The Second District ( North and South Carolina )

became the domain of Daniel E . Si ckles , a conceited , non-West Pointer
who had achieved his rank while serving in the Army of the Potomac during
the war .

Georgia , Florida , and Alabama , the Third District , were given

to the reluctant George H . Thomas , who had no desire for the assignment
and who therefore was replaced on March 15 by John Pope , a
t ionable suitability for such a delicate task .

man

of ques-

The Fourth District

(Mississippi and Arkansas ) was reserved for Edward 0 . C . Ord , who had
been in charge in Arkansas for several months and had proven his ac ceptability for such an assignment .

Louisiana and Texas were styled the

Fifth District and presented to Philip H . Sheridan , who since the preceding August had been in charge of them plus Florida in a command known as
the Department of the Gulf .

5

Of the five men , four--Si ckles , Sheridan ,

Pope , and Ord--s ided to one degree or another with Congress on the matter
of how to deal with the South .

6

Although it was not clear as to whether

Johnson or Grant and Stanton had pl�ed the maj or role in making the
selections , it was obvious that the chief execut ive was not allowing
,

personal considerations to sway his decision in enforcing congressional
reconstruction .

Concerning these initial choices , the now Radical-

oriented Nation was forced to concede :
There appears--if we are to judge from the selection of
generals to c ommand the military districts at the South , under
the new law , and from the course already adopted by General

5
6

sefton , �Y and Reconstruct ion , 18 , 113-15 .
Hyman , "Johnson , Stanton , and Grant , " 93 .
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Schofield , the only doubt ful one of them all--to be no di sposi
tion on the President ' s part to frustrate or evade the execution
7
of the Congres s ional scheme of Reconstruction
•

•

•

•

Whatever his motive for being so co-operat ive , Johnson had
created for himself a dilemma .

Having placed in command men who were in

varying degrees hostile to his program , any subsequent attempts to
replace them were sure to bring about agitation .

In the opinion of the

president , the need for changes nonetheles s soon became apparent .
dan proceeded to conduct himself in an arrogant , haughty manner .

SheriIn

the wake of the Third Reconstruction Act , which gave the military com�
manders extensive powers of removal in their district s , he replaced the
elected governor of Texas and various other les s er civil officials in
both Texas and Louisiana.

Sickles interfered extensively in business

and commercial proceedings in his area , even in a few cases to setting
aside court decisions relating to these matters .

Pope aroused oppos ition

by att empting to control the compos ition of civil juries and to confine
publication of official state and local governmental announcements to
newspapers sympathetic to congressional reconstruction .

This latter

action often ran contrary to state law which required that legal not i ces
had to be published in local newspapers before the steps t o which they
referred could be taken .

He also saw fit to make some removals from

civil offices and seemingly to try to arrange voting districts for state
constitutional conventions so as to benefit the Radic als .

7
8

8

"The Week , " Nation , March 21 , 1867 , p . 226 .
Sefton , � and Reconstruction , 144-50 , 158-59 , 166-67 .
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The commander-in-chief was . not willing to tolerate such continued
military interference with the . functioning of the civil governments in
the South .
posts .

He accordingly determined to remove the offenders from their

In August � 1867 � the presidential

ax

fell .

Ge�rge H. Thomas was

ordered to replace Sheridan , but he still was unwilling t o become involved in the thorny politics of reconstruction and pleaded ill health .
I n his stead , h e recommended Winfield Scott Hancock , a man o f strong
Democratic leanings but acceptable to the chief executive because . of his
pro-Johnson attitude .

Hancock became the new Fifth District commandant .

At virtually the same t ime , Edward R . S . Canby was instruqted t o relieve
Sickles of his command in the Second District .

9

Pope ' s turn came in late

December when he was replaced by the more pliable George G . Meade .

The

s ame order that placed Meade in command of the Third District als o provided for a new commander for the Fourth District where General Ord was
supplanted by Irvin McDowell .

10

Aware of the unrest which had been caus ed by the strong rule of
Sheridan , Sickles � and Pope , the president probably felt j ustified in
making these changes in command .

The only thing which his opponents

could see , however , was that all the friends of congressional reconstruction

9

For official correspondence concerning these assignment changes ,
see Johnson to u . s . Grant � August 17 ; Grant to Johnson , August 17 ;
Johnson to Grant , August 19 ; Johnson to George H . Thomas , August 2 3 ;
Johnson t o Grant , August 26 , 1867 , Johnson Papers . The original Johnson
to Thomas letter is in the National Archives .
'•.

10

..

Sefton , � and Reconstruct ion , 169 , 173 . Johnson obviously
was satisfied with Ord ' s efforts in Arkansas and Mi ssi ssippi , but Ord
himself , for undis c losed personal reasons � requested and received relief
from his command . Ibid . , 173-7 4 .
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who initially had been placed in charge in the South had , by the end of
1867 , been relieved of their post s .

Charges and c ounter-charges were

Cons ervatives were elated over the removals ; Radi cals were

hurled .

angry and chagrined .

The New York Times summe d up the s ituat ion as many

persons on both s ides of the is sue saw it by labeling the then impending
removals as " features of his
Congress .

[ Johnson ' s ]

policy as against the policy of

They are all parts of his plan for staying the work of

Congress and thwarting its measures of reconstruction . "

11

The patronage problems which Pres ident Johnson had to face in the
aftermath of the 1866 congressional elections were much more extensive
than merely the question of the appointment of military rulers for the
South .

Considering the overwhelming Radical succes ses , what type of

policy should be pursued?

Should removals continue to be made or should

he now fall back upon normal channels of patronage and cease all t ampering with the system?

Senator William Pitt Fessenden addressed himself

to these matters immediately following the Maine election :
The election is now over . No further changes c an produce the
least effect , ex�ept to exchange good officers in whom the people
confide for bad ones , whose appointment s will dis gust thinking
men of all parties . My advice to the President is to turn a deaf
ear to thes e fellows when they come about him , talking of

11
Editorial , New York Times , August 7 , 1867 . It i s interesting
to note that Congress later retaliated for the removals of the pro
Congres s generals by exerting pressure to force the removals of Hancock
and Schofield . See editorial , ibid . , March 27 , 1868 . It perhaps also
should be noted that , in general , Johnson apparently did little tamper
ing with the military in patronage matters . As was t o be expected ,
charges oc curred now and then that anti-Johnson officers were being
dis criminated against , but these were balanced by occasional reverse
charges by pro-Johnson officers .
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support . All they mean by it is the necessity of - supporting
them out of the Treasury--not caring how odious they make the
President and the Secretary . 12
Although Fessenden probably expressed an opinion held by his
moderate . Republipan colleagues in the Senate and House , the chief execu•

tive also was r�ceiving contrary advice . Now thirsting for revenge ,
many of his supporters continued pushing for the removal of his enemies
I

from office .

A

prominent Troy , New York , lawyer declared that it should

be clear that 11every office holder who . has in this electio� voted against
your policy of re-construction should be immediately removed & his place
filled by true and loyal friends of your administration . 11 13 In response
to a Johnson request
to inform him of the situatio� in his area , a Mon.:
;

tana supporter' · advised the president that changes should be made in several key positions , since most of the appointees to office in that
territory were "of the Radical school . 1 114 Two Freeport , Illinois ,
correspondents urged removal of the Third District assessor on the
grounds that he was a 1 1venomous slanderer of Andrew Johnson and abusive
of his friends . 111 5 A Missouri man informed the chief executive that
the Radicals , by rej ecting Johnson men as unqualified for the positions ,
were attempting to regain control of the revenue collectorships of the
Third and Fifth Districts , which had been made vacant by executive

Papers .

12Fessenden to Hugh McCulloch , September 1 5 , 1866 , McCulloch
13oavid

L.

Seymour to Johnson , November 8 , 1866 , Johnson Papers .

14Thomas E . Tutt to Johnson , December 4 , 1866 , ibid .
2
l5Thomas J . Turner and A . D . Meacham to Johnson , March 11 , 1867 ,
,!lli, ( original in National Archives ) . ·
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removal of the incumbents .

He noted that they already controlled most

of the federal offi ces in the state and warned that they shOuld be content
only with complete control of the . patronage there .

16

As the president was pondering the feas ibility of making further
changes , a victorious Congres s was turning its attention to those already
made .

While considering whether or not the Johnson appointments made in

the heat of the c ongres s ional campaigns should be allowed to stand , John
Sherman , an influential Republican senator and a leading moderate ,
received a number of letters urging confirmat ion of the Johnson nomina
t ions .

17

A colonel wrote from New York City urging that General Stephen

McGroarty , a Republican and a disabled veteran with a distinguished war
record , be confirmed as revenue collector for the Second ( Ohio } District .
A member of the Ohio General Ass embly urged that Colonel Willi am E .
H�es be allowed his position as collector for the Ninth District , in

16
Allen P . Richardson to Johnson , April 9 , 1867 , ibi d . Agitation
for changes was not confined to the immediate aftermath of the 1866 elec
tions but rather continued throughout most of Johnson ' s administration .
Most of these changes continued t o be urged on the grounds o f Radical
domination of offices . For examples of these pressures for removal , see
the following letters to Johnson in his papers : R. King Cut ler , August .
5 , 1867 ; R . D . Goodwin , October 10 , 1867 ; William Thorpe , October 11 ,
1867 ; Lovell H . Rous seau , December 19 , 1867 ; William M . Daily , December
28 , 1867 ; Moses Bates , January 4 , 1868 ; James Mann , January 9 , 1868 , Hugh
McCulloch , June 9 , 1868 . The original McCulloch letter i s in the
Rutherford B . Hayes Library .
17

The Sherman papers const itute an extens ive collection and many
of them for this period deal with patronage problems . They therefore
afford ample examples of support both for and against the presidential
apppointments of 1866 .
18
Francis D arr to Sherman , December 7 , 1866 , Sherman Papers .

18
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view of his war record and his qualifications for the office .

19

While

denouncing his activities against the Republican party , another Ohioan
endorsed Haynes becaus e of his service during the war and because he was
a 11liberal , gentlemanly , democrat of good habit s . 11

20

A Cleveland writer

called for the confirmat ion of Henry N. Johnson for a collectorship .

He ·

cited Johnson ' s ability and the fact that he was a loyal Republican as
reasons why his nomination should be upheld and declared that he knew
few Republicans who wanted him rej ected .

21

Albert G . Clark should be

allowed to have his postmastership , according to one Toledo source , becaus e he had labored in the Republican party from its incept ion , actively
supported the war effort , ably served on the city council , and was capa
ble of e fficiently running the post office .

22

A petition containing

approximately sixty-three names requested confirmat ion of Brigidier
General Lewis C . Hunt as Collector of Customs for the Miami , Ohio , District .

A distinguished war record and his reputat ion as a solid busi

nessman were Hunt ' s qualifications for the post .

23

John Hunter should

be allowed to have his revenue collectorship becaus e , while he did on
some points follow the presidential policy , he definitely was no Copperhead , had appointed Republicans t o subordinate positi ons , and was opposed

l9

Frank Sawyer t o Sherman , December 18 , 1866 , January 1 , 1867 ,

ibid .
20

charles Foster to Sherman , December 24 , 1866 , ibid.

21
George A . Benedict to Sherman , December 29 , 1866 , ibi d .
22
John R . Osborn to Sherman , December 29 , 1866 , ibid .
23
John R . Osborn and others to Sherman and Benjamin , Wade , January
13 � 1867 , ibid .
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chie fly by Democrat s .

24

The postmaster appointee for Newark , Ohio ,

Thomas J . Anderson , should . be accepted by the Senate in that , while he
had been originally a Democrat and then had j oined in the support for
Johnson , he was a competent officer .

25

A petition containing some 140

names likewi se urged Anderson ' s confirmation , as did another Newark man
who confessed that he had never thought that he would want t o endorse
any of· the recess appointments made by Andrew Johnson .

26

While there were those who recognized the merit of many of
Johnson ' s appointees , many others urged rej ection .
ence was quite revealing on thi s point als o .

Sherman ' s correspond-

Several Bucyrus , Ohio ,

writers were urging as early as June , 1866 , that Isaac Bryant , a onearmed war veteran , not be given the postmastership there because he had
been a Copperhead supporter .
sion to denounce Bryant

as

27

The former postmaster likewis e took occa

"one of the dirtiest copperheads . "

28

Two

writers from Upper Sandusky requested that the nominee for revenue ass essor of the Fifth Di strict , Theodore E. Cunningham , be rej ected by the
Senate on the grounds that he was an ardent supporter of the Democracy

24
Willia.m T . McClintock to Sherman , January 25 , 1867 , ibid .
25

James R . Stanberry to Sherman , December 11 , 1866 , ibi d.

26
James R . Stanberry and others to Sherman , January 1 , 1867 , ibid . ;
James L . Bickey t o Sherman , January 16 , 1867 , ibi d .
27
James Lewis and others to Sherman , June 22 , 1866 , ibid .
28

James G . Robinson t o Sherman , October 16 , 1866 , ibid . Bryant ' s
nomination aroused a considerable storm of protest and as of February ,
1867 , Sherman began t o receive several letters urging that he not be
confirmed .
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and had filled subordinate offices with Copperheads .

29

Another anti-

Cunningham mis s ive declared that the men he had appointed to office were
"notorious for their oppos it ion to the Government , during the rebellion ,
and to Congress , in its efforts to restore the Union . "

30

A petition

s igned by approximately three hundred citizens of the Ninth District
called upon the Senate to rej ect all of the changes whi ch had been made
in that area by the president during the recess of Congres s .

31

Another

Ninth District resident charged that the as sessor and collector there
i•

had been replaced by "virulent Copperheads " because they would not "bow
to Executive dictation and be transferred to the Copperhead camp . "

32

The dismissed collector of the Fourteenth District informed Sherman that
he and the former asses sor had been replaced by men who were substituting
Copperheads for loyal Union men in subordinate places .

33

29
A . W . Brinkerhoff to Sherman � November 2 , 1866 , �· ; G. W.
Beery, to She�an , November 2 , 1866 , �·
30
J . B . Rothchild . and others to Sherman , November 3 , 1866 , �·
For other letters directed against Cunningham because of hi s Copperhead
proclivities , see the following in the Sherman collect ion : Charles H .
Kurt z and others , December 27 , 1866 ; 0 . M . Todd , January 24 , 1867 ; Porter
Carlin , Januarh 29 , 1867 ; Porter C arlin and others , February 6 , 1867 .
The letter of February 6 constituted a pet ition by Ohio state legislators
who had supported Sherman ' s re-election in 1865 .
31

Charles H . Preston and others to Sherman , December , 1866 , ill2:.·

32
J . F . Dewey to Sherman , December 4 , 1866 , ibid .
33
N . B Gates to Sherman , December 8 , 1866 , ibi d .
It ·is note�
worthy that in virtually all the cases cited and in many others. whi ch
could be noted , the primary charge against the man or men involved was
that he or they or the people he or they were appointing were C opperhead
Democrat s . The height of such charges must have been a letter from the
nervous Circleville postmaster who declared that · he . had been informed
that the president had nominated yet another man for that position . This
name , like the ones which had been submitted earlier and all others which
might be submitted in the future , was to be rej ected because he was a
Copperhead .
See W . H . P . Denny to Sherman , Apri l 6 , 1867 , ibid .
• .
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With the Radical Republicans now firmly in the driver ' s seat ,
there was little question as to whose urgings would . receive the sympathy
of the Senate .

The president had been able to nu,Ute almost any removals .

which he desired to make prior to the elections , but in the wake of those
same . elections , obtaining confirmation for the appointments to fill those
vacated pos itions proved to be considerably more complex .

Be�ween the

beginning of the second , lame duck session of the Thirty-ninth Congress
in December , 1866 , and the end of a called session of the Fortieth Congress on April 20 , 1867 , the Senate , while confirming some 1069 nominations , rej ected or tabled approximately 877 others , including 3 37 postmasters , 157 internal revenue as sessors , and 148 internal revenue col
lectors .

34

In a letter to a brother who was hoping for confirmat i on of

his appointment as a consul , Thomas Ewing , Jr . , exclaimed in dismay , "You
would be surprised to know how the heads of the most gallant officers
have been struck off by the ultraism of the party leaders .
paid t o

No regard i s

the[ ir ] fitness or military service--they don ' t weigh a feather . "

In summing up the s ituation on April 21 , Senator Morgan mildly commented
to Weed that some of the presidential appointments were either rej ected
or held over " owing to the practice that has grown up in the Senate of
permitting Republican members of Congress to control the patronage in
their Districts . "

36

The maj ority of Republi cans in Congress no longer

34
This information is based upon a study of the . U . �· Senate
Executive Journal , XV ( December 3 , 1866-November 29 , 1867 ) , Index. For
other figures c oncerning rej ections and confirmations , see Appendix I I .
35

Thomas Ewing , Jr . t o Hugh Ewing , February 20 , 1867 , Ewing Papers .

36

Edwin D . Morgan to Thurlow Weed , April 21 , 1867 , Weed Papers .

35
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possessed any confidence in the chief execut ive , and the Senat e , through
its power of confirmat i on , was determined to deny him use of the patronage
system.

Sniping at the president through thi s means , therefore , contin-

ued on a limited scale throughout the remainder of his administration .
At least one of Johnson ' s adherent s had given some thought in
advance to what the president ' s react ion should be if the Senate should
choose to follow the course which it ult imately di d t ake .

Writing in

July , 1866 , to the secretary of the navy , James F . Babcock , a prominent
Connecti cut Democrat i c legi slator , declared that every act ive Radical
who would not resign should be removed from offic e .
j ect , " he added , "let them keep rej ect ing .
them busy at that work .

"If the Senat e re-

I would , if Pre sident , keep

They will soon get t ired of it . "

37

There i s

some evidence that the chief executive actually did attempt to follow
this line of attack ,

38

but he soon learned that the Senate could play

the same game and it was he who apparently first t ired of this fruitless
activity .

As early as February , 1867 , the customs collector at Phila-

delphia, an early Johnson supporter , reported t hat he had heard that

37

Babcock to Gideon Welles , July 12 , 1866 , Welles Papers .

38
out standing examples of this fact are that as of the end of the
extra session of the Fort ieth Congres s on April 20 , 1867 , Johnson had
submitted five nominees for minister to Austria and none had been
acc epted . Before obtaining confirmat ions , he was obliged to submit eight
names for the Cinc innat i postmastership , seven for the Brooklyn post
mastership , seven for the collector of customs for the eastern Maryland
district , s even for the Macon City , Missouri , pensi on agency , and ten
for the Fifth Wi s consin district internal revenue collectorship . Eleven
nominees each were submitted for the internal revenue as sessorships of
the Ninth Illinois and Second Indiana di strict s and ten for the Fourth
Wisconsin district asses sorship and all had been rej ected as of April 20 .
For these and other examples , see U . �· Senate Executive Journal , Index.
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no nominations would be submitted to the Senate if they were likely to
be rejected .

He protested that such a process would deprive the presi-

dent ' s early friends of "all hopes of official station s imply for an
independent expression of opinion & for active friendship and support "
of him. 39 By mid-1868 , the situation had deteriorated to a point which

. ·� \ �,

one follower . despondently described to Johnson :

"Whenever one of your

friends applies to you for office , you ask him, can you be confirmed , if
he answers , I don 't know or , I think I can , you say , bring me evidence
from leading Senators , that such is the fact , and I will appoint you . "
He then lamented :
It places you in the attitude of surrendering your independ
ence , makes you subject to the control , and dictation of the
Senate , causes the Senate to make the appointments with your
consent ; instead of your making them , with its consent , an�
weakens , if it does not br� ak the cord of attachment , which
binds your friends to you. 0
Even if the president indeed had entertained and now was abandon·

ing the hope of cultivating and supporting a following for himself through
the use of his patronage powers , he still had a viable alternative to
surrendering the system to Congress .

Leading members of the Democratic

party long had been writing to Johnson , assuring him of their support .
Clearly , any Johnsonian ambition to establish a strong power base within
the Republican party had been shattered by the outcome of the 1866 electiona ; why should he not now move in the direction of the Democracy and
39william F. Johnston to Andrew Johnson , February 1 5 , 1867 ,
Johnson Papers .
4°Felix McCloskey to Johnson , June 1 , 1868 , ibid.
3
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use his patronage powers for its benefit?
Despite the existence of an alternative which was undoubtedly
personally attractive to the chief executive and which in addition might
prove quite fruitful , there was little to indicate as the weeks and
months passed that the president actively was pursuing such a course .
In the immediate aftermath of the congressional elections , the Nation
declared that prior to that time , Johnson had proven to be "a faithful
and humble servant to the Democrats , " but that publication asserted that
now the chief magistrate had seen the light :
Amongst the signs of Mr . Johnson ' s conversion is his refusal
to listen any longer to Democratic applications for offices .
Delegations of office-seekers and their friends calling atten
tion to the state of the post-offi�e in their neighborhood are
now every day sent away sorrowful. 41
Although the Nation perhaps had overstated the case , the Democrats
found little more encouragement at the White House than did the Republicans . Many Republican congressmen may have believed, as did Representative Schenck of Ohio , that their wishes were "not to be regarded at all
at the other end of the Avenue , " but they found Democratic colleagues in
the same boat . 4 2 In some cases , both Democratic and Republican legislators felt that acceptable executive appointments were being made in their
districts . 4 3 While Republicans therefore could not declare that the
41 "This Week , " Nation , November 22 , 1866 , p . 401 .
4�obert Schenck to John Sherman , March 16 , 1867 , Sherman Papers .
For an example of Democratic dismay , see James Brooks to Andrew Johnson ,
April 11 , 1867 , Johnson Papers .
43That such was the case can be seen in the fact that both Demo
cratic and Republican congressmen in that critical period December , 1866,
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pres ident had become

any

more friendly toward them as a result of the

1866 campaigns , they could not with

any

honesty flatly charge that he

had turned the favors of his offi ce toward the Democrat s .

B,y refusing t o allow the Democracy special access t o the privileges of the patronage system, Andrew Johnson must have been aware of
the damage it would do to him .

Like almost

any

man who has been privi-

leged to hold the high office which he held , Johnson apparently yearned
for another term , a term of his own .

His chances of receiving the Repub-

lican nomination were nonexistent , although Gideon Welles as lat e as
June 25 , 1868 , professed to s ee some hope for that developement .

44

Johnson might have had a chance to secure the Democratic nomination , but
his steadfast refusal t o surrender the patronage system to the Democrats
was one of the factors which deprived him of it .

45

Concerning Andrew Johnson ' s patronage activities in the period
between the di s astrous out come of the 1866 elections and the end of his
administrat ion on March 4 , 1869 , the only apparent conclusion one can

t o April 20 , 1867 , were receiving des ired appointments or were urging
confirmation for appointments in their respective district s . For exam
ples from the Democratic s ide , see Rufus P . Spaulding to John Sherman ,
January 8 , March 20 , 1867 , Sherman Papers ; Reverdy Johnson to Andrew
Johnson , March 2 , 1867 , Johnson Papers ; E . D . Holbrook t o John Sherman ,
March 11 , 1867 , Sherman Papers ; Charles A . Eldredge t o Andrew Johnson ,
April 6 , April 14 , 1867 , Johnson Papers . From the Republican standpoint ,
see William Lawrence to John Sherman , March 9 , 1867 , and Samuel Shella
barger to Benj amin Wade and John Sherman , March 11 , 1867 , Sherman Papers .
The original April 14 Eldredge to Johnson letter is in the Nat ional
Archives .
44
Beale , Diary , III , 391 .
45

charles H . Coleman , The Election of 1868 :
-to Regain Control ( New York , 1933 ) , 162-63 .
--
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fairly reach i s that he largely reverted t o the more conventional
channels of patronage .
use of the system .

This is not to sa;y that he was above personal

He endeavored to find comfortable posit i ons for at

least the key men who had supported him in 1866 .

McCulloch , Welles , and

Seward remained s ecure in their posts , despite many attempts to unseat
them.

Although it naturally aroused criticism, Johnson attempted with

varying degrees of success to place men such as Reverdy Johnson , Francis
P . Blair , Jr . , Henry J . Ra;ymond , and Edgar Cowan in forei gn post s .

46

Yet , although estranged from the Republican party , appointment of a few
close supporters to important situations was as far as he would go .

He

did not return to the Democratic fold , although most of what support he
had after 1866 came from Democrat s .

Andrew Johnson for all pract ical

purposes became a lame duck president after the 1866 elections , but he
was still determined to chart his own polit ical course .

46

For examples of the criticisms leveled against Johnson ' s over
s eas appointments , s ee "The Week , " Nation , January 24 , 1867 , pp . 61-62 ;
editorial , New York Tribune , January 18 , 1868 .

CHAPTER V
THE INHERITED FAMILY

In April , 1865 , Andrew Johnson inherited the presidency of the
United States .

With that exalted position went all of the trials and

tribulations of a nat ion in the immediate aftermath of a long and bitter
civil war , a problem which no other American chief of state has had t o
face .

Added to this legacy was another--President Lincoln ' s body of

advisers , an official family composed of men of varied political opinions
and experience .

B,y virtue of its broad domestic as well as foreign responsibilities ,
the key position in the cabinet was that of secretary of state , the post
held by William Henry Seward .

With his close friend and advi ser Thurlow

Weed , Seward was a powerful but by 1865 somewhat declining figure in New
York politics .

Twice elected governor of that pivotal state , he was

s ent to the Senate as a Whig in 1848 .

Increas ingly identifying himself

in the 1850 ' s with the growing anti-slavery sentiment in the North , he
decided to cast his lot with the emerging Republican party .

Denied that

organization ' s nomination for president in 1856 and again in 1860--the
latter a particularly bitter blow--he eventually accepted Lincoln ' s offer
to head the State Department , believing that from that situation he both
could and should dominate the administration .

After Lincoln thwarted

this notion by proving himself master of his own hous e , Seward s ettled
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down and became a valuable asset to his chief during the course of the
war .

1
Another cabinet post of great pro� nence , that of secretary of

war , was in possession of Edwin McMasters Stanton , who had been a surpri se selection Lincoln made in early 1862 to replace Simon Cameron , a
wily Pennsylvania politician who had become a polit ical liability .

A

former Ohio lawyer , Stanton had achieved a national reputation while
practicing before the United States Supreme Court in the 1850 ' s .

A com-

mitted Union man , he , like Johnson , had supported Breckinridge for the
presidency in 1860 in the belief that his election alone could save the
Union .

Pos sessed of only limited political experience but apparently

adhering t o Democratic principles , he became attorney-general in the
Buchanan cabinet in December , 1860 .

Relegated once again to private

life after Buchanan left office , he expressed nothing but contempt and
hostility for the Lincoln government , but for some still largely unknown
reason , Lincoln t apped him to be s ecretary of war .

Although often

charged with unwarrant ed interference with military operat i ons , he served
ably throughout the remainder of the war .

Somewhere along the way , he

embraced Radical principles and was accepted by the Radicals as one of
their own , but he kept this allegiance quiet during Lincoln ' s lifetime .

loexter

2

Perkins , nWilliam Henry Seward , n D . A . B . , XVI , 615-19 .
-

-

-

2
A . Howard Meneely , nEdwin McMasters Stanton , " ibid . , XVII , 51719 ; Dewitt , Impeachment and Trial , 264-67 . According to Meneely , Cameron
later claimed that he influenced Lincoln ' s decis ion t o t ake Stanton into
the cabinet . Dewitt flatly states that such was the cas e . One of Seward ' s
biographers as s igns t o Seward a maj or role in the matter . See Glyndon
G . Van Deusen , William Henry Seward ( New York , 1967 ) , 324 . According to
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The secretary of the treasury was an influenti al individual
Hugh

because of the lucrative revenue post s which were in his charge .

McCulloch was the third person whom Lincoln had tried at that t ask but
was as yet unproven at the time of his chief ' s untimely demise .

After

holding important financial s ituat i ons in Indiana , McCulloch had been
appointed comptroller of the currency in 1863 by the then secretary of
the treasury , Salmon P . Chas e .

He remained i n that position until chosen

by Lincoln in March , 1865 , to succeed Wi lliam Pitt Fes senden , who had
replaced Chase but who now was mov ing into the Senat e .

3

Gideon Welles was chosen secretary of the navy in 1861 and he was
still in that pos ition in 1865 .

A former newspaper editor , Welles had

served . in the Connect icut legislature as a Democrat between 1827 and
1835 .

During the Mexican War , he gained what later was t o prove valuable

experience by serving as chief of the Naval Bureau of Provisions and
Clothing .

Alienated from the Democrats by the slavery i ssue , he helped

found the Republican party in Connecti cut and headed that state ' s delegation to the Republican national convention in 1860 .

Following his

appointment , he was constantly on guard to protect the prerogat ives of
his department against the attempted encroachments of both Seward and
Stanton ; at the s ame t ime , he revealed his own capabilities as an

Stanton ' s latest biography , two key considerations in the decis ion were
that Cameron favored him and that both Seward and Secretary . of · the Treas
ury Chas e , who agreed on very little , held high opinions of him. Benja
min P . Thomas and Harold M. Hyman , Stanton : The Life -and Times of Lincoln ' s
Secretary of War ( New York , 1962 } , 135-36 .
--

-

3
Alexander D . Noyes , "Hugh McCulloch , " D . A . ·B . , XII , 6-7 .
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executive and made a definite contribution to the success of Union

arms .

4

James Speed had been made attorney-general about four months
before Lincoln ' s death .

A native of the border state of Kentucky ,

Speed ' s strong anti-slavery stand had allowed him t o gain only limited
political experience prior to the outbreak of the war .

Elected t o the

state senate in 1861 as an ardent Union man , he became one of Lincoln ' s
principal advisers on matters relating t o that state .

When Missourian

Edward Bates wearied of the attorney-generalship and resigned in late
186 4 , Lincoln chose Speed as his successor .

5

Montgomery Blair , Lincoln ' s initial choice for postmaster-general ,
had served in that capacity until September , 1864 , when Radi cal Republican agitation against him became too great for the president to ignore
in an election year .

He thus formally asked for Blair ' s resignation at

that point and selected former Ohio Governor William Dennison to replace
him.

6

A lawyer · by profession , Dennison was one of the early Ohio members

of the Republican party and was chairman of the Ohio delegat i on to the
first Republican national convention in 1856 .

Although the people of

Ohio knew very little about him and generally cons idered his nomination

as evidence of the lack of qualified candidates , he was elected governor
Hi s actions at the war ' s outset were unpopular and he therefore

in 1859 .

4

Howard K . Beale , "Gideon Welles , " ibi d. , XIX , 629-31 ; C arman and
Luthin , Lincoln � the Patronage , 16 . See also Richard S . West , Jr . ,
Gideon Welles : Lincoln ' s � Department ( New York , 1943 ) .
5
6

E . Merton Coulter , "James Speed , " D . A . B . ,

XVII ,

440 .

Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage , 273-77 .
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was not renominated in 1861 .

7

His most immediate service to the party

prior t o as suming the duties of postmaster-general was to organize a
pro-Lincoln slate of Ohio delegates to the 1864 convention and then to
serve as permanent chairman of that convention .

8

Following his re-election in 1864 , President Lincoln decided t o
name a new s ecretary o f the interior an d settled upon United States
Senator James Harlan of Iowa , a very close friend of the Lincoln family .
The product of a frontier environment , Harlan had been both educator and
An ardent Whig and former Free-Boiler , he was elected to the

lawyer .

Senate in 185 5 by an action that had to be reaffirmed by the Iowa legislature two years later , since it had originally been done after one house .
had adj ourned .

The Republican choice for a second term in 1860 , he sub-

sequently became an active supporter of Abraham Lincoln and his friendship with the chief executive made his s election for a cabinet post vir
tually a foregone conclusion .

9

The resignation of John P . Usher , the

incumbent s ecretary , was not to become effective until May 15 , 1865 , and
Harlan therefore had not assumed his position at the t ime Johnson c ame
to the presidency .

10

These were the men whom Johnson bad to decide t o retain . or t o
replace as h i s official advi sers .

7

Having been thrust into a situation

Homer C . Hockett , "Wi lliam Dennison , " D . A . B . , V , 241 .

8
Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the . Patronage , 278 .
9
10

Earle D . Ros s , "James Harlan , 11 D . A . B . , VII I , 268 .
Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage , 311-12 .
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to which he had not been elected , the new president apparently not only
felt obliged to follow what he considered to be his predeces sor ' s policies but also to retain his offi cial family , an understandable attitude
but one that did not remain unchallenged .

Some gentle prodding for

changes took place at the outset of his administration .

While declaring

that he had not " one word by way of advice , " Senator Dixon , in a letter
in early May , noted that should the chief executive be considering chan
ges in his cabinet , Montgomery Blair should be given a posit ion .

11

A

few days later , Lewis D . Campbell , one of the new president ' s Ohio cronies , expressed the opinion that the people seemed t o pre�er that Seward
and McCulloch be retained in their positions .

"But i� the residue of

the Cabinet were replaced , " he added , "I think the country would generally approve of it . "

12

Such temperate suggestions went unheeded , and

during the early months of 1866 , those seeking to give him counsel began
to be more emphati c about the neces sity of cabinet changes .

From Ohio ,

Campbell qui ckly saw the direction in which Congress was headed and
warned his illustrious �iend that should "you retain the same council
you have around you controlling the Executive patronage to promote their
views and . not yours , I greatly fear the radi cals will r apidly increase
in power and strength . "

13

From Hart ford , one of Gideon Welles ' regular

correspondents declared that ,

as

matters stood at that juncture , the

11
James Dixon to Johnson , May 5 , 1865 , Johnson Papers .
12
13

Campbell to Johnson , May 8 , 1865 , ibid .
campbell to Johnson , January 19 , 1866 , ibid.

12 0
chief magistrate had enemies in his own official family as well as in
federal offices throughout the nation . The simple answer to this problem
was a "reconstructed Cabinet and the appointment of true friends to official position . " Such a move would rally the necessary support for a
"Johnson party as strong as that which rallied around Andrew Jackson. "14
By May ,

it .was clear that the president had men of Radical senti-

ment within his official body of advisers , but despite urgings from his
friends to show some decisiveness and rid himself of such untrustworthy
men , Johnson made no move in that direction .

In an exasperated mood ,

Thomas Ewing, Jr . , wrote to his influential father :

"The President does

not move . to sustain himself--whether from fear of some law being passed
crippling his power of removal
inaction no one knows .

appointment , or from constitutional
I think it �s the latter . "15 The chief executive ,
&

however , had bis own reasons for not making the , cabinet removals which
were so widely sought by his supporters . Although Radical newspapers
were making much of the accession of men such as Harlan , Speed , and
Stanton to their ranks , none of the persons in question had said anything
to Johnson to indicate new loyalties , and he therefore could not be certain that they held such opinions .

He preferred to believe that they

were honorable men and wou+d voluntarily resign if they did .not believe
in his policies . 16
14Altred E . Burr to Welles , April 7 , 1866 , Welles Papers .
2
15Ewing Jr . to Thomas Ewing , May 16 , 1866 , Ewing Family Papers .
16Beale , Diary , II , 481-8 , 4- .
2 52 25
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The: president ' s assumption proved partly correct .

The i ssuance

of invitations to attend the National Union convention scheduled for
August in Philadelphia had the effect of smoking out most of Johnson ' s
opposition within his official family .
Harlan resi gned .

In July , Speed , Dennison , and

Speed and Dennison had been opposed to a lenient policy

toward the South from the time Lincoln had shown a willingness to adopt
that course .

17

Harlan apparently felt much the same way , although

Johnson had t o ask for his resignat ion .

18

The chief execut ive filled the vacated positions with men whose
loyalty to him was unquestionable .

The Post Office Department went t o

Alexander Randall , who had been a prime mover i n organizing the National
Union drive to support Johnson .

During his early political career in

Wiscons in , Randall had manifested both Whig and Democrat i c leanings , but
he gradually became identified with the Free-Soil element and then with
the Republicans .

Serving as governor of Wi sconsin for two t erms , he was

in office when the war came .

He worked energetically to enlist forces

for the Union cause and sought a military commiss ion upon . leaving office .
Lincoln did not see fit to grant this desire , but he finally did make
him first as sistant postmaster-general in 1863 , a position from whi ch he
actively worked for Lincoln ' s re-election and then proceeded to render
valuable service t o his chief ' s succes sor .
17

19

Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage , 312-13 .

18
Milton , Age of Hate , 340 . Radicals quite naturally clas sified
these resignations as act s of conscience . See Blaine , Twenty Years of
Congress , II , 218-19 and Burke A . Hinsdale (ed . ) , The Works of James
Abram Garfield ( 2 vola . , Boston , 1882 ) , I , 234 .
19
Joseph Schafer , "Alexander Williams Randall , " D . A .- B . , XV , 344-
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The attorney-generalship was bestowed upon a man of much greater
legal ability and reputat ion than Speed had possessed.

An Ohio lawyer ,

Henry Stanbery had for a time practiced law with Thomas Ewing and gradu
ally became widely known .

Elected attorney-general of Ohio in 1846 , he

extended his practice into the United States courts and the Ohio Supreme
Court , later in 185 3 , moving his law offices to Cincinnati where he suecess fully pursued his profess ion until brought to the national scene in
1866 .

20
Former Senator Orville Hickman Browning of Illinois received the

Interior Department appointment .
...

Originally a Whig , Browning had served

. .

in both houses of the Illinois legislature but lost bids for Congress in
1843 , 1850 , and 1852 .

He . became a Republican in the mid-1850 ' s and

watched rather enviously as a close friend , Abraham Lincoln , rapidly
rose to the heights of success within the ranks of that party .

Despite

this political j ealousy , he served as an Illinois delegate to the 1860
Republican convention and was instrumental in winning votes for Lincoln .
Chosen by Governor Yates to fill Stephen A . Douglas ' unexpired senatorial
term , Browning drifted away from the Illinoisan in the White House over
the issue of emancipat ion .

Denied a term of his own when the Democrat s

gained control o f the Illinois legislature i n 1862 , Browning then moved
t o support Andrew Johnson and in May , 1866 , became his adviser on Illi
nois patronage and an active participant in the National Union movement .
20
A . Howard Meneely , "Henry Stanbery , " ibid . , XVII , 498 .
2

�heodore C . Pease , "Orville Hickman Browning , " ibid . , III , 17576 . See also Maurice G. Baxter , Orville H. Browning : LiDCOln ' s Friend
and Critic ( Bloomington , Ind . , 1957 ) . Thomas Ewing may have influenced
Johnson ' s select ions of St anbery and Browning . Se� Ewing to Johnson ,
March 15 , 1866 , Johnson Papers .

21
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Although a large number of removals were made subsequently by the
new department heads ,
the 1866 elections .

22

they failed to affect measurably the . outc ome of

Johnsonian proponents , even s o , were ready for new

changes by 1867 .

The influenti al Blair family definitely wanted new

patronage moves .

Driven from Republican ranks by the Radi cal s , they

determined to organize a new party built around the . War Democrat s , men
who like the Blairs had supported Lincoln in 1864 but now found themselves
without a party .
their effort s .

Even beyond the 1866 campaign , th� Blairs persist ed in
They were particularly determined t o have changes in the

key pos itions of secretary of state and secretary of war and , if . need be
in order to have them, they were willing to see the entire family re
placed .

23

Indeed , early in 1867 , the elder Francis Preston Blair proposed

exactly that move .

Hi s nominees were John A . Andrew ( secretary of state ) ,

philanthropist George Peabody ( s ecretary of the treasury } , Horace Greeley
(postmaster-general ) , Governor Jacob D . Cox of Ohio ( secretary of the
interior ) , and Edgar Cowan ( attorney-general ) .

Ad interim appointments

as s ecretary of war and s ecretary of the navy were to go t o General Grant
and Admiral David G . Farragut , respectively .

24

Late in February , he

22
Winston , Andrew Johnson , 363 ; Ralph Korngold , Thaddeus Stevens ,
A Being DarkJ.y Wis e and Rudely Great (New York , 19 5 5 ) , 356 .
2

3william E . Smith , The Francis Preston Blair FamiJ.y in Politics
(2 vols . ; New York , 1933 ) , II , 329-33 passim. Montgomery Blair was an
especially bitter foe of Seward and took every opportunity to denounce
him , first privately ( as an example , see Blair to Johnson , April 11 ,
1866 , Johnson Papers ) and then openly , in the hope that public opinion
would force the New Yorker from office . Neither tact i c worked . Cox ,
Politics , Principle , and Prejudice , 66-67 .
24

Blair to Johnson , February 12 , 1867 , Johnson Papers .
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once again urged a clean sweep of the cabinet "as a . concession to the
discontents of the country . " 25 Johnson, however, could see no reason
for such a move and the changes were not forthcoming. 26
The Blairs were not the only persons trying to force cabinet
removals .

In a February letter to his father, the yo�ger Ewing reported

a great deal of pressure being brought to bear upon the president to
reorganize his official family .
Ewing, was Greeley .

The leader of this drive, according to

The obj ect was to place universal suffrage men in

the more important positions, and the individuals against whom the great
est effort was being made were Seward, Stanton, Welles, and Randa11 . 2 7
The pressure was intensified by conservative elements in various parts
of the nation prior to the state elections of October and November .

By

that time, Seward, McCulloch, and Randall were being singled out as John
son' s greatest political liabilities . 28 Representative of this sentiment
was an Indiana newspaper editor who asked what these men were doing for
the president :

"Do they appoint your friends to public positions? If ·
they do an exception to that rule is made in this section . " 29 still

Johnson held back and the changes were not made .
25 Blair to Johnson, February 2 4, 1867, ibid.
2�ilton, Age of Hate, 386 .
27Thomas Ewing, Jr . , to Thomas Ewing, February 19, 1867, Ewing
Family Papers .
2 \ilton, � of Hate, 464 .
29J . B. Stoll to Johnson, September 25 , 1867, Johnson Papers .
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The final great effort to bring about turnovers in the cabinet
came in the immediate aftermath of the impeachment trial.

The inducement

placed before Johnson was the Democratic nomination for president, and
the particular targets for attack were Seward and McCulloch.

On the eve

of the presidential balloting at the Democratic convention, Johnson was
informed that his friends had labored arduously for his nomination, and
that they felt "this evening that your success would have been beyond all
doubt if you had not such a dead weight to carry, in your Cabinet, espe
cially the State and Treasury Departments."

30

Another Johnsonian Demo-

crat earli er had pleaded for changes on the grounds that such a move
would make Johnson's strength among Democratic delegates "assume a formid
able shape at once."
question:

31

To all such pleas, Johnson's only reply was a

"Are we not doing well in carrying seven Cabinet officers,

who were Republicans, in favor of all the measures that the Democrats
profess to support?"

32

Not even the prospect of a presidential nomination

could force him to abandon those men who had stood by him during his
33
time of tria1.

30
R. W. Latham to Johnson, July 7 , 1868, ibid. Latham earlier
had lamented that cabinet changes made twelve or-even eight months before
would have assured Johnson of the nomination. See Latham to Johnson,
June 11, 1868, ibid.
3l
aalph W. Newton to Johnson, June 24, 1868, ibid. For other
letters holding forth the hope of nomination in return for cabinet chan
ges, see William W. Warden to Johnson, June 29, July 1, 1868, ibid.
32 .
Johnson to Edmund Cooper, July 8, 1868, ibid.
33

one historian sympathetic to Johnson has declared that both
Seward and McCulloch were "devious and uncandid in their treatment of
the President." Milton, Age of Hate, 641. This charge, however, appears
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The president ' s loyalty to his executive officers was not reciprocated in every c as e .

Perhaps Johnson ' s ardent supporters were wrong in

suspecting from t ime to t ime the fi delity of men like McCulloch and
Seward , but as time pas sed , there was room for little doubt concerning
War Secretary Edwin M . Stanton .

Almost from the t ime of Johnson ' s eleva-

tion t o the presidency , Stanton ' s removal from office both was expected
and called for by Johnsonians .

As early as mid-June ,_ 186 5 , the new chief

was being warned that Stanton was treacherous and should be removed
"while it is yet t ime" and the names of Frank P . Blair , Jr . , and Cassius
M. Clay were being suggested as replacements .

34

These remonstrances fell

on deaf ears and Stanton remained in his place .
Rumors of the s ecretary ' s imminent resignat ion gradually faded ,
only to be given new l i fe in early 1866 .

The president received several

letters in late January and early February urging that Stanton be replaced
by Maj or General James B . Steedman , a trusted pro-Johnson soldierpolitician .

Citing newspaper accounts of Stanton ' s impending departure ,

grossly unfair , especially t o Seward , who probably lost what politi cal
influence he yet had by standing by Johnson . Van Deusen , Seward , 482 .
McCulloch ' s maj or error was retaining in offi ce and protect ing the decid
edly Radical Commis s ioner of Internal Revenue , E . A . Rollins , who finally
resigned in June , 1868 , after filling many revenue positions with Radi
cals . McCulloch , however , was not a politician and this fact perhaps
explains the reason for his s lowness in sens ing Rollins ' disloyalty .
There appears t o be little evidence that McCulloch himself was in any
way disloyal t o his chief . For some comment s on the McCulloch-Rollins
relat ionship , see Herbert S . Schell , "Hugh McCulloch and the Treasury
Department , 1865-1869 , " Mississippi Valley Historical Review , XVII
( December , 1930 ) , 415 .
34

Letters from Herman Walther to Johnson , June 15 , 1865 ; James S .
Rollins to Johnson , June 7 , 1865 ; David Dudley Field t o Johnson , June 8 ,
1865 ; W . W . Jones to Johnson , June 20 , 1865 , Johnson Papers .
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George H . Pendleton , prominent Ohio politician , highly recommended
Steedman as "an able , energetic , accomplished businessman , of great executive ability" and predicted that in him Johnson would have "an able
faithful trustworthy adviser of commanding influence . "

35

The erratic

editor of the New York Tribune also endorsed the general , calling him
"one of the bravest and truest of our Union Volunteers , and a c apable ,
devoted patriot . "

36

The reports of which these men had heard also died without any
vis ible effect upon the war minister ' s pos ition , but as the year 1866
moved t oward the fateful congressional elections , his lack of loyalty
became increas ingly evident in the amount of official advert i sing given
by the War Department t o newspapers which violently opposed the president .
Although Johnson tried to counter the effects of his secretary ' s actions
by removing as much pat ronage as possible from his control and by attempting to place military notices in organs friendly to the administrat ion ,
he allowed the man himself t o retain his office .

38

While other c abinet

officials who were no longer in sympathy with the official policies of
the execut ive offered their resignations in July , Stanton remained in

35

Pendleton t o Johnson , January 28 , 1866 , ibid.

36

Horace Greeley to Johnson , January 28 , 1866 , ibi d . De an Rich
mond , Samuel J . Tilden , Samuel Barlow , and . Augustus Schell were among
others who wrote letters of endorsement for Steedman .
37
Milton , �o�ate , 324 . It _ i s of interest to note that
while Stanton t ook such covert actions as cited , he assumed no open
stand against Johnson ' s policies and in fact continued the appearance of
supporting the president ' s stand until well into 1867 . Dewitt , Impeach
ment and Trial , 267-69 .
38
Thomas and Hyman , Stanton , 529 .

37
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his place .

Secretary McCulloch later recorded his impre ssion of the

entire matter :
He [ St anton ] attended the Cabinet meetings , not as an adviser
of the President , but as an opponent of the policy to which he
had himself been committed , and the President lacked the nerve
to dismis s him. The failure of the President to exercise his
undoubted right to rid himself of a minister who differed with
him upon very important questions , who had become personally
obnoxious to him , and whom he regarded as an enemy and a spy ,
was a blunder for which there was no excus e , 39
Whether Stanton was retained because the pres ident lacked the .
nerve t o replace him or was s imply willing to give every benefit of the
doubt to a man who had not the honesty to admit his true position , one
thing was certain--the chief executive ' s enemies knew that he had within
the ranks of his

own

official family one of their own , and they thus

moved t o protect him from removal .

Fearful that Johnson would make a

wholesale sweep of hostile officeholders { including Stanton ) as soon as
Congress adj ourned , the Radical members of the Thirty-ninth Congres s sett led upon a course of action which later was described by James G . Blaine ,
who had been of that persuasion :
Against the early decision of the founder s
against the
repeat edly expressed j udgment of ex-President Madison , against
the equally emphatic judgment of Chief Justice Marshall , and
above all , against the unbroken practice of the Government for
seventy-eight years , the Republican leaders now determined t o
deprive the President of the power o f removing Federal officers . 4°
•

•

•

The measure which was designed to safeguard Radical incumbent s in their
respect ive offices was known as the Tenure of Office Act .

39
McCulloch , Men and Measures , 391 .
40
Blaine , Twenty Years of Congress , II , 270 .

Passed on
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March 2 , 1867 ,

41

in its final form , it had as its heart this c lause :

That every person holding any civil office t o which he has
been appointed , by and with the advi ce and consent of the Senate ,
and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such
offi ce and shall become duly qualified to act therein , is and
shall be ent itled to hold such office unt il a suc ces s or shall
have been appointed by the President , with the advice and consent
of the Senate , and duly qualified ; and that the Secretaries of
State , of the Treasury , of War , of the Navy , and of the Interior ,
the Postmaster-General , and the Attorney-General shall hold
their offices respectively for and during the t erm of the Presi
dent by whom they may have been appointed and for one month
thereafter , subj ect to removal by and with the advice and con
s ent of the Senate . 42
The views of the executive and legislat ive branches of the government concerning the Tenure of Office Act naturally were widely divergent .
To the maj ority of the Radical-dominated Congres s , the passage of the

4

1March 2 was a red letter day in the Radic al struggle against
Johnson . On that day , not only did the Tenure of Office Act become law
but also the First Reconstruction Act and the Army Appropriations Act .
The latter , while providing as always for army s alaries , included an
unusual clause which c alled for the permanent stat ioning in Washington
of the general-in-chief (Grant ) and decreed that all orders by the presi
dent and the secretary of war had to be i ssued through him to be valid .
The Tenure Act and this sect ion of the Army Act were designed t o tie the
chief executive ' s" hands polit ically and militarily . However , since Grant
and Johnson worked in harmony until early 1868 , any suggested effect of
this measure upon the actual course of reconstruction in 1867 is very
much open to question . Sefton , � and Reconstruction , 111-12 ;
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 482n .
4

� ichardson , Mes sages and Papers , VI , 492 . In the original
measure , a provis ion to include cabinet members was excluded by the
Senate , as it earlier had been by the House . The latter body , however ,
experienced a change of heart when rumors concerning the imminent removal
of Stanton once again began to make the rounds . Subsequently , before
the Senate c ould complete action on the bill , the House voted to include
cabinet members . The Senate , which was less dominated by the Radicals ,
refused to accept this move , but the Hous e insisted upon the inclus ion .
A conference c ommittee then worked out a compromi se stat ement which
included the c abinet in the manner des cribed . Radicals now assumed that
their favorite was s afe . Dewitt , Impeachment and Tri al , 183-85 , 193-93 .
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measure simply rect ified a mistake made by the early fathers of the
nation .

The First Congress had recognized the power of removal by the

executive largely because of the greatnes s of the man who at that t ime
occupied the offi ce .

In subsequent years , however , that authority had

been misused by lesser men to exalt the power of the executive branch ,
thus necessit at ing remedial action in order t o prevent a despoti sm .

43

President Johnson could not be expected to regard the measure in
question in such a favorable light .

To him , it was flying in the face

of all precedents--a flagrant attempt by Congress to usurp power whi ch
was right fully his .

Although the act had been desi gned in such a

as to bring even the cabinet under it s provis ions in

an

manner

obvious attempt

to save Stanton from removal , all the members of that body c ondemned it ,
and the s ecretary of war even went so far as t o help Seward write the
presidential vet o .

44

That message , grounded upon the congres sional

debates of 1789 , pointed to the precedents which subsequently had been
s et :
That the power of removal is c onst itutionally vested in the
President. of the United States is a principle which has been not
more dist inctly declared by judicial authority and judicial com
mentaries than it has been uniformly practiced upon by the
legis lative and executive departments of the Government . 45
Established practices were traced through Lincoln , who , Congress was
reminded , had displaced numerous officeholders "upon probable suspicion"

43

S1'

wi lliam A. Dunning , Es s s .2B. the Civil War and Rec onstruction �
Related Topic s { New York , 1898 , 289 .
44

�. , 2 88 ; Pat rick , Reconstruction , 121 .

45

Richardson , Messages and Papers , VI , 493 .
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of their disloyalty to the Union .

46

The presidential arguments were to

no avail as the measure became law over his vet o .

47

Several months pas sed before the president chose to give the
Tenure Act a maj or test .
obnoxious to him .

During this time , Stanton became increasingly

Following the passage of the act , whi ch had been de-

s igned in part t o protect him , the secretary allowed his Radical proclivit ies to be ever more apparent .

When the chief execut ive learned that

his war secret ary had personally written the second supplementary reconstruction bill which had recently become law over his veto , he decided
that the t ime had c ome to make some changes in the War Department .

48

As

the initial move in the same month that also was t o see the removal of
two t op generals from their southern commands , Johnson asked for Stanton ' s
resignat ion .

When the secretary refused to surrender his post , the

chief magistrate , against the advice of General Grant , suspended him from

46
The entire veto mess age may be found in ibid . , 49 3-98 .
47

That the Tenure of Office Act had been aimed exclusively at
Johnson became clearly evident very shortly after Grant took office . A
move was made to repeal the act and , although the Senate would not go
along with this effort , a compromise was reached whereby Grant could re
move officials during the recess of Congress , subj ect to Senate approval
during the following session . The purpose , according to one senator ,
was "so that there might be no obstacle in the path of General Grant to
the removal of the obnoxious offi cials who had adhered to Andrew Johnson . "
George F . Hoar , Autobiography of Seventy Years ( 2 vols . , New York , 1905 } ,
II , 138 . In 1887 , Congress repealed the restrictions of both the Tenure
Act and the Army Act . Claude B. Cross , "The Removal Power of the Presi
dent and the Test of Responsibility , " Cornell Law Quarterly , XL ( Fall ,
1954 } ' 83-84 .
48
Milton , � of Hate , 447 ; Patri ck , Reconstruction , 121 ; Dewitt ,
Impeachment and Trial , 270-71 . For some other c onsiderations whi ch may
have played a role in the pres ident ' s decision , see McKitrick , Andrew
Johns on , 497 .
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office and placed Grant in the secretary ' s pos ition ad interim.

49

Although Grant felt that the Tenure Act covered Stanton , he nonetheless
assumed the ad interim appointment .
When Congress reconvened in December , Johnson sent to the Senate .
a full report concerning the suspension , including his reasons for doing
so .

In it , he not only cited the secretary ' s defi ance in refusing to

resign his office but also the damaging facts that , while Stanton , in
his reply to the order suspending him , had c laimed c overage by the Tenure
Act , his original reaction to the law had been an emphatic rej ect ion of
it as unconstitutional and that he had helped draft the veto mes s age .
The president also point ed out that Stanton ' s growing differences of
opinion with the official views of the administration had caused disunity
within the cabinet and stated his belief that , when a department head ' s
views become s o widely divergent from those of his superior , only "a
severance of the official relationship" could remedy the s ituation effec
tively .

50

The Senate did not find the president ' s arguments convincing

and on January 13 , 186 8 , refused to ac cept the suspension .

49

For the exchange of correspondence among the three , s ee the
following letters in the Johnson Papers : Grant to Johnson , August 1 ,
1867 ; Johnson t o Stanton , August 5 , 1867 ; Stanton t o Johnson , August 5 ,
1867 ; Johnson to Stanton , August 12 , 1867 ; Stanton to Johnson , August
12 , 1867 ; Johnson to Grant , August 12 , 1867 . By suspending { as opposed
to removing) the secretary of war from office and subsequently submitting
a report of his action t o the Senate , Johnson s eemed to be acting within
prescribed limits set by the Tenure Act , a fact whi ch later was to cause
his defense attorneys some trouble during the course of the impeachment
trial .
50
Richardson , Messages and Papers , VI , 589 . It may also be of
some interest to note that Johnson charged that Stanton withheld vital
information concerning the s ituat ion which resulted in the riot in New
Orleans in 1866 . Ibid . , 590 . The entire text of Johnson ' s December 12
mes sage is reprinted in ibid . , 583-94 .
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On January

The Senate ' s refusal to concur caused Grant to act .

14 , he notified Johnson that as of the evening of the previous day he no
longer considered himself ad interim secretary of . war .

51

At a cabinet

meeting on the s ame day , however , it was revealed that the president and
the general had made a prior agreement t o the effect that Grant would
either retain the office or surrender it before the Senate acted in order
to give the chief magistrate time to find someone who would remain in
that position unti l the court s could test the constitutionality of the
Tenure Act .

52

Although the general subsequently wrote his commander-in-

chief both denying that he had ever promised to surrender his post in
advance of Stanton ' s reinstatement and asserting that he had informed
him pri or to the Senate ' s action that he would vacat e the office if
Stanton was reinstated by the Senate ,

53

Johnson obvi ously had caught

Grant in a lie , a fact to which the other cabinet members then attested .
A later Radical probe halted short of revealing this perfidy because of
fear of damaging Grant ' s presidential aspirations , which already had had

51
Grant to Johnson , January 14 , 1868 , Johnson Papers .
52
This comment is based upon the recollections of that meeting by
the other cabinet members who re sponded to Johnson ' s request to put them
See Welles to Johnson , February 5 , 1868 , Gideon Welles
in writing .
Collection ( Henry E . Huntington Library ) , copy in Johnson Papers ; Brown
ing to Johnson , February 6 , 1868 , 0 . H . Browning Papers ( Illinois State
Historical Library ) , copy in ibid . ; McCulloch to Johnson , February 6 ,
1868 ; Randall t o Johnson , February 6 , 1868 ; Seward t o Johnson , February
6 , 1868 , Johnson Papers .
53

Grant to Johnson , January 28 , 1868 , ibid .

134
some of their luster knocked off by his acceptance of the ad interim
position in the first place .

54

Whether or not Grant had been perfidious i n his actions , the
point was that Stanton had been reinstated by the Senate , Grant had returned that post to Stanton ' s care , and the president was in the . same
position he had occupied prior to the August suspens ion .

Although his

friends urged him to forget the wayward secretary , Johnson was determined to remove him from offi ce .

His attempts t o find a capable man to

replace Stanton ad interim , however , found little enthusi astic response .
One by one , prominent figures re fus ed the appointment , and even the
chief clerk of the War Department rej ected an offer .

In ·order to force

the is sue with Stanton , the chief executive finally had to settle for
the vain and pompous adjutant general of the army , Brevet Maj or General
Lorenzo Thomas .

55

On February 21 , 1868 , Johnson gave Thomas two papers--

one , to be delivered to Stanton , notified the War Department chief that
he had been removed from his post and that he was to surrender custody
of the office to Thomas ; the other , addres sed to Thomas , authorized him
to act as secretary of war ad interim.

56

Refusing to comply with the

54
Patrick , Reconstruct ion , 123 . Immediately after Grant ' s accept
ance of the secretaryship , the editor of the Radical-oriented Chicago
Tribune , in a letter to one of the general ' s key supporters for the presi
dency , noted that one effect of the appointment had been to make Grant
appear t o many as "in some s ense tainted with Johnsoni sm . " Horace White
to Elihu Washburne , August 13 , 1867 , Washburne Papers .
55

Patrick , Reconstruction , 124 .

56
Johnson to Stanton , February 21 , 1868 , Johnson Papers ; Dewitt ,
Impeachment and Trial , 344 .
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order , Stanton had Thomas arrested .

Before the case could be brought to

trial , however , the Radicals , unwilling to see the Tenure Act tested in
the courts , persuaded him to drop charges against the adjutant general ,
thereby denying the president the test case which he had worked so long
and hard to produce .

Instead , on February 2 4 , the House of Representa

tives passed a resolution impeaching Andrew Johnson of high crimes and
misdemeanors in office , basing this action mainly upon his apparent vio
lation of the Tenure of Office Act by dismi ss ing Stanton from office .

57
Patri ck , Reconstruction , 124 .

57

CHAPTER VI

PRESIDENTIAL PATRONAGE ON TRIAL
Between December 17 , 1866 , and January 13 , 1868 , s everal attempts
were made to impeach the pres ident .

Efforts to prove charges ranging

from plotting to place Tennes see under Confederate control whi le he was
that state ' s· military governor to having a hand in Lincoln ' s as sassinat ion all ended in embaras s ing failure for Johnson ' s ant agonists .

1

By

February , 1868 , hopes of building a credible c as e against the chief executive appeared dim indeed .
Johnson ' s unsuccessful attempt to remove Stanton from office gave
new life to the stalled impeachment drive .

For the first time , the

president ' s opponents had in this apparent violation of the Tenure of
Office Act something s olid upon which to construct a case against him ,
and they were determined to make the most of it .

During the course of

the extensive debate which preceded the vote on the impeachment resolution , s everal representatives expressed confidence that the chie f executive ' s obvious violation of the law of the land was all that was necessary
to j ustify impeachment .

Rufus Spalding of Ohio smugly presented his

opinion :
Now , Mr . Speaker , in � apprehension , if there be any effi
c acy in an enactment of Congres s , we are not called upon to
ascertain
whether the President has , in fact , committed a
high misdemeanor , because Congres s has already , upon the face
•

•

•

�e impeachment drives in this period are described in detail by
Dewitt , Impeachment and Trial , 135-338 passim . An excellent concise sum
mary is given in McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 491-504 .
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of its enactment , declared the alleged act of removal to be
such . 2
Proclaiming that the House had a "complete , compact , and perfect case ,"
John F. Farnsworth of Illinois saw no need for witnesses o r further testimany , since the s ituat ion was "as clear and plain as if he confes sed the
crime . "
•

3

Mis s ouri ' s William Pile was equally certain :

are plain and unambiguous .

and conclusive . "

4

"The provisions

The proof of the act s is documentary

"The case is a plain one , " declared New Yorker Burt

Van Horn , " and there can be but one conclusion arrived at by any candid
mind . "

5

Tenness ean William B. Stokes was emphatic :

n o getting around or s liding out o f thi s .

"Now , sir , there i s

He has bid defiance to an act

of Congress ; he has done that which the law positively forbid him from
doing . "

6

John F . Driggs of Michigan felt no need for debat e :

"Mr .

We have before us the

Speaker , it is of no use to argue the question .

law , and upon the Speaker ' s desk the President ' s admis sion that he has
violat ed the law . "

7

Some House members attempted to broaden the case somewhat by
as serting that , by removing Stanton while the Senat e was yet in session ,
the Pre s ident had violated not only the Tenure Act but also the Constitut ion .

Such was the burden of Thaddeus Steven ' s comments in concluding

the debate late on the afternoon of February 24 ,

2
3
5
7

8

but he had been

Cong. Globe , 40 Cong . , 2 ses s . , 1340 .
Ibid. ' 1344 .
Ibi d. , 1389 .
Ibid . ' 1368 .

4
6
8

Ibid . ' App . 156 .
Ibid . ' 1395 .
Ibid . ' 1400 .
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preceded by others arguing the same thing .

Pile called for "the

production of one single precedent for the exercise of such power . "

9

Illinoisan Burton Cook held that even if the Tenure Act did not exist ,
Johnson had "exercised a power entirely unwarranted by the Constitution
and laws of the United States . "

10

James Moorhead of Pennsylvania viewed

the pre s ident ' s action as "no les s than open and defiant refusal to obey
the law and the Constitution that he has solemnly sworn to support . "

11

Ohio ' s John A . Bingham , a dedicated Johnson foe , likewise pronounced the
chief executive guilty of a violation of the Constitution and as s erted
that "in that particular he is subj ect to the penalties imposed upon him
by the sixth s ecti on of the tenure-of-office act . "

12

While alleged executive violation both of the Tenure Act and of
the Constitution may have been a sufficient c as e for s ome congressmen ,
others found that they were unable to limit themselves to such unimportant considerati ons .

Ohioan James M . Ashley , who had worked long and

hard to bring about Johnson ' s impeachment , was not afraid to let his true
feelings be known :

9

Ibid . , App . 156 . There indeed was an almost exact precedent
to Stanton ' s case . In 1800 , President Adams had removed a protesting
Timothy Pickering as secretary of state while the Senate was in session .
Johnson ' s counsel had hoped to keep this fact under wraps until the
right time , but the president ruined this strategy by revealing it to
a New York World reporter on March 9 . Milton , � of �' 529 .
10
Cong. Globe , 40 Cong . , 2 sess . , 1362 .
11

Ib J."_.
d ,
_

12

APP · 157

•

Ibid . , App . 160 . The penalities imposed by the section to
which Bingham referred were a fine of $10 , 000 , or imprisonment up to
five years , or both .
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I regard this as one of the smallest of the many offences of
which thi s man has been guilty . If Mr . Johnson had been gui lty
of no impeachable offence until his removal of Mr . Stanton , no
one believes that a maj ority of this House c ould be induced to
vote for his impeachment now . l3
Indiana ' s George W. Julian , one of the most radical of the Radicals , saw
it much the s ame way :

" It is true , the removal of the Secretary of War

is relatively a small matter

•

and I believe it would be regarded

as

scarcely a sufficient ground for this proceeding , if not considered in
the light of far greater previous offences . "

14

Pennsylvanian John M .

Broomall felt constrained t o agree with these pronouncements :
Now , I am not of the opinion that this last act of the
President is the greatest one of his enormities . On the con
trary , I am inclined to think that in it s consequences it is
among the smallest , a mere foiled att empt at dictatorship . l 5
Despite the valiant attempts of Johnson ' s House friends to confine
the debate to the i ssue at hand , i . e . , the president ' s removal of Stanton
as a violation of the Tenure Act ,

16

comments of men such as Ashley ,

Julian , and Broomall encouraged the spread of the argument to subj ects
far afield , and allowed all of the pent up feelings and suspi cions of
the chief executive ' s enemies to find expression .

In words charged with

emot ion , Farnsworth asserted :
Sir , this nation has been too long disgraced by this man ,
this ac c idental President , m.aa.e · so by the as sass in ' s pistol ,

13

�· ' 1360-61 .

15
16
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Ibid. , App . 158 .

For s ome examples of the efforts o� pro-Johnson House members
to defend the right of the president to remove Stanton from offi ce , see
the speeches of James Brooks , James B. Beck , William S . Holman , Benjamin
M . Boyer , and Charles E . Phelps . Ibid . , 1337-39 , 1349-51 , 1353-5 5 , 136265 , App . 244-47 .
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this man who , in an evil hour , was thrust upon the country .
Too long has he been an incubus , and a disgrace to thi s great
and glorious nat ion . Let him be removed . 11
Illinois ' at large representative John A . Logan did not believe it necessary to go into Johnson ' s many offences , since they were "patent to the
whole country . "

Citing particularly his appointment of "disreputable

persons " to office , the congressman declared that the chief executive
had done "every act which can be enumerated in the English language whi ch
i s an obstruction t o the prosperity of thi s nat ion and the preservati on
of the harmony of it s people . "

18

Ben But ler , another ardent Johnson

antagonist , "mourn:t'ully" recalled the chief magistrate ' s " change of purpos e , which became so painfully evident in the swmner of 186 5" and li sted
his many crimes from that point to "his attempt to draw into a conspiracy
with himself the general officer of the Armies of the United States . "

19

"Now s ir , what is the hi story of this man? , " asked George S . Boutwell of
Massachusett s .

After recalling for his hearers the drunken spectac le

which Johns on had made of himself before the nat ion and the world during
his inauguration as vice-president , he presented another question for
their consideration :
Is not he the man who , in violation of his oath of office ,
appointed men t o places of trust and power througout the ten
States of the South who could not t ake the oath of offi ce pre
s cribed by the law of the country? 20

17
20

Ibid . ' 1347 .

18

�· ' 1353 .

19

Ibid . ' 1393 .

Ibid . , App . 161 . This remark was an obviou� reference t o
Johnson ' s provis ional governors and other men appointed t o fill federal
offices in the southern states in 1865 . As was noted earlier , no com
plaints were made concerning those appointments until the president ran
afoul of the Radic als on other matters .
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Kansan Sidney Clarke hinted at something much more dark than any of
these things :

"I believe him guilty of a deliberate conspiracy to de-

stray by treacherous plots the fruits of the victory which patriotic
sacrifices had ·won . " 21 Pennsylvanian William D . "Pig-Iron" Kelly , who
had been among the first congressmen to whom Johnson attempted to deny
use of the patronage , 22 made his remarks even more pointed .
Possessed by the thought of the Presidency and the possible
perpetuation of his power , there stood between him
and the
position in which it would take but his own selfish interest to
persuade him that the perpetuation of his power was essential
to the life of the nation , but one life , that of Abraham Lincoln ,
and that life , a few days after Mr . Johnson was inaugurated as
the President ' s constitutional successor , violence removed
. . . 11 2 3
•

•

•

.

Whipped to a feverish frenzy by two days of debates which were
punctuated by a weekend of restless activity , the House voted on Monday ,
February 24 , to impeach the president . The count was 126 to 4 7 with
every Republican present voting for and every Democrat against the
action . 2 4 The Radical majority had managed to convince itself of the
rightness of its cause and , in the minds of these men , there could be but
one conclusion to the matter .

Cried Boutwe+l prior to the vote :

I cannot speak of the Senate , but by the House of Representa
tives and by the country such demonstrations have already been
made as must satisfy us that there is no question as to what

21Ib �. d .

__ ,

139 0 .

2�cKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 383 .
23Cong. Globe , 40 Cong. , 2 seas . , 1347 .
2 4 Ibid . , 1400 ; Dewitt , Impeachment and Trial , 373 .
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the j udgment of the House is to be here and now , or that that
judgment is finally to -be sustained by the judgment of the
Senate . 2 5
Official impeachment articles were adopted by the House on March
2 and 3 .

Nine of the eleven accusations dealt either directly or indir-

ectly with the president ' s attempt to remove Stanton from office and to
replace him with Lorenzo Thomas ad interim , labelling this effort a "high
misdemeanor" and/or "high crime . "

The tenth article , one o-r Ben Butler ' s

pet proj ects , cited several statements made by the chief executive during
his 1866 "swing around the circle , " charging that those remarks were intended to "bring into di sgrace , ridicule , hatred , contempt , and reproach
the Congres s " and calling them a "high mis demeanor . "

Article

XI

was a

cat ch-all device which in abbreviated form rehashed most of the charges
made in the first ten articles .

26

Even as the Hous e carried its case be-rore the Senate , and the
trial entered its initial stages , both friendly and unfriendly sources
suggested that the president use his official patronage to kill the impeachment drive .

An old Tennes see friend and associate , Colonel Edmund

Cooper , could not understand why the chief executive re fused t o avail
hims elf of this possible way of salvation .

Some Radical senators inti-

mated that sagacious changes in the cabinet might prevent convi ction .
25

Cong . Globe , 40 Cong . , 2 ses s . , App . 16 0 . This dis cussion of
the proceedings in the House leading to Johnson ' s impeachment is based
upon Dewitt , Impeachment and Trial , 359-73 .
26
The complete text of each of the eleven impeachment arti cles
may be . found in Senate , Trial , I , 6-10 . The seven men who were to manage
the House ' s case before the Senate were elected on March 2 : Butler ,
Stevens , Bingham, Boutwell , Logan , James F . Wilson of Iowa , and Pennsyl
vanian Thomas Williams . Ibid. , 4 .
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The chief magistrate , however , remained unmoved.
acquittal .

He would not buy

27

When the impeachment trial finally did get under way late in
March , Ben But ler , in making the opening argument for the House , immediately moved t o broaden the scope of the case consi derably when he de
clared the "plain and inevitable issue" to be nothing less than whether
the president "without any re straint whatever" had the right t o remove
or suspend indefinitely from their positions execut ive officers and to
replace them with " creatures of his own appointment . "

28

However , when

the time c ame for the president ' s counsel to make it s opening stat ement ,
Benj amin Curtis , speaking on behalf of his colleagues , reminded those
assembled that the only charges for which the chief executive was on
With them in question ,

trial were those expressed in the eleven articles .

he then narrowed the situation to one all-important considerat ion :
Now , there is a question involved here .
That question
is , whether Mr . Stanton ' s case comes under the tenure-of-office
act . If it does not , if the true constructi on and effect of the
tenure-of-office act when applied to the facts of his case ex
cludes it , then it will be found by honorable senat ors
that a mortal wound has been inflicted upon them by that deci
s ion . 2 9
•

•

•

•

27
Milt on , Age of Hate , 527-28 , 533 ; St . George L . Sioussat ( ed . ) ,
"Notes of Colonel W . G . Moore , Private Secretary to President Johnson ,
1866-1868 , " American Histori cal Review , XIX ( Oct ober , 1913 ) , 125-26 ,
129 .
28
Senate , Trial , I , 96 .
29

Ibid . , 378 . The president ' s counsel was composed of Curtis ,
a former Uri'ited States Supreme Court justice , prominent New York att orney
William M . Evarts , who was destined to do the bulk of the work for the
defense , Henry St anbery , recently res igned as attorney-general in order
to devote full t ime to the case , Ohio lawyer William S . Groesbeck , and
Judge Thomas A . R . Nelson , a Greenville native who was Johnson ' s personal
selection .
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Curtis ' s remarks indicated the line of defense the president ' s
counsel intended to pursue , and Butler , in the course of his opening
statement , had tried to anticipate the defense ' s cas e in this connection .
He first attempted to show that Stanton was covered by the Tenure Act ,
arguing that the term that Johnson was serving was in reality that of
Lincoln :
Whose presidential term is the respondent [ Johnson ] now
serving out ? His own , or Mr . Lincoln ' s ? If his own , he i s
ent itled t o four years up to the anniversary o f the murder , be
cause each presidential term is four years by the Constitution .
II

He further contended that , if Stanton were not covered by the law , hi s
commiss ion had expired either one month after March 4 , 1865 , or if the
act were not retroactive , on March 2 , 1867 .

In either case , the presi-

dent , by not commissioning the secretary in accordance with the provisions of the Tenure Act , had violated that law and was thereby "guilty
of a high misdemeanor . "

30

Having attempted to prove the chief magistrate guilty regardless
of Stanton ' s legal status , Butler then proceeded to indicat e that the
president already had recognized the validity of the Tenure Act by act ing
under its provis ions .

He recalled that initially Johnson had suspended

Stanton and later had informed the Senate of this action and his reasons
for having made such a move .

By adopting this course , Butler contended

that the chief executive had followed the procedures outlined by the

30

Ib J._.
' d ' 102- 3 .
__
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measure in question and thereby had estopped himself from questioning
the law ' s validity . 3l
In his statement , Curtis wasted no time in replying to these
contentions .

He ridiculed the manager ' s play upon the word "term. "

Maintaining that the period of four years was a conditional rather thaQ
absolute limit assigned by the Constitution , he contended that Lincoln ' s
death had ended his tenure in office and launched the vice-president
upon his own term.

There was

no more . propriety
in calling the .time during which Mr .
Johnson holds the office of President
a ·part of Mr . Lin
coln ' s term, than there would be propriety in saying that one
sovereign who succeeded to another sovereign by death holds a
part of his predecessor ' s term. 32
•

•

•

•

•

•

Turning his attention directly to Stanton ' s right to hold his
position under the Tenure Act , Curtis reminded the senators that there
had been considerable debate in the Senate at the time of that measure ' s
passage as t o whether the provisions covered the holdovers from Lincoln ' s
cabinet .

He . carefully noted that one of the members of the j oint commit-

tee which had worked on the law had reported that such was not the case .
"And now I ask the Senate ," continued the defense attorney , "

.

•

•

whether

it is possible to hold that Mr . Stanton ' s case is within the scope of
that tenure-of-office act? I submit it is not possible . " 33

31Ibid . , 103 .
32Ibid . , 379 .
33 Ibid . , 3 82 . The senator to whom Curtis referred was John
Sherman , who later would adjudge the president to be guilty as charged
of violating the law. For his reasoning , see ibid . , III , 3-16 .
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After devoting some time to showing that the president had the
right of removal based upon precedents dating from the legislative action
of 1789 , 34 Curtis turned his attention to the question of estoppel and
quickly demolished that point . Contending that the president ' s actions
in suspending Stanton and reporting to the Senate had been done to prevent a collision with the law if at all possible , he ridiculed the idea
of an estoppel in this case at any rate :
That the President of the United States should be impeached
and removed from office , not by reason of the truth of his case ,
but because he is estopped from telling it , would be a spectacle
for gods and men . Undoubtedly it would have a place in history
which it is not necessary for me to attempt to foreshadow. 3 5
Excluding intermissions , the time which expired between Butler ' s
opening argument and the end of testimony was only sixteen days . During
this time , all of the articles were given considerable airing and both
sides went to great lengths to produce evidence that the president both
could and had or had not used his removal powers excessively . 36 Still ,
in the final analysis , as the time for closing arguments came around ,
the central question remained as Curtis had posed it at the beginning-34After referring to the congressional debates and subsequent
action taken by Congress in 1789 , Curtis declared, "Now , it is a rule
long settled
that when such contemporary exposition has been made
of a law , and it has been followed by an · actual and practical construc 
tion in accordance with that contemporary exposition , continued during
a long period of time and applied to great numbers of cases , it is after
ward too late to call in question the correctness of such a construction . "
Ibid . , I , 388 .
35 Ibid . , 394-96 .
•

•

•

36Any perusal of Senate , Trial , I , reveals numerous charts , lists ,
documents , etc . , purporting to help prove either one contention or the
other as noted and to show that Stanton ' s case either was or was not
unique .
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whether Stanton was covered by the provisions of the Tenure of Office
Act . As they had done throughout the course of the trial , the House
managers contended that he was . 37 Clinging to Butler ' s reasoning set
forth in the opening argument , they insisted that Johnson was filling
out Lincoln ' s term and not his own and that Stanton , therefore , as
Lincoln ' s appointee , was covered by the law. Manager Boutwell put it
simply :
It was not a new office ; it was not a new term. He succeeded
to Mr . Lincoln ' s office , and for the remainder of Mr . Lincoln ' s
term of office . He is serving out Mr . Lincoln ' s term as Presi
dent . The law says that the Secretaries shall hold their offi
ces respectively for and during the term of the President by
Mr . Stailton was
whom they may have been appointe� .
appointed by Mr·. Lincoln .
3
•

.

•

•

•

•

In replying to the managers ' argument , the defense counsels took
several different stands . Nelson was content to refer his listeners to
the views expressed by Curtis in the opening argument . 39 Groesbeck ,
while likewise contending that Johnson was serving his own term, added
the novel thought that , even if it were Lincoln ' s term, Stanton was a
holdover from that president ' s previous term and that he both could and
would have removed the secretary during the present term. 40 Stanbery
agreed with his colleague :

"Mr .

Stanton never had

any

tenure of office

37Four managers spoke in closing arguments : Boutwell , Williams ,
Stevens , and Bingham. In addition , Logan , acting under a privilege voted
by the Senate , filed a statement .
3 8senate , Trial , II , 9 3 . For the statements of other managers ,
see ibid. , 49 , 221-22 � 236 , 4 5 0-5 1 .
40�· , 194 .
39 Ibid. , 172 .
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under the tenure-of-office act for the current presidential ter.m , never
having been appointed for that ter.m by either Mr . Lincoln or Mr . Johnson . "
As had Curtis , Evarts reminded the senators that , at the time of the

Tenure Act ' s passage , the explanation had been given to the Senate that
cabinet members such as Stanton were not meant to be included in the
measure .

This point had been made with no c ontradiction at that time

amid an atmosphere of seeming agreement

•

The defense counsel then chided

his senatorial audience :
And I would like to know who it is in thi s honorable Senate
that will bear the i s sue of the scrutiny , of the revising people
of the United States on a removal from office of the Pres ident
for his removal of an officer that the Senate has thus d�clared
not to be within the protection of the civil-tenure act . 4 2
·

At the outset of the trial , manager Butler had declared the maj or
issue to be a scrutiny of the entire matter of the right of the president
to remove execut ive officers from their respective positions .
his fellow managers gave considerable attention to this facet .

In closing ,
In con-

sidering the spectacle of a president able to make removals at will ,
Logan demanded :

"If the Congress of the United States has no right

•

to fix the tenure to certain offices , and exercise their j oint authority
in appointments as well as removals from offi ce , what restri ction i s
there on the President ' s power? "

43

Also striking at the idea . of tenure ,

at the pleasure of the chief executive , Boutwell could not bring himself
to believe that the framers of the Constitution would have given the

41

Ib_
.d '
_
J._.

43

Ib_
"d '
_
J._.

3 69 .
42 .

41

president power "to corrupt the civi l , military , and naval officers of
the country by rendering them absolutely dependent for their positions
and emolument s upon his will . u

44

The other managers vigorously contended

that , while precedent had allowed the chief magistrate to make removals
as he willed in the past , the Tenure of Offi ce Act had changed that situation .

Williams called the past practi ce one that had grown out of "an

early and erroneous construction" of the Constitution .

45

"All the acts

from 1789 down to 1867 bear witness of one thing , " urged Bingham , " and
that is that the C ongress of the United States have fUll power under the
Constitution by law t o confer upon the President the power of temporary
or permanent removal or withhold it . "

46

Congres s had pas sed a law on

March 2 , 1867 , and , regardless of past practice , it was the president ' s
duty to abide by that law .
this point .

Both Bingham and Stevens were adamant on

47

In reply t o the s e argument s , Johnson ' s defense attorneys c ited
the precedents that had developed during the almost eighty years since
1789 .

They asserted that Congress now had no constitut ional right t o

change the s ituat i on .

" I thus present to you , " declared Nelson , "what

I may c all an unbroken current of authority in favor of the proposition
that not only the civil-tenure bill is unconstitutional , but that the
President had the right to remove from offi ce . "

44

Ibid . ' 80 .

45

.
Ibid . , 236 .

48

46

The important question

Ibid . , 442 .

47
Almost all of Bingham' s lengthy speech was built around thi s
point . For representative comments by Stevens , see ibid . , 223 .
48

Ibid . , 162 .
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to Groesbeck was ,
Is this Senate prepared to drag a President in here and
convict him of crime because he believed as every other Presi
dent believed , as the Supreme Court bel� eved , as thirty-eight
of the thirty-nine Congresses believed? 9
Evarts charged that Congress , unable to find "adequate support for the
pretension that the Senate could claim a share in the distinct act of
removal , " deliberately changed the law to its advantage . 5 0 Stanbery made
it clear that he believed that the chief executive had the constitutional
power to remove Stanton .

"Whenever there is an unfaithful or improper

officer , " asserted the former attorney-general , "the President of the
United States has not only the power but it is his duty to remove him. " 51
Nothing short of a constitutional amendment could alter that situation . 52
As

is well known , the attempt to convict Andrew Johnson of the

impeachment charges lodged against him failed by one vote . All of the
thirty-five senators who voted "guilty" were Republicans .

Of the nine-

teen "not guilty" verdicts , twelve had been certain from the outset-nine held by the only Democrats in the Senate and three possessed by the
conservative-oriented Dixon , Doolittle , and Daniel Norton.

The remaining

seven were cast by heretofore accepted Republicans who braved the wrath
of their colleagues to cast their ballots for acquitta1 . 53
Those senators who desired to do so were allowed to file opinions
explaining why they voted as they did. Most of the thirty-five men who
.

'

·-

49 Ibid . ' 206 .
51 Ibid . ' 3 81 .

5 0Ib J.' d

310 .

52Ib J.' d

382 .

__. '

__. '

53The seven were Fessenden (Maine ) , Joseph S . Fowler (Tennessee ) ,
James W. Grimes ( Iowa ) , John B . Henderson (Missouri ) , Edmund Ross {Kansas ) ,
Trumbull ( Iilinois ) , and Peter Van Winkle (West Virginia) .
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voted against the chief executive apparently had made their decisions to
do so prior to the trial , and those filing opinions therefore expressed
such views t oward the patronage powers of the president in general and
the Tenure Act in part icular as could be expected .

Concerning the latter

topi c , the accepted view was that which had been advanced in the Hous e ' s
case--Stanton was within that measure , it was the law of the land , and
the pres ident , by violating it , was guilty as charged .

54

In a somewhat

different approach , Senator Howe of Wisconsin conceded that the war minister was not within the provisions of the act , but at the same t ime he
asserted his belief that Johnson ' s attempt to remove him was "an abuse
of authority" and as such constituted an impeachable offence .

"To remove

a good man from office and to replace him with a bad man , " he stated,
"s eems t o me an offence against the public interest s , which , if it go
unrebuked , will excuse any pos sible offence that leaves the President
outs ide of a penitent iary . "

55

In addit ion t o finding the president guilty o f an impeachable
crime in his dealings with Stanton and to denouncing the idea that he
alone posses sed the ri ght of remova1 ,

56

a few senators elected to criti-

cize the chief execut ive ' s us e of the patronage in general .

Massachusett s ' s

54

For examples of this view , see the opinions of Senators Howard ,
Yates , Stewart , Sumner , and Williams , in Senate , Trial , III , 38-39 ,
104-6 , 152- 5 3 , 261-6 3 , 348-49 .
55

Ibi d . ' 69 ' 72 .

56
For some representative views on thi s latter point see the com
ment s of Senators Howe , Justin S . Morrill , St ewart , and Harlan . Ibid . ,
6 4-65 , 137 , 152-53 , 233 .
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two Senators were most vindictive .

"To defeat the will of the people ,"

cried Henry Wilson , "the President , in the interest of disloyalty , inequality , and injustice , sought to use the corrupt and corrupting influ
ences of executive patronage . "

57

Charging in effect that the president

during the period of executive reconstruction in the South had turned
public offices there over to rebels and traitors ,

58

Charles Sumner also

lashed out at other aspects of the chief magistrat e ' s us e of the patronage system,
The power of removal
was seized as an engine of tyranny
and openly employed t o maintain his wi cked purposes by the sacri
fice of good citi zens who would not consent to be his tools . In
competent and dishonest creatures , whose only recommendation was
59
that they echoed his voice , were appointed to office
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Among those senators who chose t o vote for the chief executive ' s
acquitt al , there was a tendency to think alike .

Almost all of them cited

the precedents upon which the president ' s removal power was based , but
at the same t ime they tended to fight shy of the idea that the Tenure
Act was unconstitut ional , as Johnson ' s defens e had maintained .

There

was almost unanimous agreement , however , that Stanton was excluded from
that measure .

Ten of the nineteen men chose to file opinions , and of

thes e only Van Winkle , one of the seven "recusant senators , " failed t o
concur o n this point .

57

Ibi d. ' 217 .

60

I n agreeing that Stanton was excluded from the

58

Ibid . ' 257-58 .

59

Ibid . ' 258 .

6°
For aspect s of Van Winkle ' s argument , see ibi d . , 147 . For the
nine others , see ibid . , 20-21 ( Fessenden ) , 52-53 (Johnson ) , 118 ( George
Vickers ) , 170 ( Gar;e-tt Davi s ) , 196 (Fowler ) , 2 44 (Doolittle ) , 301- 2
( Henderson ) , 321-22 (Trumbull ) , 331-33 ( Grimes ) .
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Tenure Act , Doolittle commented, "I think that opinion will command the
assent of nine-tenths of the legal profession of the whole country . "

61

While intending to us e the Tenure of Offi ce Act to deny the president
the us e of the patronage system , the . Radicals had left this one small
loophole and then compounded their mistake by trying to build an impeachment case around it .

This error allowed Andrew Johnson to avoi d becoming

the first and only American pres ident to be removed from office for high
crimes and misdemeanors .
Sensing the failure of the impeachment effort even before the
final vote was taken , the New York Times gave an apprais al of the situation with whi ch succeeding generations have generally agreed .

Pushing

the point that impeachment had been urged upon the . Republi can party by
its extremist element , the Times declared that that effort had been "the
reckless device of the Radical s ection of that party , intended to put
the patronage of the Nation into its hands and t o give it the absolute
and complete control of the Republican sentiment and the policy of the
62

country . "

Denied final success in their effort and foreseeing new

possibilities with the coming of Grant to the presidential offi ce , the
Radicals were content to allow Johnson to rid himself of Stanton .

61

Ibid . , 2 4 4 .

62
Editorial , New York Times , May 13 , 1968 .
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then pas sed his last few months in offi ce in relative peace , although
the Senate continued to reject some of his nominations .

63

63
on April 24 , Johnson had submitted to the Senate the name of
Brevet Maj or General John M . Schofield , the former First District com
mander , as his nominee for the pos ition of secretary of war . This move
apparently was encouraged by Evarts , who saw the nomination of the moder
ate Schofield as a way to assure Republican moderates that , i f they
voted for Johnson ' s acquittal , the president would not seek revenge upon
the Radicals . Jam�s Lee McDonough and William T . Alderson , "Republican
Politics and the Impeachment of Andrew Johns on , " Tennes see Historical
Quarter].y , XXV I ( Summe r , 1967 ) , 177-83 . Schofield subsequently was
accepted by the Senate for the secretaryship . That body als o accepted
Evarts as the new attorney-general after rejecting Johnson ' s renomination
of Stanbery . Milton , Age of Hate , 634 .

CHAPTER VII

IN SEARCH OF A POLICY

In attempting t o understand Andrew Johnson ' s use of the patronage ,
there is a strong temptation to agree with one writer who , whi le. studying
another aspect of the era , at one point exclaimed in exasperat ion that
" searching for the motives that impelled Andrew Johnson is at times like
s earching for a propulsion mechanism in a fogbank. . "

1

That s earch can be

somewhat les s difficult , however , i f two terms as· they related to the
s eventeenth pres i dent are kept firmly in mind :

democracy (both in the

party and historic sense ) and individualism.
During the course of the impeachment trial , Thaddeus Stevens
presented a theme whi ch was repeated both before and after that t ime :
betrayal of the Republican party .

"After the death of Mr . Lincoln , "

asserted the House manager , "Andrew Johnson had changed his whole code
of politi cs and policy , and instead of obeying the will of those who put
him into power , he determined to create a party for hims elf , t o carry
out his

own

ambitious purposes . "

2

Such statements as this one were based

upon a questionable assumption , namely , that Johnson owed allegiance to
the Republican party and was obliged to work within its organizat ion .

1

Sefton , � and Reconstruction , 117 .

2

3

Senate , Trial , II , 228-29 .

3

one recent s cholar seemed to be adopting much the s ame line of
reasoning when he declared that one of the purposes of his work was to
show how Andrew Johnson "threw away his own power
as party leader . "
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 14 .
•

155

•

•
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Yet the fact stands that he was not a Republican , had never been a
Republic an , and never claimed to be a Republi can , not even in 1864 when
he was selected as Lincoln ' s running-mate on the National Union {not
Republi c an ) t i cket .

"Who i s the President o f the United States ? , "

thundered T . A . R . Nelson during the 1868 trial :
A democrat of the straightest of strict construct ionists ; an
old Jacksonian , Jeffersonian democrat ; a man who proclaimed his
democracy in the very letter of acceptance which he wrote at the
time when he was nominated for the Vice-Presidency ; a man who
told you· and who told the whole country in that letter that he
4
was a democrat
•

•

•

•

Nelson was right .

The is sue of seces sion had forced Andrew

Johnson to part company with the bulk of hi s party in . l860-61 and , as a
senator and military governor , he had stood strong f'or the Union throughout the course of the war .

He remained at heart , however , a Democrat

and at the . war ' s end he was ready to forgive and forget .and t o get on
with politics as usual .

The problem was that the divisions caused by

the war had sapped greatly the strength of the Democrat i c organization ,
and the one sure way t o revive it was to get the s outhern states , the
traditi onal stronghold of the Democracy , restored to the Union as " quickly
as pos sible .

For that reason , perhaps the Radi cal charges that the aim

of presidential reconstruction was t o do just that should not be dismis sed as lightly as some pro-Johnson historians have tended to do .
Remember�ng Nelson ' s point that Johnson was a Democrat of the
Jacksonian persuasion goes a long way in explaining those changes in

4

senate , Trial ,

II ,

123 .
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officeholding
president .

whi ch he did make , or at least attempted to make , while

If he indeed was working on the as sumption of resuming politi-

cal practices as they had been before the war , patronage changes were to
be expected .

Perhaps then his often quoted remarks about kicking out

officeholders which were made at Cleveland and St . Louis during the famous " swing around the circle " have been viewed in the wrong light .
Rather than looking at them solely in the context of the Radical- Conservative struggle than taking place , they should be seen in the way
Johnson explained them at the time .
for four or five years or more .

Here were men who had been in office

Under the Jacksonian standards to which

Johnson subscribed , they had enj oyed the emoluments of office long enough
and others now should have the same chance .

Of course , the times were

not normal and Radical politicians were astonished that the chief executive should try to turn out of office men . of proven Union and party
loyalty .

What did not occur to them was that he might be acting under

another set of values and that they should be surprised not that he was
attempting to bring about changes among officeholders but rather that he
was not seeking to make more changes than he did .

Only consideration of

the special political conditions created by the immediate postwar situation which presented few viable alternatives probably kept him from
adopting a more proscriptive patronage policy .

5

5

one reconstruction historian has accused Johnson of practicing
"the politics of nostalgia . " He contends that the president was living
in a static . world in which the ideas of Jefferson and Jackson were suffi
cient guides and the Democratic party was still the best one to lead the
nation . Stampp , Era of Reconstruction , 5 4 . For comments on Johnson ' s
Jacksonian convictions , see Chapter II .
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Johnson ' s patronage moves , as well as his actions in other areas ,
cannot be explained by saying simply that he was a Democrat in the party
sense .

He also believed in historic democracy , a phenomenon that calls

for faith in the people , believing that they will express their wishes
through the voice of the maj ority and that that voice will be saying
what is .best for the society as a whole .

Andrew Johnson had that faith

and it helped dictate his actions throughout his political career .
As ·was noted in an earlier chapter , Johnson at times worked outside the bounds of the Democratic party .

The reason was that he so

identified himself with the people that he , like Jackson , tended to
equate his aims and desires with those of the people and thus with
democracy .

If the result then ran counter to what the other Democratic

party leaders wanted , he simply took his case to the people in the belief that they would sustain him .

During his early political career ,

this concern for what he felt the people wanted helped him to build an
eager following , first among the Democrat s of Greene County and then
those of the First Congressional District .

6

These people apparently

tended to view him as the Democratic party and vice versa .

In .the 1 8 50 ' s ,

he was suc ces sful in transferring this concept to the state level and thus
became the gubernatorial candidate of the rank-and-file of the party in
opposit ion to the designs of the party leaders .

7

It was only natural

6

Temple , Notable Men , 369 , 371 ; Graf and Haskins , Johnson Papers ,
I , xxvii .
7

For details , see Abernethy , From Frontier to Plantat ion , 314-16 .
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therefore that in early 1861 he should take the attitude that the only
way to save Tennessee for the Union was to build a following around him
self and he used Lincoln ' s patronage ac cordingly .

There was little in

his subsequent actions as military governor to indi cate that he underwent
any fundamental change in heart immediately prior to becoming president .
It was then with carefully cultivated prior notions that Andrew
Johnson as cended to the presidency in 186 5 .

Within twelve months , he

found his program stalled and , as he had done many times in Tennessee
politics , he turned to the people to sustain him.

Because . needed support

on several occasions had been rallied by building an organization centered
around himself , he was not averse to the idea of the National Union move
ment when it was developed by his adherents .
While encouraging the National Union effort , Johnson soon
bewildered his followers by refusing to use the one weapon which they
considered vital to building a party to sustain him, the federal patron
age .

Thi·s bafflement led both friend and foe , both then and later , to

charge him with a fatal procrastination or constitutional inaction .
Those who did so , however , were probably greatly underestimating him .
It never occurred to them that he simply might comprehend some things
which his supporters did not

•

The problems presented by use of the

patronage system to build a new party were of such magnitude that any
possible advantage that could be gained was more than offset by the evil
consequences caused by turning large numbers of people out of office in
an electi on year .

No more than Tennessee had been saved for the Union

in 1861 by the massive application of federal patronage could the North
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have been won for Andrew Johnson in 1866 by the same means .

He

apparently sensed this fact and the general proscription whi ch many of
his followers so vociferously wanted did not take place .

Such tampering

with the system as did occur largely ceased after the desires of the
people had been voiced through the 1 866 balloting .
Andrew Johnson ' s democracy was not the only thing which directed
his presidential activities .

Indeed , perhaps his political convictions

were net as important in determining his course of action as was the
fact that he was very decidedly an individualist .

The nineteenth century

abounded in examples . of the rugged individualism to which so many Ameri�
can politi cians in this twentieth century still pay lip-service .

B,y

virtue of the plebeian background of which he was so proud and his many
s ided personality , the seventeenth president was a prime example .
What were some of the characteristics of his personality?
Honesty , integrity , courage , and singleness of purpose have been empha
s ized by his friends .

Egotism , obstinacy , and bull-headedness have been

the terms with which his detractors have replied .

Yet , to attempt to

isolate and present one set of attitudes or the . other would be doing
Andrew Johnson a disservice because he was a complex person who on occa
sion manifested all of these traits .
The decisively pro-Union speeches of a southern senator in 1 86061 , the activities of a military governor in often hostile surroundings
between 1862 and 1865 , a willingness to run the risk of impeachment in
an attempt to test the constitutionality of a questionable law , an un
ruffled , business-as-usual attitude while on trial--such things as these

16 1
bore testimony to Johnson ' s political courage .

Devotion to the Consti

tution and to the Union of all the states was the guiding principle of
his presidential administration .

Honesty and integrity were the hallmarks

of his dealings with the people who came into contact with him.
To identify honesty and integrity prominently with Andrew Johnson
is to run the risk of sounding suspiciously like a Stryker or Winston .
There is much about his patronage activities , however , that can satisfac
torily be . explained only in the light of these admirable qualities .
Johnson was an open and avowed Democrat who had been placed in the second
spot on what proved to be a successful coalition ( National Union ) ticket .
The Republican who had headed that ballot suddenly lost his life shortly
after taking office , thus making Johnson the nominal head of an organi
zation whi ch .had as its other prominent leaders Republicans who were , or
increasingly became , of Radical persuasion .
as

All went well at first , but

the complexities of the reconstruction situation began to assert them

selves , he found himself more and more out of step with the Radicals .
In 1 866 , an abortive attempt was made to build a thi�d party centered
around him.

What feasible alternative then was left ?

The logical answer

obviously would have been to turn to his old party and use the executive
patronage at his command to increase that party ' s influence on the
national level .
to do s o .

The Democratic leaders both expected and implored him

Yet , he steadfastly refused t o make such a move , and this

� action or inaction probably cost him the Democratic presidential nod in

16 2
1 86 8 .

8

What political practicality dictated, honesty and integrity

prevented .

The 1 864 Democratic national slate of candidates had been

rej ected by the voters .

Although Johnson himself was a Democrat , he

had not been elected to office as such , and he therefore would not conduct
himself as a Democratic president .
Because the president possessed these commendable qualities and
conducted his activities accordingly , he made the rather fallacious
assumption that those with whom he dealt also had them .

This attitude

caused him to hesitate about asking for the resignations of cabinet members who had deserted to the Radical cause but had not openly declared
such sentiments to him.

It also led him to turn a deaf ear to the char-

ges of corruption in office that began to be heard in the latter part
of his administration .
One of the characteristics of U . S . Grant ' s administration was
corruption in public office .

What sometimes is overlooked is the fact

that some of the scandals which came to light in the Grant era partially
developed during the Johnson administration .

A particularly noteworthy

example was the notorious whiskey frauds which became fUlly evident
during Grant ' s time .

Reports of such activities were circulating openly

at least as early as 186 8 .

In taking note of a congressional report

citing corruption in the collection of taxes from whiskey sales , the New

8

The New York Times , prior to the Democratic convention , s aw
little chance for Johnson to secure the nomination . The reason was sim
ple : " He has never surrendered the patronage of his offi ce to the con
trol of the party . He has never made its leaders his special advisers
or allowed .them to dictate either his policy or his action . " Editorial ,
New York Times , June 2 4 , 1 86 8 .
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York Tribune in an undoubtedly partisan attack , charged "The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue , the Secretary of the Treasury , have repeatedly urged
the dismissal of dishonest revenue officers , but the President protects
them. "

9

In discussing the activities of the so-called "whiskey ring" in

particular and corruption in general , the Times pointed to a powerful
lobby present in Washington with the purpose of securing appointments .
Asserted that organ :
We do not · suppose the President is ever cons ciously influ
enced by these men , but it is a fact which must be admitted that
the business of office brokerage has increased to a shameful
extent during President Johnson ' s administration . And it must
also be acknowledged that the men who engage in it are frequent
ers of the White House , and do have , or profess to have , inter
views with the President on the subJ ect of appointments to '
office . lO
No one who has made a detailed study of . Johnson ' s life can maintain that
he was corrupt or that he knowingly would help corruption prosper .

The

evidence of offi cial infidelity cannot properly be laid at his doorstep
or even perhaps at those of his immediate advisers , but his obvious lack
of knowledge and experience with the conduct of patronage on the national
level undoubtedly permitted persons of questionable character to gain
publi c offi ce in 1 86 5 and 1 866 and helped pave the way for later frauds .
Courage , singleness of purpose , honesty and int�grity constituted

9

Editorial , New York Tribune , March 13 , 1 86 8 . Rumors concerning
the existence of a "whiskey ring" actually had been circulating since
the last years of the Lincoln administration . Patrick
, Reconstruction ,
.
1 88 .
10

Editorial , New York Times , June 27 , 186 8 . There apparently was
a great deal of pardon brokerage in the aftermath of Johnson ' s 1 86 5
amnesty proclamation , but evidence to support the Times charge of office
brokerage is scanty .
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one aspect of Johnson ' s individuality , but there was the other side .

An

inordinate pride in his own background led to a tendency toward great
self-esteem.

This egotism was evident in his absolute confidence that

he was right and Congress was wrong about reconstruction .

It can be

seen on the patronage level in the offi cial advisers with whom he sur�
rounded himself .

The holdovers from Lincoln ' s cabinet for whom he dis-

played the greatest personal affection , Welles and Seward , tended almost
always to agree with him.

The men whom he brought into his cabinet in

1866 had shown an unswerving loyalty toward him and would say only what
he wanted to hear .

One key consideration concerning his desire to replace

Stanton was that the secretary was unwilling to follow his lead on the
maj or issue of the day .
Johnson ' s obstinacy and bull-headedness encourages the conclusion
that some of his actions can be explained only as having been dictated
11
by " simple cussedness . "

Certainly , many of his exasperated followers

must have felt inclined toward such a theory to explain why he refused
to use the patronage in 1866 .

The Democratic leaders probably felt that

was the only explanation that could be offered for his refusal to surrender the system to them in the latter part of his term of offi ce .

It ·

seems to be about the only thing to say about his determination to

11
This term . was the only explanation one . historian could find
to explain why Johnson would ask Congress in December , 1867 , publicly
to commend General Hancock for having is sued an order in the Fitth .Dis
trict declaring that the civil government was supreme over the military ,
an attitude directly opposite to the one expressed by the second supple
mentary reconstruction act . McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 499-500 .

16 5
rid himself of Stanton despite the advice of almost all of those close
to him.
After the Senate reinstated the secretary to his position in
January , 1 86 8 , Grant returned the office to him.

This action left him

in pos session of the official place of the secretary of war in the War
Department building but of little else .

He dared not · attend cabinet

meetings , and he could not function properly wit�out presidential recog
nition of his status .

Yet , simply his physical possession of the war

minister ' s offices seemed to infuriate Johnson and made him determined
to do something about it .

To do s o , he had to defy the Tenure of Office

Act and the Senate ' s official January action , whi ch he did .

I n the

ensuing drama of his impeachment and trial , he had on his side precedent ;
the House had law .

In this context , the latter had the better part of

it , but the president es caped conviction because a sufficient number of
senators were unable to bring themselves to believe that the provision
covering the cabinet could be extended to Stanton and the other Lincoln
holdovers .

Stanton then was forced to quit his position and that one

fact might have been to Johnson the most satisfying part of the whole
affair .
In viewing Johnson ' s patronage activities

as

a whole , it must be

concluded that his policy was pragmatic and variable rather than con
crete and definite .

Decis ions apparently were made on the demands of

the immediate situation and of the case in question rather than in line
with a defined policy .

The president ' s own political position and strong

individualistic turn dictated this stance .

A Jacksonian Democrat by
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political persuasion , the to-be-expected impulse to practice rotation
in offi ce was thwarted by the unusual political circumstances following
the war in whi ch one party was seriously weakened because of its compromising stand during that conflict , and the other was united in the desire
to extract guarantees before the situation was returned to normal .

Pre-

vented by his own honesty and integrity from giving patronage aid to the
Democratic party , his unwillingness or inability to compromise with the
Radical wing of the Republican party drove him into an increasingly isolated position .

This self-imposed isolation was des cribed by the New

York Times shortly after his acquittal :
He has been in the main independent of all outside dictation
and advice ; probably we have never had in this country before ,
a Pres ident who deterred to the opinions of others so little ,
and who had such unconquerable faith in his own , as Mr . Johnson . l2
Andrew Johnson probably was not displeased with this evaluation of his
presidential career .

12

Editorial , New York Times , June 2 4 , 1 868 .
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APPENDIX

TABLE I
REMOVALS UNDER JOHNSON , 1 866-186 7

Ministers , etc .
Secretaries of Legations
Consuls
Attorneys
Marshals
Collectors of Customs
Surveyors of CUstoms
Naval Officers
Appraisers of Merchandise
Inspectors of Steamships
General Land Office
Surveyor-General
Registers of Land Offices
Receivers of Public Monies
Territorial Officials
Indian Agents , etc .
Treasury & Mint Officials
Pension Agents
Internal Revenue As ses sors
Internal Revenue Collectors
Postmasters
D . C . Officials
Commissioners of Agriculture
TOTALS

2
1
8
2
3
10
9
2
2
2

1

1
1

19

1

71

1
9

32 8

75

20

8
3
1
3
2
24
20

4
1

103
92
82
2
1

a

1
3
1

1
1

1
4
1
1

1
1

a

4

6

1
12

91

These figures are based upon the nominating messages received by
the Senate between December 3 , 1866 , and April 20 , 1 86 7 , and thus to a
large degree are reflective of removals. made by Johnson during the course
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TABLE I ( continued )
of the 1866 congressional campaign . The sourc� for . these figures is
the United States Senate Executive Journal , XV, 1-78 4 .
bin some nominating messages , Johnson mentioned the name of the .
person being replaced but did not state the reas on (death , resignation ,
removal , etc . ) for the vacancy .
�is figure should be almost wholly discounted because most of
these persons had only temporary commissions and were probably replace
ments for undesirable assessors /collectors whose proposed successors had
been rej ected by the lame duck Thirty-ninth Congress . Also , several
positions in this group undoubtedly were counted more than once because
of the confu�ed wording of executive messages to the Fortieth Congress
concerning persons in this category . Apparently , each time a replacement
for the temporary appointee was rej ected or withdrawn , the next nominat
ing message , instead of following the normal practice of referring to
the last person nominated and his fate ( rej ected , withdrawn , etc . ) ,
referred to the temporary appointee . For these reasons , this figure is
not a part of the totals given in Chapter III or above .

17 8
TABLE II
SENATE ACTION ON JOHNSON NOMINATIONS ,
DECEMBER 3 , 1866-APRIL 20 , 1 8 67 a

Ministers , et c .
Secretaries of Legations
Consuls
Attorneys
Marshals
Collectors of Customs
Surveyors of Customs
Naval Officers ( incl . Storekeepers )
Appraisers of Merchandise
Inspectors of Steamships
General Land Office
Surveyor-Ge�eral
Registers of Land Offices
Receivers of Public Monies
Territorial Officials
Indian Agents , et c .
Treasury & Mint Offi cials
Pension Agents
Internal Revenue Assessors
Internal Revenue Collectors
Postmasters
D . C . Officials
Others
TOTALS

Confirmed

Rej ected

8
6
70
27
25
36
29
ll
6
4
5
7
34
44
8
25
9
23
115
113
439
15
10

8

2
19
20
8
14
1
20
157
14 8
337
15
4

10 6 9

877

15
19
15
25
32
15
2
1

�hese figures are based upon a personal count of the persons
listed in the index of the United States Executive Journal as having
been nominated for various executive positions . They will not coincide
with those given in Table I because vacancies occurred for many reasons
other than removal ( death , resignation , transfer , et c . ) .
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